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Established firms increasingly engage in the development of a new digital platform to 
capture new growth opportunities presented by digital technologies. Prior research on 
platform strategy has generally examined the process of platform creation in the context 
of established ecosystems. However, less is known about platform strategy development 
in nascent ecosystems. Nascent ecosystems are interdependent networks of firms, in the 
early stage of formation, characterized by a lack of blueprints that define the value 
propositions and the associated structure of governance and interaction. This 
characteristic presents strategic challenges for managers since they must determine the 
platform positioning (i.e. the platform’s technical design and platform scope) under 
extreme ambiguity and uncertainty.  
This thesis aims to understand the dynamics of platform positioning strategies of 
an established firm in a nascent ecosystem by answering two interrelated questions: How 
does an established firm develop platform positioning strategies for a nascent ecosystem? 
and Why the positioning strategies shift over time? These questions are addressed by 
investigating the journey of TELECO, a global telecommunication producer, in 
developing a new digital platform in the nascent Internet of Things ecosystems over a 
period of 9 years.  
I introduce an alternative pathway of platform positioning that consists of three 
distinct platform positioning strategies: (1) Analogous positioning, (2) Expansionary 
Positioning, and (3) Downward positioning. The first strategy entails positioning the 
platform analogous to the firm’s position in its legacy, non-platform ecosystem. This 
strategy is shaped by an Evolutionary strategic frame which entails managers’ belief on 
the continuity between the legacy and the nascent ecosystem. The second positioning 
strategy involves expanding the platform’s position to maximizes potential value creation 
and capture. I find that this strategy is shaped by a Proactive strategic frame which entails 
managers’ belief on the transformative nature of the nascent ecosystem and vision to 
shape the ecosystem’s evolution. The last positioning strategy entails calibrating the 
platform’s position to the point that minimizes contestations and better corresponds with 
the firm’s capabilities limitations. This strategy is shaped by an Adaptive strategic frame 
which entails managers’ belief on the need to adapt to the changing ecosystem dynamic 
and adjust their prior assumptions. Overall, this thesis offers rich theoretical insights into 
the research of platform strategy in nascent ecosystems by explicating the interplay of 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the process of developing platform strategies by an established 
firm in a nascent ecosystem. Advances in digital technology and the rise of platform 
economy encourage firms to pursue growth by developing new digital platforms that 
bring together users and complementors to create novel value propositions (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008; Evans and Gawer, 2016; Cusumano et al., 2019). Digital platform is a 
bundle of digitized resources that serve as a technological foundation where outside 
parties can develop interrelated products or services, and get benefit from the presence of 
the platform’s users and complementors (Tiwana et al., 2010; Gawer, 2014). In the last 
decade, the creation of digital platform becomes a primary option for firms to capture 
opportunities of emerging digital technologies due to the platforms’ ability to enable 
network effects (Rochet and Tirole, 2003), reduce transaction costs (Parker et al., 2016), 
and stimulate innovations (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). The platform phenomenon has 
also attracted considerable scholarly attention which results in a growing body of research 
on platform leadership and innovation (Gawer, 2009; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; 
Cusumano et al., 2019), platform competition (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Cennamo and 
Santaló, 2013; Cennamo, 2019), and platform governance (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; 
Wareham et al., 2014; Hagiu, 2014).  
Research on platform strategy generally draws on the example of established 
ecosystems such as PC (Gawer, 2009; Baldwin and Woodard, 2009), video games (Zhu 
and Iansiti, 2012; Ozalp et al., 2018), mobile phones (Tiwana, 2015; Parker et al., 2017), 
and software system (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014). In established 
ecosystems, the activities, actors, roles, positions, and interactions between actors are 
largely known and relatively stable (Adner, 2017). Therefore, the strategic challenges in 
this setting revolve around achieving a strategic position through network effects 
(McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017), resolving technological design and market trade-offs 
(Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Cennamo, 2018), and governing interactions among users 
and complementors (Wareham et al., 2014). Nevertheless, in the last few years, firms 
increasingly engage in the platform creation in nascent ecosystems to secure a strategic 
position in new markets early on (Anthony et al., 2016; Eggers and Moeen, 2018; Dattee 
et al., 2018). Nascent ecosystems are networks of interdependent firms, which are in the 
early stage and still in the process of formation. Unlike established ecosystems, nascent 
ecosystems are characterized by extreme ambiguity and uncertainty concerning 




Eisenhardt, 2009; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018; Moeen et al., 2020). Nascent ecosystems 
generally lack “ecosystem blueprints” that define the value propositions (i.e. what value 
to create and how) and the associated structure of governances (i.e. who does what and 
who gets what) (Dattee et al., 2018, p.467). These characteristics introduce strategic 
challenges for platform creators that are the focus of this thesis.  
One central decision to be made by platform creators is to determine the platform 
positioning. Platform positioning is at the heart of the platform’s competitive strategy 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). Platform positioning entails 
the choice of technical functionalities (i.e. platform architecture) and the range of markets 
and applications (i.e. platform scope) a platform would address (Cennamo, 2019). The 
positioning strategy is essential because it determines the share of the value created in the 
ecosystem that the focal firm will command (Teece, 2018), and the ability to influence 
the course of the ecosystem evolution (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Extant research 
offers guidelines on determining positioning strategy in an ecosystem. For instance, 
Adner (2006; 2017) suggests performing a thorough analysis of activity configurations 
and interdependence among actors. Other studies emphasize certain market 
characteristics including the heterogeneity level of complementors and customers 
(McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017), customer preferences (Zhu and Iansiti, 2012), and 
competition dynamics (Seamans and Zhu, 2017) as factors that must be considered in 
developing positioning strategy. However, the applicability of these insights is limited 
since in nascent ecosystems the interdependence structure does not yet exist and 
information on market characteristics is ambiguous (Dattee et al., 2018). 
As mentioned earlier, in nascent ecosystems the roles of actors, the system 
activities, value creation, and value distribution are unclear and contested (Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Anthony et al., 2016), which make otherwise simple decisions complex 
and challenging. In this context, a platform creator develops platform positioning strategy 
while the ecosystem is still in flux and with limited understanding regarding which 
platform functionalities are matters and which markets are the most lucrative (Dattee et 
al., 2018). Therefore, the strategy development can be difficult as it requires the creator 
to appeal not only to potential users, but also to complementors that may have divergent 
perspectives about how value should be created, and conflicting interests when it comes 
to value capturing (Ansari et al., 2016; Adner, 2017; Shipilov and Gawer, 2020). 
Established firms face unique challenges in this endeavour since they need to also 
incorporate constraints of their organizational legacy and resource dependencies in their 




Moreover, the inherent ambiguities of nascent ecosystems also create a strategic 
dilemma for a platform creator. For instance, the firm may take a more conservative 
approach by positioning the platform as a specialist for a narrow market niche and then 
incrementally expand as the ecosystem progress (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Snihur et 
al., 2018). While this approach enables evolutionary adjustment (Rindova and Kotha, 
2001), it implies constraining the firm’s choices early (Seamans and Zhu, 2014), which 
minimizes growth opportunity and latitude to influence the ecosystem formation to the 
firm’s advantage. Similarly, the firm may follow a more aggressive ‘get-big-fast’ 
approach to build network effects and secure early domination in multiple strategic 
domains (Eisenmann et al., 2006). Yet, such approach can prematurely lock the firms in 
a suboptimal investment and hamper flexibility to adapt to changing environments 
(Murray and Tripsas, 2004). These risks and dilemmas make the development of platform 
positioning strategy in nascent ecosystems far from straightforward. 
In addition, prior research tends to portray platform positioning strategy as a static 
choice in which once decided the firm marches its resources to scale the platform and to 
occupy the targeted position (e.g. Adner, 2012; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012; Hagiu, 2014). 
Nevertheless, recent research suggests that strategizing for nascent ecosystems entails a 
dynamic process since in nascent ecosystems, changes and development are more likely 
to occur (Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2019). For instance, 
new technological innovations or unanticipated firms’ actions may cause bottlenecks to 
emerge and change the course of the ecosystem evolution (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 
Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018). Similarly, what constitutes a strategic position within a 
nascent ecosystem may likely change since the positions are still up for grabs and 
contested (Ozcan and Santos, 2015). In the context of platform creation, these researches 
imply that the evolving competitive landscape of nascent ecosystems requires a dynamic 
approach to platform positioning strategy. Developing a sustainable platform strategy will 
be difficult since firms are unlikely to withstand their position across different milestones 
of the ecosystem’s evolution (Moeen et al., 2020). Therefore, the main challenge for 
platform creators is to decide which positioning strategy may be more fruitful at a certain 
point in time. However, how firms develop platform positioning strategies in nascent 
ecosystems over time remains to be addressed. 
As noted above, the ambiguous nature of nascent ecosystems makes it difficult for 
decision makers to fully know ex-ante the ecosystem structures and to anticipate all the 
potential changes and the dynamics upfront (Dattee et al., 2018). In this situation, 




strategic decisions (Walsh, 1995). Thus, the strategy developments in this context are 
mainly influenced by how managers make sense and cognitively frame ambiguous 
information (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Eggers and Kaplan, 
2009). Rather than making optimal decisions among technological or economic trade-
offs (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013), managers in nascent ecosystems envision the future 
of the ecosystem since they lack information about the role and positions of other actors 
and their interdependencies (Adner and Feiler, 2019). Similarly, the decisions about 
platform design are influenced by managers’ beliefs and assumptions since there is no 
dominant category that stakeholders adhere to when referring to a similar type of platform 
(Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Grodal et al., 2015). Moreover, the strategy literature has 
underscored the role of managerial cognitions such as strategic frame in shaping firms’ 
strategic actions toward ambiguous opportunities (e.g. Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 
2006; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). For example, prior studies suggest that managerial 
cognitions influence how emerging opportunities are perceived (Gilbert, 2006) and how 
capability gaps are estimated (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013), which then guide a firm’s 
strategic actions. These studies imply that managerial cognitions become particularly 
salient in a highly ambiguous environment. Despite its prevalent impact on strategy 
development, platform research rarely considers the cognitive dimension in platform 
creation (Tiwana, 2015; Khanagha et al., 2020). 
The literature on strategic cognition also highlights the role of managerial cognition 
in instigating strategic changes which necessary to respond to the changing environment. 
Prior studies show that strategic changes occur when managers redefine their belief on 
the causal relationship between the changing environment and its impact on the firm’s 
performance (Barr, 1998; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). This research implies that the 
dynamic of platform strategy in a nascent ecosystem can be influenced by managers 
changing beliefs. Given the evolving nature of nascent ecosystems, managers may revise 
their prognosis and assumptions as the ecosystem progress and the realities unfold (Garud 
and Rappa, 1994). Nevertheless, current research mostly focuses on platform strategy at 
a given point in time rather than examining its processual dynamic over time (McIntyre 
and Srinivasan, 2017). The few scholars who took a processual perspective (e.g. 
Eisenmann et al., 2011; Teece, 2017; Khanagha et al., 2020) have focused around 
technology and market lifecycle over the platform’s evolution, but did not examine the 
cognitive processes and strategic frames that guide decisions on platform positioning. As 




to incorporate the cognitive dimensions of platform positioning to understand the 
dynamic process of platform positioning strategies in nascent ecosystems. 
Thus, understanding how a platform creator, especially an established firm, develop 
strategies in a nascent ecosystem over time and the cognitive process that underlies the 
strategy emergences are theoretically and practically relevant. Based on the above 
considerations, this thesis asks two interrelated questions:   
How does an established firm develop platform positioning strategies for a nascent 
ecosystem? and Why the positioning strategies shift over time?  
These research questions are addressed using a longitudinal single case study 
(Pettigrew, 1990; Langley, 1999) of TELECO’s (pseudonym) journey in creating a new 
digital platform in the IoT ecosystem. The IoT ecosystem comprises of multiple actors 
across different industries that exhibit complex interdependencies. Despite its enormous 
potential, the IoT ecosystem is nascent and still emerging since there are a lot of variations 
in terms of technology architecture, value propositions, and the structure of value creation 
and value capture (Gartner, 2018). TELECO is a global network equipment producer that 
was among the first firm introducing an IoT platform on a large scale. The firm has 
dynamically changed its platform architecture and subsequent market scope to eventually 
occupied a strategic position in the IoT ecosystem. Multiple sources of data, including 
field observations, analysis of internal strategy documents, and formal and informal 
interviews, were utilized to investigate the phenomenon. The longitudinal analysis of 
TELECO’s platform strategy over a period of 9 years while the IoT ecosystem was 
gradually taking shape, reveals the dynamic of platform positioning strategies and the 
internal cognitive process that trigger strategic changes. Hence, TELECO was a 
revelatory case (Siggelkow, 2007) that enable for theory development about the platform 
positioning strategies in a nascent ecosystem. 
This thesis offers contributions to theory and practice. The central contribution of 
this study is a processual framework that explains how an established firm develops and 
positions its new platform in a nascent ecosystem over time. In particular, I introduce an 
alternative pathway to achieve a strategic position in a nascent ecosystem, which has been 
overlooked by prior research. The framework consists of switching between the three 
platform positioning strategies at different milestones of the ecosystem’s evolution. In 
doing so, this study extends the research on platform positioning and ecosystem strategy 
(e.g. Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Adner, 2017) by bringing a processual and dynamic 




strategy emerges and shift by explicating the cognitive dimensions underlying strategy 
development. As such, this study adds to the platform strategy research by elucidating the 
cognitive dimensions of platform creation as opposed to purely technological or 
economic aspects that dominate platform research (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). By 
revealing the dynamic and emergent nature of an established firm’s strategies in a nascent 
ecosystem, this study also contributes to a broader literature of incumbents’ adaptation to 
technological changes (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Eggers and Park, 2018). Finally, this 
study offers managerial insights for managers of established firms engaging in the 
platform creation initiatives in the increasingly common setting of nascent ecosystems. 
My processual framework can be used as a guideline for managers in positioning their 
new digital platform to successfully navigate challenges in different phases of a nascent 
ecosystem’s evolution. 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. A review of the literature informing 
this research is provided in Chapter 2. The aim of this chapter is to explore three research 
streams that are central to this thesis, namely: Platform strategy, Incumbent’s adaptation, 
and Strategic cognition. This chapter describes current insights within these literature 
streams, which motivate and justify this study. In Chapter 3, the research design and 
methods are introduced. This chapter also explains the philosophical stance of the 
researcher, data collection methods, as well as data the data analysis. In Chapter 4, the 
research setting of this study is presented. In particular, I introduce the IoT ecosystem and 
TELECO as an appropriate case study for addressing the research question. In Chapter 5, 
the empirical findings which describe the dynamic of platform positioning strategies at 
TELECO. This chapter conceptualizes three platform positioning strategies and the 
underlying strategic frames in the main phases of the ecosystem’s evolution. I present a 
detailed narrative in outlining platform strategy development at TELECO. Then, In 
Chapter 6, the empirical findings are discussed with respect to the research questions and 
the extant literature. In this chapter, the emergent positioning strategies and their 
dynamics are theorized. The theoretical and managerial contributions of this study are 
also discussed in this chapter. Finally, in Chapter 7, the conclusion which summarizes the 
main contributions and implications of this research is presented. It also outlines the 





CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides reviews of the literature that informed and motivated this thesis. 
The following review covers three research fields that relevant for understanding the 
phenomenon under investigation, namely: Platform Strategy, Incumbents’ Adaptation, 
and Strategic Cognition (See Figure 1 for illustration). This literature review chapter aims 
to discuss the relevant insights concerning platform strategy and incumbents’ response to 
emerging technologies such as digital platforms. The literature on strategic cognition also 
consulted to understand the role of managerial cognition in strategy development under 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Three sections of this chapter describe current insights and 
issues that exist within these literature streams. Finally, the last section discusses the 
interplay of these separate literature that justifies the research questions which this thesis 
address.  
 The review starts with the introduction of the platform literature which describes 
the definition of platform and the value creation and value capture logic of digital 
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results in a diverse definition and terms of platforms (Gawer, 2014; Parker et al., 2017). 
The first part of this section clarifies the concept and definition applied in this thesis. 
Then, previous works on platform strategies are consulted to identify several key strategic 
decisions to be taken when developing a platform (e.g. Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; 
Parker et al., 2016). These studies highlighted four key strategic decisions concerning 
platform positioning, technical design and architectures, scope and ecosystem 
membership, and governances. Platform literature has also underlined the unique nature 
of competition in a platform-based ecosystem, which challenges the widely accepted 
Porter’s five forces model of competition (van Alstyne et al., 2016). As such, studies on 
a platform-based competition are reviewed to provide insights on the strategies to 
compete in a platform-based ecosystem. 
 The review then moves to the incumbents’ adaptation literature, which has 
investigated established firms’ responses toward emerging technologies, including digital 
platforms. This literature has examined the challenges confronted by established firms in 
the face of emerging technologies (e.g. Christensen, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Day 
and Schoemaker, 2000). Research has also noted that emerging technologies often result 
in the creation of nascent fields (i.e. industries, markets, ecosystems). Several studies on 
this stream have acknowledged firms’ effort in shaping the nascent fields to their 
advantages, despite extreme uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the environments 
(e.g. Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Eggers and Moeen, 2018). Lastly, recent studies 
investigating platform creation effort by established firms are reviewed (Gawer and 
Phillips, 2013; Svahn et al., 2017; Khanagha et al., 2020). These studies provide initial 
insights toward the approaches an established firm may consider when developing a 
digital platform. 
 The literature on incumbents’ adaptation has highlighted the role of managerial 
cognition in influencing firms’ attitudes toward emerging technologies. These studies 
have reported cognitive processes that play a crucial role in shaping firms’ strategic 
actions to technological changes (Kaplan, 2008a; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Benner and 
Tripsas, 2012). Given the ambiguity and uncertainty of nascent ecosystems, it is 
reasonable to assume that cognitive processes, in which managers make sense and 
interpret emerging situations, may influence strategy development in a nascent platform 
ecosystem. As such, I consult the literature on strategic cognition that has investigated 
the role of managerial cognition in strategy development and strategic change.  
 These three independent bodies of literature provide essential building blocks to 




established firm. The platform strategies literature informs the key decisions to develop 
a digital platform and strategic aspects to compete in a platform-based ecosystem. The 
literature on incumbents’ adaptation reveals the challenges and strategic issues faced by 
established firms when confronting with emerging technologies. Lastly, the strategic 
cognition literature informs how managerial cognitions shape strategy development and 
may triggers strategic changes within an organization. Overall, the intersection of the 
three literature informs the relevance of the research question of this thesis, which 
discussed in more detail in the last section. 
2.1 Platform Strategies and Competitions 
Platforms have been increasingly featured in today’s businesses and transformed a range 
of economic and social fields. A platform typically uses technology to connect users, 
organizations, and resources in an ‘ecosystem’ to create and capture values (Cusumano 
and Gawer, 2002; Iansiti and Levien, 2004a). Platform provides building blocks (products 
or technologies) that act as a foundation where a variety of firms in the ecosystem can 
develop complementary products, technologies, or services (Gawer, 2009). The platform 
owners benefitted from the network effects i.e. the increased value of the platform 
according to the increased value of users and the platforms, as well as from the 
complementary innovations i.e. derivative products which result from value co-creation 
of other firms (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; McIntyre and 
Srinivasan, 2017). These characteristics enable platform companies including Google, 
Amazon, Microsoft, and Uber gain strong competitive positions in the market. 
 This section is organized into three parts. The first part is dedicated to identifying 
different platforms recognized by strategy and management scholars and clarified the 
type of platform and its ecosystem that become the focus of this research. The second part 
discusses the strategic decisions involves in platform creation. Lastly, research on 
platform competitive strategies are discussed.    
2.1.1 Definition of Platform and Platform-based Ecosystem 
The pervasiveness of platforms has gained interest from practitioners and management 
scholars. The term platform has been widely used to explain management phenomena 
from different perspectives such as product design, market-transaction, and industry 
platform (Gawer, 2009; Thomas et al., 2014). Depending on the research stream and 
empirical settings, platforms have multiple definitions and theoretical underpinnings 
(Tiwana, 2014; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014). From a product system 




products (Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Gawer, 2009). In this stream of research, the 
concept of platform centre on the reuse or sharing of common elements across production 
systems (Baldwin and Woodard, 2009). The platform architecture following ‘design 
rules’ where a set of low-variety elements (i.e. the platform) is surrounded by numerous 
high-variety elements (i.e. complementors). The product platforms are typically used 
within an internal firm to produce a variety of products at a lower cost and to enhance 
flexibility in product designs to achieve economies of scope and scale (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2014). For example, Sony built its Walkman products based on key modules 
and platforms to produce around 250 models of Walkman at a low cost (Gawer, 2009). 
Moreover, product platforms enable learning across products and can reduce production 
costs of complex products, such as aircraft and automotive (Gawer, 2009). For instance, 
automotive manufactures generally use a common product platform for different products 
or models  (Simpson et al., 2006).  
From a market-transaction perspective, the term ‘platform’ is used to characterize 
products or services that mediate transactions between two or more groups of markets. 
This multi-sided platform creates value by enabling direct interactions between different 
groups of participants who may not be able to interact otherwise (Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
Hagiu, 2009). This type of platform operates in a multi-sided market, a market where one 
or several platforms enable two or multiple groups of users (e.g. readers and ads) and try 
to attract them to the platform by appropriately charging and governing users on each side 
of the platform (Hagiu, 2014). In this market, the platform owners benefited from market 
intermediation, while the platform users benefited from the lower search and transaction 
costs (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). For instance, Airbnb and Booking.com reduce search 
costs by providing search function based on desirable characteristics, while PayPal offers 
digital features to settle transactions between buyers and sellers; thus, reduce the 
transaction cost.  The key important feature of the multisided platforms is the presence of 
indirect network effects in which different side of a group of users can mutually benefit 
from the increasing number of participating users on another side (Rochet and Tirole, 
2003; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2014). For example, users benefited from Netflix 
with more available movies, while the content providers benefit from a large base of 
viewers (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). Moreover, positive indirect network effects can 
lock other firms out from gaining market share, which enables the platform owner to 
dominate a market (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). As such, most of the research on multisided 
platforms concern with pricing structures and governances to solve the ‘chicken-egg’ 




The industry platform perspective considers platforms as a ‘central hub’ that serve 
as foundations where other firms can build complementary products or services on top of 
it and can gain access to the platform’s users/customers (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). An industry platform 
performs functions that are essential to a technological system (i.e. ecosystem) and solve 
business problems for other firms in the industry (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Industry 
platform is more complex than product platforms and multi-sided platforms since it 
constitutes both modularity and market facilitation features (Thomas et al., 2014). 
Moreover, an industry platform typically organizes around an ecosystem of partners or 
complementors (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014), a point which I shall discuss later. Gawer 
(2014) considers industry platforms as evolving organizations characterize by (1) a 
modular technological architecture; (2) value creation through economies of scope in 
supply or/and in demand; and (3) federation and coordination of various agents who can 
simultaneously innovate and compete. The distinguishing feature of the industry platform 
resides in its role in federating and coordinating (as opposed to simply coordinates or 
intermediate) multiple agents in the ecosystem (Gawer, 2014). The aim of Industry 
platforms is to facilitate and increase the degree of innovation on complementary products 
and services (Gawer, 2009). As complementary innovations grow, the platform creates a 
cumulative advantage and entry barrier which makes it harder to dethrone by rivals or 
new entrants (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). The examples of industry platforms are 
Microsoft Windows, Intel microprocessors, Apple’s iPhone, and Goggle’s android. 
In this thesis, the term platform corresponds to the notion of industry platforms 
according to the definition described earlier. In particular, I focus on the platform which 
is based on digital technology that serves as a foundation where outside parties can build 
complementary products and services on top of it (Tiwana, 2014). The platform is part of 
an ecosystem shaped by layered modular architecture (LMA) which consists of loosely 
coupled layers of multiple platforms (Yoo et al., 2010; Sturgeon, 2019).  
Platform-based ecosystem. In the past years, the term “ecosystem” has been widely 
used in discussion among practitioners and strategy scholars (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et 
al., 2018). Broadly speaking ecosystems refers to interdependence among independent 
actors across organizations in realizing value propositions. Several streams of research 
have emphasized different aspects of ecosystems based on their unit of analysis. One 
stream of research centres around an individual firm and its environment in the context 
of a business ecosystem such as the ‘Microsoft ecosystem’, the ‘Silicon Valley 




a community of interacting actors beyond the boundaries of industries that depend on each 
other for their survival and competitiveness (e.g. Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Teece, 2007). 
These studies emphasize the shared fate of the community as a whole and the role of 
ecosystem managers i.e. ‘keystone’ or ‘hub’ firm as a provider of stability as well as an 
orchestrator of value creation and capture (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a; Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe, 2006). The second stream of research focuses on the activities and interactions 
among actors to create novel value propositions (e.g. Adner, 2006; Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Adner, 2017). In this view, the ecosystem concept aims to highlight the interplay 
between a core product, its components, and its complementary products/services, which 
together create value for customers (Adner, 2017). Ecosystem is defined as “the 
alignment structure of the multilateral set of partners that need to interact in order for a 
value proposition to materialize” (Adner, 2017, p.42). Every firm in an ecosystem defines 
its own ecosystem strategy based on its view on the ecosystem structures, roles, and risks 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Adner, 2017). Across different actors, these strategies can be 
consistent or contradictory. As such, the focus is on understanding how interdependent 
actors interact and how they reach mutual agreements regarding the position and flows of 
activities in order to develop and commercialize innovations for the end customers 
(Adner, 2017). 
The third stream of research, which is the main focus of this thesis, focus on the 
ecosystem of a platform which entails the platform’s sponsors/owners and their 
complementors that enhance the platform’s value to consumers (e.g. Wareham et al., 
2014; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014a; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). Platform-based 
ecosystem refers to the platform and its network of complementors that produce 
complementary products/services to enhance platform value (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 
2017). Jacobides and colleague (2018) illustrates platform ecosystems as a “hub and 
spoke” where an array of peripheral firms (i.e. complementors) connected to the central 
platform through open-sources technologies and/or technical standards. An example of a 
platform-based ecosystem can be found in the video games industry (Cennamo and 
Santaló, 2013), the enterprise resource planning industry (Wareham et al., 2014), and the 
software industry (Eisenmann et al., 2011). 
At the most fundamental level, a platform ecosystem consists of three different 
actors: Platform owner/sponsor, complementors, and consumers/users (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2014). Platform owner/sponsor is the “architect” of the ecosystem who sets 
the ecosystem-level goals, defines the member’s role, and establishes standards & 




complementary products/services based on technological resources provided by the 
platform. The complementary products/services enhance the value of a core platform’s 
product/service through indirect network effects so that the value of the core products is 
greater with the complementary prpducts/services than without them (Gawer, 2009; 
McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). The complementord also gain access, either directly or 
indirectly, to the platform’s mutual customers (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). Together, these 
actors create and capture value from the end users by utilizing the platform features and 
functionalities. 
Platform ecosystems can be seen as a semi-regulated market where the platform 
sponsor foster and orchestrate the entrepreneurial actions of its members (Wareham et al., 
2014). Therefore, strategy in the context of a platform-based ecosystem is not only about 
the search for competitive advantage, but also the search for alignment (Wareham et al., 
2014; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). These unique challenges raise specific strategic 
questions concerning the governance mechanisms between the platform owner and its 
complementors (Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010; Wareham et al., 2014), 
the leadership role of a platform owner at the industry level (e.g. Gawer and Cusumano, 
2008), and rivalry between competing platform ecosystems. Some of these topics will be 
discussed in detail in the later section.  
The layered modular architecture of platform ecosystems. A platform ecosystem 
often part of a broader innovation ecosystem where the platform works as a central engine 
providing a set of standards, shared assets, and interfaces that underpin an activity system 
around it (Thomas et al., 2014; Dattee et al., 2018). In the digital economy, the structure 
of the ecosystem is typically shaped by a layered modular architecture (LMA) that 
consists of competing sets of nested platforms (Yoo et al., 2010; Sturgeon, 2019). As 
shown in Figure 2, at the foundational level, the technology platforms (e.g. chipsets, 
programming language, network) enable the functionality of the core platforms to provide 
higher-level products and services such as standardized hardware systems and software 
environments. These lower-level layers enable the higher-level platforms to develop user-
facing applications and to connect multiple groups of users (Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
These higher-level platforms support additional platform layers and could generate an 
unbounded range of market applications because of the modular system elements and re-
programmability of digital technologies (Zittrain, 2006; Yoo et al., 2010). Moreover, the 




be rapidly added at a negligible cost (Huang et al., 2017) which results in a vast array of 
new products, services, and business models.  
 The result of such multi-layered architecture is a vast ecosystem of nested 
platforms, each with its standards, industrial or consumer users, and markets (Sturgeon, 
2019). This adds another complexity for strategy making during the platform 
development process since firms encounter unbounded opportunities (Dattee et al., 2018). 
A firm may opt to focus on a certain layer, either in the lower layer or the higher layer, to 
be a specialist for that particular layer. The firm then would courting for its installed base 
at one layer, while serving as a component at another layer (Yoo et al., 2012). For 
instance, Google maps act as a platform at the service layer and at the same time act as a 
component of the android-based phones in the device layer (Yoo et al., 2010). The 
dynamic nature of LMA also enables the same firms to compete on one layer and 
peacefully coexist on the other layers. For example, Apple’s iPad and Amazon’s Kindle 
are competing in the device layer but complementing each other in the application layers 
with their iBook and Kindle’s contents (Yoo et al., 2010). A firm may also aim to capture 
the most value in the ecosystems by addressing the whole layers. Moreover, the nature of 
digital platforms enables easy scalability, which opens up the opportunity to establish 
domination in multiple layers (Sturgeon, 2019). In this case, the platform owner my 
‘envelope’ rivals in the other layers by extending the platform functionalities (Eisenmann 
et al., 2011). Competition in multi-layered platform ecosystems, thus, not only reside 
within a layer but also across different layers (Sturgeon, 2019). The challenges exacerbate 
when the technology and market are still evolving since platform owners have to make 
the technology and business decisions based on moving targets (Dattee et al., 2018). 




2.1.2 Strategic Decisions in Platform Creation 
Platform creation involves designing a core platform technology and orchestrate third-
party innovators (complementors) around the core of the platform. A platform creator 
needs to ensure the collective innovation performance of the platform ecosystem and 
orchestrate the relationship without formal contractual agreement (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002; Wareham et al., 2014). As such, platform creation involves strategic decisions that 
govern technology evolution, product and system design, and interdependencies among 
actors in the ecosystem (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Wareham et al., 2014; McIntyre 
and Srinivasan, 2017). Prior research provides in-depth insights into the strategy to 
develop a platform and compete in a platform-based market (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; 
Parker et al., 2016; Cusumano et al., 2019). In general, there are four key strategic 
decisions a platform creator should make: Platform Positioning, Technical Design & 
Architecture, Ecosystem Membership, and Governances. The following paragraphs 
describe each decision. 
Platform positioning. When introducing a new platform in a market, the platform 
creator needs to determine the positioning of the platform in relation to other competing 
platforms. A platform positioning strategy describes the type of contents and functionality 
a platform will offer, the range of users it would target, and the degree of uniqueness of 
the platform’s value propositions (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Cennamo, 2019).  To gain a 
competitive position in the markets, a platform creator should offer compelling value 
propositions that would attract users, partners, and complementors to join the platform 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Dattee et al., 2018). It can be done by developing 
technological solutions that solve essential technological and business problems (i.e. 
bottlenecks) that would support the growth of an ecosystem (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; 
Adner, 2012). For instance, Qualcomm established a wireless technology platform for the 
cellular phone industry by solving a basic technical problem of incompatibility and 
inefficiency between wireless devices (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). When there is a 
dominant platform in the market, aspired platform creators could offer alternative value 
propositions that address unmet user needs (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012; Cennamo and 
Santaló, 2013). The platform owner could develop a platform that is customised for 
underserved groups of users. This was the approach taken by Apple when introducing the 
iPhone (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012). A more detailed review of positioning and competitive 
strategies is provided in the next section. 
 Technical design & architecture. Platform creators encounter with various forms 




each component of a technological solution and explains how they would interact 
(Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Tiwana, 2014). The platform architecture should be easy 
to connect to or to build upon to create both intended and unintended values/applications 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). In designing the platform architecture, a 
platform creator should answer several questions related to the degree of openness, such 
as which features should be developed in-house, how open the interface should be, and 
how much information about the platform should be exposed to the 
outsiders/complementors (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Boudreau, 2010). Prior research 
suggests that a platform creator faces the tensions between control and openness when 
determining the platform architecture (Boudreau, 2010; Tiwana, 2014). On the one hand, 
the platform creator should maintain control over the features to appropriate and gain 
considerable amount of value (West, 2003). On the other hand, if it has too much control, 
the platform creator may not be able to attract complementors and to encourage 
innovations (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Therefore, platform creators should relinquish 
some control over the technical design in order to attract wider engagements by external 
parties. For example, a study by Boudreau (2010) showed that opening a technology 
platform by granting greater level access to the complementors (i.e. hardware developers) 
will increase innovations in terms of new product introductions. Nevertheless, giving too 
much control of the platform may have a detrimental effect on the platform’s 
innovativeness. Thus, determining platform technical design & architecture entails 
addressing the tension between control and openness.  
 Scope & Ecosystem membership. The third strategic decisions related to the 
membership of the platform ecosystem. A platform owner would need to determine who 
should be included in the platform and how to attract them (Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
Hagiu, 2014). Moreover, the firm should define the roles of each member (as producers, 
complementors, or consumers) and define how the interaction between members would 
look like (van Alstyne et al., 2016). The decision of platform membership would affect 
the structure of interdependencies and the competitiveness of the platform in the long-
term. For instance, Microsoft introduces Windows as a three-sided platform (users-
application developers-hardware manufacturers), while Apple prefers to choose a two-
sided model by producing the hardware itself (Hagiu, 2014). The next challenge for a 
platform owner is to attract members to the platform. The literature has underscored the 
chicken-egg dilemma of launching a new platform where neither side will join without 
the other side joining first (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Prior 




exempting membership fee or by implementing different pricing strategies for a different 
side of users (Hagiu, 2014). Other non-financial incentives such as technology transfer, 
co-marketing, and diffusion of development tools such as Software Development Kits 
have also been found to be beneficial to attract partners/complementors (Gawer and 
Henderson, 2007; Wareham et al., 2014). In addition, recent research has underscored the 
importance of getting acceptance from the key actors in the platform ecosystem (Ansari 
et al., 2016; Snihur et al., 2018). A case study of TiVo, a digital video recorder start-up, 
showed how the firm adjusts its platform strategy to gain support from the ecosystem 
incumbents (e.g. broadcast networks, broadband providers) (Ansari et al., 2016). In 
addition, platform creators engage in simultaneous cooperation and competition 
relationships with other ecosystem actors (Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Hannah and 
Eisenhardt, 2018). For example, platform owners often have opportunities to extend the 
scope of their platform by integrating into the complementary markets (Gawer and 
Henderson, 2007). In this case, the platform owner may need to consider the effect of 
competing with the complementors as it may create disincentives to commit to the 
platform ecosystem (Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Alexy et al., 2018). Thus, determining 
and retaining membership of the ecosystem should also consider the coopetition tensions 
that may emerge during interaction among members. 
 Governance mechanisms. Finally, the platform creator should decide the 
governance mechanisms of the platform ecosystem. A platform owner should design 
governance mechanisms that encourage contributions from autonomous actors to create 
complementary products and services to a heterogenous group of end users beyond 
predefined products/services (Wareham et al., 2014). In essence, governance is about 
regulating innovations of those whom the platform owner cannot directly control i.e. 
partners/complementors (Tiwana, 2014).  Wareham and colleagues (2014) argued that 
the governance mechanism of a platform ecosystem should address the paradox of 
stability-evolvability. For a platform ecosystem, the ability to generate new outputs (e.g. 
products, services) and complementary innovations are essential (Baldwin and Woodard, 
2009; Boudreau, 2010). The platform evolvability is particularly important when the 
markets are heterogenous and the technologies are emerging. However, excessive 
evolvability is financially unsustainable since complementors and consumers would have 
little assurance of their investments (Tiwana, 2014). Maintaining the balance between 
stability and evolvability is a central challenge in designing governance mechanisms. On 
the one hand, ecosystem governance requires a mechanism that could increase a desirable 




governance requires mechanisms to limit undesirable variance (Yoo et al., 2012; 
Wareham et al., 2014). Platform owners should, therefore, introduce governance 
mechanisms that would support variance-increasing and variance-decreasing. For 
instance, a study by Wareham et al., (2014) in the enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
software ecosystem showed how a platform owner gives open-source code to increase the 
complementors’ creativity and at the same time, employ partner certification to reduce 
undesirable variance in the process.  
 To summarize, there are several strategic decisions that have to be made by a 
platform creator related to the value propositions, technical design, membership, and 
ecosystem governance. A platform owner should also consider emerging tensions that 
may arise when making strategic decisions such as the chicken-egg, control-openness, 
cooperation-competition, and stability-evolvability.  
2.1.3 Competing in a Platform-based ecosystem 
The proliferation of digital economy and platform technology is changing the nature of 
competition and altering the way firms conducting business. Advances in digital 
technologies shift the competition level from a standalone product to platform systems 
(Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Cusumano et al., 2019). The platform-based competition 
challenges the key assumptions on the existing theory of competitive strategy which 
based on the traditional product-based market (Porter and Heppelmann, 2014; van 
Alstyne et al., 2016). First, while in traditional market competition defined at the level of 
a well-defined product-market, platform competition operates across multiple product-
markets and industries (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Competitors are not defined as firms 
offering similar products for the same customers since the products built on or sold 
through the platform are varied and span across sectors or industries (Cennamo, 2019). 
The inter-connectedness and interdependencies of an integrated product-system are spans 
beyond traditional industries’ boundaries (Parker et al., 2016). As such, the porter five-
forces model, which assumes a fixed industry boundary, may no longer be relevant 
(Parker et al., 2016). For example, the competition between Google and Apple with their 
smartphone not only occurred in the mobile phone market but also in a wider application 
market (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012).  
Second, the general theory of competition considers market structure as a given, 
where firms are responding to the market structure (Porter, 1985). The implicit 
assumption in traditional market strategy is that competition entails a zero-sum game 




platform competition is a battle for a positive-sum where the platform enlarges the size 
of the pie or create an alternative pie that taps new markets and sources of supply 
(Cusumano et al., 2019). The illustrative example is Amazon which invented new models 
of self-publishing and publishing on demand, within the traditional book industry (Parker 
et al., 2016). Finally, in the world of platforms competition become less important than 
cooperation and co-creation since the crucial factor is not protecting value inside the firm, 
but creating value outside the firm (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Ceccagnoli et al., 
2012). In this case, the main factor for competing in the platform market is no longer 
ownership of (physical) assets, but access to customer-partner-producer networks and 
their interactions (Hagiu, 2009). 
According to Parker (2016), competition in a platform ecosystem can be seen as a 
game of ‘three-dimensional chess’ where the lead firm navigates dynamic competitions 
at three levels: platform against platforms, platform against partners, and partner against 
partners. At the first level, one platform competes with another, as in the smartphone 
battles among Apple (iPhone), Google (Android), and Rim (Blackberry). The competitive 
advantage of these product resides on the power of the entire ecosystem (i.e. apps) rather 
than on a particular product feature. At the second level, competition occurs between a 
platform and its partners. For example, Microsoft invited third parties to develop new 
features such as browser, instant messaging for its operating system, while at the same 
time developed the features by itself (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Competing with a 
partner/complementor is a risky move as it can strengthen the platform (through added 
features), but at the expense of weakening partners (Gawer and Henderson, 2007). 
Finally, two unrelated platform partners compete for positions within the platform 
ecosystem. For example, in the case of video console ecosystems, multiple video game 
developers target the same consumers at the same console (Cennamo and Santaló, 2019).  
Platform positioning strategies. A number of studies in the platform strategy 
literature have investigated how a platform establish competitive advantage and secure a 
strategic position in the market. At the most fundamental level, there are two strategies a 
platform can choose: Platform domination or Platform differentiation (Rochet and Tirole, 
2003; Suarez and Kirtley, 2012; Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Cennamo, 2019). Platform 
domination strategy suggest aiming for a position where it could address the largest 
customer base and gain the biggest network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Schilling, 
2002; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). This strategy derives on the assumption that network size 
is the core element of platform competitive advantage (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Hagiu, 




users can get a direct benefit from the opportunities to interact with others (Schilling, 
2002). A large base of users also provides indirect benefits to the users from the positive 
externalities, which incentivise complementors (and other users) to produce 
complementary innovations (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). For example, a video game 
console with a large user base has more value to game developers since it offers greater 
market opportunities; the other way around, a video game platform with a large option of 
games are more attractive for the users (Venkatraman and Lee, 2004). The increase of the 
platform’s network size also increases switching costs and lock-in effects, which makes 
it more difficult for users and complementors to switch to other competing platforms 
(Hagiu, 2009). As such, once a platform reaches a critical mass of users it creates a 
positive network effect between the users’ and complementors’ network size which gets 
reinforce overtime and further enhances the value of the platform (Rochet and Tirole, 
2003; Hagiu, 2009). These direct and indirect network effects, therefore, motivate the 
development of a large installed user base and complementors to achieve domination in 
the ecosystem. 
The platform domination strategy suggests that the way to win the competition in a 
market is by building scale fast and growing the network of users and complementors; 
thereby, limit the market space for sub-scale competitors (Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
Cennamo, 2019). As such, the key competitive actions for a platform creator adopting 
this strategy is to gain a wide adoption on both sides (i.e. users & complementors), and 
grow it larger than competitors (Cennamo, 2019). To attract both-sides of the market and 
to overcome the ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem, prior studies have proposed pricing as a 
mechanism to attract and coordinate both sides of the markets (e.g. Rochet and Tirole, 
2003; Parker et al., 2005; Hagiu, 2009). The general suggestion for pricing strategy is to 
subsidize a group that is more valuable and charge a group that benefits from the presence 
of the other group (Eisenmann et al., 2006). For example, Facebook gives free account to 
users, while charging advertisers for promoting in the platform. Another mechanism to 
promote adoption is related to the ‘platform openness’ in which platform providers grant 
broad access and participation to its members (West and Wood, 2008; Boudreau, 2010). 
Empirical researches have shown how platform openness leads to the faster growth of 
users and a greater number of complementary offerings that contribute to establishing 
dominance (e.g. Boudreau, 2010; Alexy et al., 2018). Finally, Eisenmann and colleagues 
(2011) introduced the ‘platform envelopment’ as a strategy to expand the scope of the 
platform. Platform envelopment occurs when one platform adding another platform’s 




(Eisenmann et al., 2011). For example, Microsoft’s Windows incorporated functionalities 
offered by other specialized platforms such as Netscape (web browser) and Real Player 
(media file management) that enable Microsoft to expand to adjacent markets and 
establish dominance. 
Prior studies show that platform dominance strategy is particularly suitable in 
markets following the winner-take-all logic (van Alstyne et al., 2016; McIntyre and 
Srinivasan, 2017; Cennamo, 2019). The winner-take-all logic works in a market that 
encourages users to adopt one platform and abandon others. Scholars identify three 
conditions that susceptible to the winner-take-all effect: Strong network effects, High 
multihoming or switching costs, and High homogeneity of consumers and complementors 
(Lee et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2009; Parker et al., 2016; Cennamo, 2019). First, as mentioned 
earlier, strong network effects attract more users to a platform with a larger installed base. 
The more users join the ecosystem, the more values are created and the more profit 
margins are captured by the platform owner (Hagiu, 2009). Second, the higher it cost 
users to participate on more than one platform (i.e. multihoming) or the more expensive 
it takes to switch to another platform, the more likely it is for winner-take-all logic to 
prevail (Parker et al., 2016). For example, most people typically chose either an Android 
phone or an Apple phone and stay with it for a few years since it is relatively expensive 
to have both of them or frequently switch from one to another (Parker et al., 2016). 
Finally, the winner-takes-all logic prevails when the users do not have distinctive needs 
or preferences (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). High market commonality makes platform 
size become the key value for users (Cennamo, 2019). For example, the absence of 
distinct user needs and the presence of strong network effects in the ride-sharing services 
lead to a fierce rivalry between two or three dominant platforms (Parker et al., 2016). 
Another approach to competing in a platform-based ecosystem is through platform 
differentiation (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012; Cennamo and Santaló, 
2013). While the platform domination strategy assumes that there is only one winner, 
which is the platform with the largest network, platform differentiation strategy seeks 
competitive advantages through unique market positioning or superior performance. 
Previous studies have shown that platform technical performance and functionalities are 
key important values for users, apart from the network size (Tiwana, 2014; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2014). Superior technical performance can benefit users by improving 
productivity, ease of use, and better performance (Zhu and Iansiti, 2012; Cennamo, 2019). 
Furthermore, users may have different needs and preferences that open up opportunities 




users may prefer a specialized feature dedicated to their needs rather than a generic feature 
offered by the dominant platform (Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). The heterogeneity of market 
needs and preferences makes platforms’ unique functionalities more valuable than the 
platform’s network size (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). As such, competitive advantage 
can also be achieved through differentiation by determining market positioning along 
with the heterogeneity of customers’ preferences and relative to competing platforms 
(Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Seamans and Zhu, 2014; Cennamo, 2019). 
The platform differentiation strategy puts more emphasize on establishing a unique 
identity rather than platform size (Cennamo, 2019). The key competitive action for a 
platform creator following this strategy is to gain differentiation advantage based on a 
unique market positioning (e.g. Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Seamans and Zhu, 2014) 
and distinct technological architecture (Gawer, 2009; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). As such, 
platform creators applying this strategy perform competitive actions that are contradictory 
to the domination logic. For instance, rather than aiming for a mass market, a platform 
creator can customize the platform to a particular segment that underserved by a dominant 
platform (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012). Facebook did this by focusing on students’ 
community to differentiate from MySpace, the dominant social network at that time. 
Moreover, platforms can differentiate by purposefully limiting access to certain users that 
they do not want to serve. For example, eHarmony, an online dating platform, applies an 
extensive screening of users’ in order to ensure the users in its platform are their target 
market (Cennamo, 2019). Restrictive access for complementors or partners can also be 
applied through a quality screening or certification program (Wareham et al., 2014). A 
restrictive openness, as opposed to full openness, can be applied to ensure the quality and 
exclusivity of the platform’s ecosystem (Cennamo, 2019). In addition, platform creators 
can also differentiate by developing exclusive content/complements that are not available 
on other platforms (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). Platform creators could also apply 
technology-based differentiation by focusing on certain functions that appear to the 
emerging needs of users (Zhu and Iansiti, 2012; Suarez and Kirtley, 2012). In this case, 
differentiation can be achieved by focusing on only a few attributes highly valued by 
target users while de-emphasizing other attributes that are less essential to them (Suarez 
and Kirtley, 2012). For example, when launching the iPhone’s, Apple differentiated by 
focused on its unique strengths in user interface and multi touch display and de-
emphasized other features outside its strengths (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012). In the end, 
platform creators’ choices of the market scope and technical architecture contribute to the 




Moreover, platforms evolve as a result of increased competition or other dynamics 
in the market (Cennamo, 2019). In this case, a platform’s competitive positioning might 
get challenged or even dethroned by others by others (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Suarez and 
Kirtley, 2012; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). Moreover, platforms competitive landscape 
may shift due to convergence of previously separate adjacent markets (e.g. Parker et al., 
2016; Khanagha et al., 2020). In this case, platforms may find themselves competing in a 
larger market domain. For example, when Facebook launched the “Candy Crush game” 
it made inroads for social media-based games which changed the competitive landscape 
in the video games industry. With the changed competitive domain, platforms should 
continuously scan their competitive environment and evolve their strategy accordingly 
(Cusumano et al., 2019). As such, when assessing platform strategy, it is necessary to 
consider not just the platform’s strategic positioning at a given point of time, but its 
evolutionary competitive positioning overtime (Cennamo, 2019). Nevertheless, most 
studies investigating platform competitive strategy adopt a cross-sectional view, rather 
than the dynamics of platform positioning and its evolution process (McIntyre and 
Srinivasan, 2017). The few scholars who took a temporal perspective (Seamans and Zhu, 
2014; Seamans and Zhu, 2017) have only focused on one directional strategic 
repositioning (from A to B); thus, do not fully capture the dynamic of platform strategy 
over time. Scholars, thus, have limited knowledge about the evolution and dynamics of 
platform competitive strategy. 
Overall, this section reviews the literature on platform strategies and describes the 
nature of competing in a platform-based ecosystem. Platform strategy challenges extant 
theory of competitive strategy based on traditional, linear value chain business model. 
Furthermore, platform businesses entail fundamentally different value creation and 
capture logic than the linear, value-chain businesses. As such, developing and 
orchestrating a new digital platform present multiple strategic challenges for established 





2.2 Established Firms’ Responses to Technological Changes 
The rise of emerging technologies, such as digital platforms, can change an industrial 
landscape and pose a long-term threat to the legacy businesses and competitiveness of 
established firms. Scholars have documented how technological changes render existing 
technologies and business models obsolete and disrupt established value-network 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
Taylor and Helfat, 2009). It is often argued that established firms tend to struggle with 
new technological development and get replaced by new entrants (e.g. Christensen, 1997; 
Ansari and Krop, 2012). However, prior studies have noted that some established firms 
survive and thrive across technological changes (Garud et al., 2002; Bhardwaj et al., 2006; 
Svahn et al., 2017). Therefore, why some organizations adapt and prevail toward 
technological changes, while others are inert, and fail is a central question for strategic 
management scholars and practitioners (Eggers and Park, 2018; Kumaraswamy et al., 
2018). The literature on incumbent adaptation to technological changes and radical 
innovations has investigated the dynamics of technological changes and organization 
responds (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Eggers and Park, 2018). This literature provides useful 
theoretical lenses to understand how and why established firms can thrive in technological 
changes, especially in the emergence of new digital platforms. 
 In this section, I review the vast literature on incumbent adaptation toward 
technological changes. First, I analyse the challenges or barriers that may hinder 
established firms to succeed in technological changes. Then, the review moves to the 
studies on firms’ strategy to nascent fields that are triggered by emerging technologies.  
In the last section, recent studies investigating platform creation by established firms in 
established ecosystems are reviewed.  
2.2.1 The Challenges of Established Firms Towards Emerging Technologies 
Scholars and practitioners have long grappled to understand how established firms’ 
response to waves of technological changes. Emerging technologies, such as digital 
imaging, electric commerce, artificial intelligence, and the internet of things have been a 
game changing wave in this regard (Day and Schoemaker, 2000; Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). Emerging technologies have the potential to create 
entirely new industries, remake the existing one, and obsolete established strategies 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Day and Schoemaker, 2000; Yoo et al., 2010). Emerging 
technologies often change the organizational process of transforming inputs and outputs 




Rothaermel, 2003). Moreover, emerging technologies are typically deployed in a 
fundamentally different business model (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Christensen, 2006). With such disruptive effects, it has been argued that established firms 
are often having difficulties to prevail in the new competitive landscape shaped by 
emerging technologies (e.g. Christensen and Bower, 1996; Day and Schoemaker, 2000). 
Many researchers have sought to understand why established firms fail whereas 
some others adapt and survive by investigating the phenomena of technological change 
throughout history (Eggers and Park, 2018 for a complete review). For example, various 
phenomena of technological changes have been investigated including the shift from 
analog to digital photography (e.g. Benner and Tushman, 2002), the emergence of digital 
media (e.g. Gilbert, 2005), and the generational changes of semiconductor (e.g. Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010). Prior studies have produced multiple theories and propositions to 
explain the heterogeneity of incumbents’ response to emerging technologies. Several 
factors such as firm’s identity (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), managerial cognition (Eggers 
and Kaplan, 2009), dynamic capability (Danneels, 2011a), core resources & capabilities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992), learning routines (Katila and Ahuja, 2002), market evolution & 
industry structure (Jacobides et al., 2006), and ecosystems (Adner, 2012) have all been 
shown to explain the challenges of established firms in the face of technological changes. 
In essence, I categorize the hindering factors of established firms in adapting to the 
emerging technologies into five groups: Resource Legacy, Learning Routines, 
Managerial Cognition, Relational Interdependences, and Organization Configuration. 






Table 1: Hindering factors of established firms in the face of emerging technologies 
  Resource Legacy. The first source of hindering factor is related to the established 
firms’ existing configuration of resources & capabilities. Research has found that 
established firms’ may have advantages over new entrants during technological changes 
due to their existing resources such as manufacturing, marketing, and distribution (Teece, 
1986; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). These complementary resources may allow them to 
overcome a lack of relevant core technological knowledge and allow them to survive in 
technological changes (Rothaermel, 2001). However, in most cases, technological 
changes can render both firms’ core and complementary resources obsolete (Agarwal and 
Helfat, 2009; Danneels, 2011a; Roy et al., 2018). In this case, the firms’ existing resources 
become the source of inertia and rigidity in responding to technological changes 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Gilbert, 2005).  




▪ Excessive attachments to existing customers 
▪ Too strong commitment to existing 
technologies 












▪ Efficiency-oriented learning routines 
▪ Limited motivation for experimentation and 
exploration into new technologies 
▪ Inability to develop new capabilities and 
routines. 
 
Levinthal & March 





▪ Lack supports from existing stakeholders 
▪ Coopetitive tensions with existing 
partners/customers. 
▪ Heterogeneity of existing stakeholders in 
adopting new technologies/innovations 
  







▪ Managers’ lack attention to new 
technologies 
▪ Managers’ erroneous belief on the impact of 
new technologies to organization 
▪ Perception of identity-challenged 
technologies 
  
Tripsas & Gavetti 




▪ Lack of integration mechanisms prevents 
assimilation of new knowledge 
▪ The absence of an ambidextrous structure 
deters exploration activities 
Siggelkow & 
Levinthal (2003): 





 Studies have shown that established firms are generally reluctant to allocate 
necessary resources and attention to emerging technologies and businesses (e.g. 
Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994; Christensen, 1997; Day and Schoemaker, 2000). 
This resource rigidity is explainable since emerging technologies offer uncertain returns 
compare to the existing technologies and markets (Day and Schoemaker, 2000). For 
instance, Smith Corona, a typewriter manufacturer company, did not invest in building 
new resources to compete in the emerging inkjet printing market even though they had a 
considerable financial slack (Danneels, 2011). In addition, firms’ financial dependence 
on the existing technology and business model would hinder investment in exploratory 
activities that do not contribute directly to the firm revenues (Christensen, 1997; 
O’Connor and DeMartino, 2006). As such it may lead to a bias in resource investment 
where the firm prefers to invest in the technologies that would preserve their existing 
resources and market positions (Gilbert, 2005). Moreover, resource rigidity increases 
when emerging businesses and technologies have the potential to disrupt the firm’s 
technology and business model (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, 2006). In this case, the 
firm has a strategic incentive not to invest in emerging technologies since it would speed 
up the obsolesce of their existing businesses model and markets (Chesbrough, 2010; 
Khanagha et al., 2014). Prior studies revealed that established firms tend to reluctant to 
cannibalize their existing businesses (e.g. Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994; 
Christensen and Bower, 1996). Established firms often unwilling to leave an existing 
customer base over an emerging customer base that demands new products associated 
with emerging technology (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997). As such, 
established firms tend to get ‘disrupted’ when such emerging demands grow (Christensen, 
1997). Research has also shown that firms are less likely to adopt new technology when 
it is not consistent with their existing strategic commitment (Benner and Tushman, 2002; 
Benner and Tushman, 2003). A strong commitment to the existing technologies gives 
lower incentives for the firm to adopt new technology that potentially competes with the 
existing technology (Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994). In this case, the firm’s core 
capabilities become rigidities that constraining the firm’s ability to develop new 
capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). The failure of Polaroid in digital photography, for 
example, was mainly due to the resource allocation bias that favour innovations on the 
existing technology (i.e. chemical film) rather than the new technology (i.e. digital) 
(Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). In sum, firms’ resource legacy can create an investment bias 
against emerging technologies that are not consistent with the existing technologies and 




 Learning Routines. The second challenge is related to organizational learning 
routines. Research has shown that established firms tend to exploit existing capabilities 
than innovate and explore (Levinthal and March, 1993; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). 
The existing learning routines tend to focus on the established practices that make them 
inert to the boundary-spanning activities (March, 1991; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Benner 
and Tushman, 2003). The large part of the organizational routines of established firms 
has been directed for practices that are necessary and efficient for them. As such, 
established firms would emphasize the familiar solutions and development that are 
adjacent to existing competencies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Helfat, 1994). These 
routines are helpful for innovations in familiar settings, but they become ineffective when 
applied to ambiguous and uncertain settings such as emerging technologies (Day and 
Schoemaker, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Prior studies have shown that this 
efficiency-oriented routine makes exploratory learning and development of new relevant 
capabilities extremely difficult (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Gilbert, 2005). In addition, 
ambidexterity scholars argue that firms’ survival in technological changes depends on 
their ability to simultaneously balance exploitation-associated activities (e.g. refinement, 
efficiency, and implementation) and exploration-associated activities (e.g. 
experimentation, variation) (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). 
Such ambidextrous relies on the orchestration abilities of two distinct, yet interrelated 
features of organization structure, process, and culture (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004), 
which many established firms lack (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). Moreover, 
established firms tend to reinforce certain ways of problem solving based on past 
successes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal and March, 1993). Established firms 
also often lack in engaging with exploration search as they tend to search in known and 
well-tried directions (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Prior choices of technology or solutions 
may lead the firms to search and to explore areas that are closely related to their 
competencies (Bayus and Agarwal, 2007; Eggers, 2016). Overall, the firm’s existing 
organizational routines that favour efficiency over novelty and adjacent over distant 
solutions constraints experimentation and new capability development that essential in 
the face of technological changes. 
 Relational interdependencies. Another hindering factor stems from managing 
relational interdependencies with both existing and new stakeholders of an ecosystem. 
Established firms have developed complex networks of customers, suppliers, and partners 
with whom they interact to create products/services in their core businesses (Iansiti and 




stakeholders plays an important role in supporting the value creation and value capture of 
the firm (Adner, 2012; Jacobides et al., 2018). However, emerging technologies might 
disrupt a firm’s longstanding relationship with its stakeholders of the existing ecosystem 
(Gilbert, 2005; Adner, 2012). Emerging technologies have the potentials to re-structure 
firms’ existing value network that may result in the changes of roles, relationships, rules, 
and transactions among ecosystem members (Jacobides et al., 2006; Ansari et al., 2016). 
For instance, the emergence of digital video recorder technology has impacted the TV 
industry ecosystem and changed the relationship among broadcast networks, content 
providers, advertisers, content distributors, and regulators (Ansari et al., 2016). The firm 
may need to mobilize the member of its existing network to adopt the new paradigm of 
the emerging business ecosystem, since failing to get support from the existing 
stakeholder may be detrimental not only for the emerging business but also for the 
established one (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Ozcan and Santos, 2015). Yet, different 
members of the ecosystem have motivations and interests toward emerging businesses 
(Khanagha et al., 2018). Some members may be supportive, while others may be against 
the emerging technology. In many cases, the relationships can be ‘coopetitive’ where the 
firm engage in a cooperative and competitive relationship at the same time (Gnyawali and 
Park, 2011). As such, the challenges for an established firm attempting to develop 
emerging businesses are to reconfigure its ecosystem and manage the relationship in such 
a way that it will benefit both new and existing businesses (Khanagha et al., 2020). In 
addition, prior studies reveal that established firms’ response toward emerging 
technologies is also influenced by external actors, such as security analysts (Benner, 
2010; Benner and Ranganathan, 2012). In this case, established firms face pressures from 
the external actors to choose strategies that maximize shareholder value and preserve 
existing competitive advantages (Benner, 2010). A study by Benner and Ranganathan 
(2012), shows how pressure from security analysts discourage established firms from 
investing in new technologies that are outside the firms’ domain. Overall, established 
firms’ legacy relationships with multiple stakeholders can constrain the firm’s response 
toward emerging technologies. 
 Managerial cognition and Organizational identity. The fourth hindering factor 
comes from the mental models (i.e. cognition) of managers. Research has widely 
documented the role of managerial cognition in affecting established firms’ behaviour 
toward technological changes (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1996; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Tripsas, 2009). Managerial cognition entails managers’ 




organizations (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). Prior studies have 
shown that managers who paid more attention to new technologies are more likely to 
achieve a faster and better adaptation (Kaplan, 2008a; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). 
Attentive managers tend to have a better capacity in sensing new opportunities or threats 
in a faced-paced environment (Joseph and Ocasio, 2012; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). A 
study by Eggers and Kaplan (2009), for instance, found that top managers who put more 
attention toward emerging technologies were more likely to identify the promise of the 
technology and quickly embrace the technology. The study also showed that too much 
attention to the existing technologies was associated with slower adaptation of emerging 
technologies. Moreover, managers’ cognitive frame i.e. belief and perception toward 
emerging technologies may hinder or facilitate incumbents’ adaptation to technological 
changes (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 2006). The seminal case of Polaroid is one 
example of how managers' cognitive frames can hinder the adoption of emerging 
technology. Polaroid’s inability to embrace digital photography is not because of the lack 
of necessary technological capabilities, but because of managers’ belief on the razor stick-
and-blade model as the only way for the firm to commercialize its products (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). Managers’ cognitive bias on the key attributes of business models such as 
value proposition, market segments, and revenue streams may also hamper firms’ 
adaptation to technological changes (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 
2010). For example, a study by Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) revealed cognitive 
bias within Xerox that discourage the firm to develop personal copiers. However, a 
cognitive frame that is consistent with emerging technologies may increase the likelihood 
of adaptation (Gilbert, 2006; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). For example, Intel’s success in 
transforming to a platform-based firm was partly due to managers’ belief in the platform-
based business model and technology (Gawer and Phillips, 2013). 
 Managers’ cognitive frames are also influenced by the shared belief of 
organizational identity. Organizational identity refers to the members’ shared 
understanding of who the organizations are believed to be (Anthony and Tripsas, 2016; 
Ravasi et al., 2020). Prior studies have shown how organizational identity can blinds firms 
toward technological change (Tripsas, 2009; Kammerlander et al., 2018; Garud and 
Karunakaran, 2018). Emerging technologies that deviate from the members’ expectations 
associated with the organizational identity are difficult to adopt (Tripsas, 2009). For 
instance, a study by Tripsas (2009) showed the difficulty faced by a firm that identified 
itself as a digital photography firm to pursue new opportunities in flash memory 




transitioning from a product-based to platform-based business model involves a 
concurrent shift in some aspects of organizational identity. Overall, these researches 
suggest that when emerging technology challenges managers’ existing beliefs about the 
existing technologies and business models, it creates significant obstacles for 
organizations to adopt them. A more detailed review of the implications of managerial 
cognition to a firm’s strategy is provided in the next section. 
 Organization configuration. The last factor which may hinder established firms’ 
adaptation relates to the organization structure and how the firms organize themselves in 
general. Compared to the previous factors, little empirical research has specifically 
focused on investigating the effect of organizations’ configuration to established firms’ 
adaptation (Eggers and Park, 2018). Nevertheless, research indicates that certain forms 
of organizational structure may facilitate adaptation, while others structure may hinder 
adaptation (Westerman et al., 2006; Tushman et al., 2010; Ansari and Krop, 2012). For 
example, ambidexterity literature has shown that firms with ambidextrous structure i.e. 
structurally separate between exploitation and exploration activities are better in 
developing emerging business opportunities (O’Reilly et al., 2009; Tushman et al., 2010). 
Another study suggested that inter-unit knowledge management such as cross-functional 
teams may help firms’ survival in the face of technological changes (Hill and Rothaermel, 
2003). Siggelkow & Levinthal (2003) also theorized that the degree of centralization 
affects a firm’s ability to explore and adapt. Other research has explored the degree of 
vertical integration as another organizational configuration that influences firms’ 
adaptation to technological changes (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Adner, 2012). 
For instance, vertically integrated firms were found to be faster in launching a new 
product generation than non-integrated firms (Kapoor and Adner, 2012). In sum, these 
studies indicate that organization configuration in terms of form, structure, and centrality 
influence established firms’ response toward emerging technologies.  
 Overall, established firms confront several hindering factors such as resource 
dependency, learning routine, relational interdependency, managerial cognition, and 
organization configurations in the face of emerging technologies. Nevertheless, more 
recent research shows that some established firms can thrive during technological 
changes. In this case, established firms successfully respond to technological changes by 
entering nascent fields and actively shaping the environment to their advantage (Garud et 
al., 2002; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Anthony et al., 2016; Gavetti et al., 2017). The 




2.2.2 Strategies in Nascent Fields 
Emerging technologies often result in the creation of nascent markets and/or ecosystems 
that have potential to replace existing industries (e.g. digital photography, personal 
computer) or expand the existing one (e.g. biotechnology, electric vehicle) (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Day and Schoemaker, 2000; Agarwal et al., 2017). Given its 
transformational effect, firms engage in nascent fields to capture emerging opportunities 
or to remain competitive during waves of industry transformation (Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009; Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Moeen, 2017). Nascent fields are business environments 
in an early stage of formation, which appear in the initial period of industry emergence 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). From the technology evolution perspective, a nascent 
period of technological evolution starts after the emergence of new technology, but before 
standardization and mass commercialization in place (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In this period, which is also known as an era of ferment, 
firms are experimenting with multiple alternative technology options until a dominant 
design emerges (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). 
 From an industry lifecycle perspective, a nascent period starts from the incubation 
stage and ends with early signs of commercial viability before industry sales take-off  
(Moeen, 2017; Eggers and Moeen, 2018). Incubation stages denote a period of pre-
commercial technological investments before the first product commercialization 
(Agarwal et al., 2017). After incubation stages, rapid firm entry results in a modest 
increase in product sales (Agarwal et al., 2017). Then, the nascent period ends at a point 
when improved commercial viability has triggered a sharp increase in sales (Eggers and 
Moeen, 2018).  
 In the context of ecosystems, a nascent period of an ecosystem is not fully defined. 
Literature typically described four stages of an ecosystem lifecycle that covers a birth 
phase, expansion phase, a leadership phase, and a self-renewal phase (Moore, 1993; 
Iansiti and Levien, 2004b; Teece, 2017). Based on these phases, a nascent period of an 
ecosystem can be defined as a period between the start of a birth phase and the tipping 
point of the expansion phase. The birth phase denotes by the emergence of an enabling 
technology that offers multiple ranges of future alternatives (Dattee et al., 2018). In this 
phase, ecosystem creators focus on defining the value propositions of a would-be 
ecosystem including what value is created and how the value creation and value capture 
structure should look like (Moore, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004b; Adner, 2006). Then, 
the ecosystem ‘blueprint’ starts to crystalize and create a momentum that attracts others 




al., 2018). An ecosystem’s nascent period ends at the later stage of positioning battle at a 
point before a clear leadership position emerges. Figure 3 illustrates an ecosystem’s 
nascent phase and distinguishes the nascent phases from subsequent phases. 
 
  The nature and characteristics of nascent fields. Nascent fields are business 
environments (i.e. industry, ecosystems, markets) characterized by extreme ambiguities 
with regards to technology, competition, and markets (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; 
Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Moeen, 2017). The contextual features of nascent fields make 
decision-making more complex and difficult (Eggers and Moeen, 2018). Therefore, 
strategic decisions must account for the inherent uncertainties and ambiguities of nascent 
fields. First, nascent fields are fraught with technological uncertainties. Given a lack of 
dominant design, firms encounter numerous technological options without clear 
indications of which one would prevail (Schilling, 2002). Consequently, the firms’ 
decision on technological options could be decisive since choosing ‘losing’ technologies 
equal to failure in the nascent fields (Suarez, 2004; Eggers, 2016).  
 The challenges of technological uncertainties exacerbate when it is driven by new 
digital technologies. Advances of digital technologies lead to technology convergence 
which blurs the boundaries between once separated products and industries (Yoo et al., 
2012; Porter and Heppelmann, 2014). Technology convergence complicates firms’ 
strategy formulation process as it shifts the focus from choosing a single type of 
technology to a combination of multiple technologies (Yoffie, 1996). This condition 




requires mastery of a broader array of technologies that extend beyond the firm’s sphere 
of competence (Yoffie, 1996; Chesbrough, 2003). The development of products/services 
in this setting would need collective efforts of multiple stakeholders who might belong 
from different industries and not bound by contractual agreements  (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Adner, 2012). However, technological uncertainty implies that identifying potential 
collaborators and inducing them for collaborative endeavour toward emerging businesses 
could be difficult (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Dattee et al., 2018). 
 In addition, firms competing in nascent fields face with a highly ambiguous market 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Benner and Tripsas, 2012). Ambiguity refers to the lack of 
clarity about the meaning and implications of particular situations which leads to multiple 
potential interpretations (Davis et al., 2009). Ambiguity in nascent fields results from a 
lack of consensus regarding products/services definitions (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; 
Benner and Tripsas, 2012), customer preferences (Adner and Levinthal, 2001), and 
business models (McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2019). The market ambiguities imply that 
entrant firms lack complete knowledge regarding which customer groups will find the 
offering products/service attractive, and which business model will prevail (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2001; Anthony et al., 2016). In this case, firms may have to choose among a 
plethora of products and technology without any guidelines logic that connects technical 
potential with the realization of economic value (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). 
Moreover, firms may not know which resources and capabilities that are still strategically 
valuable in the new fields (Davis et al., 2009; Danneels, 2011a). As a result, it will 
complicate the capability reconfiguration strategy to pursue emerging opportunities. 
Given the absence of industry structure or ecosystem blueprint, firms may have 
different interpretations regarding which organizations represent customers, suppliers, or 
competitors and what the dependence relationship would look like (Rindova and Kotha, 
2001; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). The collective cognitive frames about products and 
market categories may be diverse since various actors are still seeking the meaning of an 
unfamiliar field. A study by Rao (1994), for instance, shows how stakeholders (i.e. 
producers & consumers) in the early development of automobile industries disagreed on 
how automobiles should look and perform. The market ambiguities might intensify when 
the nascent fields are shaped by generative technology (Yoo et al., 2010). Generative 
technology such as the Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence, and Blockchain has the 
potential to create a breath-taking variety of potential future applications (Zittrain, 2006). 
Consequently, firms not only encounter with different technological options, but also with 




stakeholders with a “mind-blowing space of exploration” (Dattee et al., 2018, p.476). As 
such, the uncertain and ambiguous nature of nascent fields create strategic trade-offs and 
complicate firms’ strategies. It would be nearly impossible for managers to be sure of 
what is going to happen in the industry, what the implications for the firm will be, and 
what the best ways of responding (Eisenhardt, 1989; Teece et al., 2016). 
 Strategies in shaping nascent fields. Despite complexities and challenges in 
nascent fields, recent research has documented some successful attempts of firms in 
entering and competing in nascent fields. The blur and fleeting structure of nascent fields 
also represents big opportunities for firms to create new markets and shape the new 
environments to their advantage (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Gavetti et al., 2017). Firms 
often incentives to engage in a nascent field early on to build industry-specific knowledge 
and resource that allow them to build a defensible position in a new market or industry 
(Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2017; Gavetti et al., 2017). In this case, 
firms may aim to shape and dominate the field rather than just passively fitting in (Santos 
and Eisenhardt, 2009). A seminal study by Santos and Eisenhardt of five new ventures 
(i.e. start-ups) in nascent fields showed a series of strategic actions for constructing 
nascent markets. They introduced claiming, demarcating, and controlling as three 
interrelated strategic actions a new venture could apply in constructing new markets. 
Moreover, firms could shape meaning and promoting their identity to become a cognitive 
referent in the market. Then, the authors argued that firms could define industry structure 
and roles for other actors by developing alliances. Finally, at the later stage, firms could 
aim to control the market by owning the market space as much as possible (Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Interestingly, the authors found that new ventures can influence other 
market actors using soft power tactics (i.e. early timings, self-serving illusions, and 
exploitations of others’ natural tendencies) to influence the actions of others. 
 Prior studies suggest that shaping a nascent field can involve institutional work 
where organizations create new meanings as the field emerge (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006; Greenwood et al., 2011). The ambiguous and fluid situations in a nascent field offer 
the opportunity to shape the collective cognitions toward a particular industry or 
ecosystem (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Firms who assume the role of ‘industrial 
champions’ initiate collective actions and devise strategies for establishing a sequence of 
interactions to create entirely new industries and associated institutional logic (Aldrich 
and Fiol, 1994; Garud et al., 2002). According to Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), 
institutional works involves constructing identities and meanings, reconfiguring actors’ 




technological fields, an important aspect of institutional works involves the development 
of technological standards (Garud et al., 2002). Technological standards represent the 
rules of engagement that define how different systems work together to function (Garud 
and Kumaraswamy, 1993; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). By developing a common standard, 
firms can derive competitive benefits as they can dictate the specifications of individuals 
components and how they should interact (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). The 
development of technological standards involves generating collective action among a 
group of actors that may have a contradictory vision and agenda (Garud et al., 2002). 
Prior studies have shown the role of institutional works to mobilize collective actions 
around the new standards (Garud et al., 2002; Gawer and Phillips, 2013). The case of Sun 
Microsystem showed how the firm employed social and political processes to mobilize 
collective actions and to avoid deviation from a common vision  (Garud et al., 2002). For 
example, Sun Microsystem used strong-arm tactics through legal instruments to sustain 
cooperation and to suppress the private interests of actors within a coalition. The firm also 
evokes the image of a common enemy to galvanize collective action. Another study by 
Gawer & Phillips (2013) also showed how Intel cultivated an external perception of 
trustworthiness by convincing others that they were a neutral platform leader. This 
research implies that that the creation of new technical institutions requires political and 
social skills to mobilize collective actions and to maintain cohesiveness’s among actors.  
 Research on ecosystem strategy has also underlined the importance of collaboration 
and coordination to facilitate ecosystem emergence. In an ecosystem, firms need to 
orchestrate a set of activities performed by multiple sets of partners in order to create 
value (Adner, 2012; Adner, 2017). In this case, ecosystem creators i.e. the keystone player 
need to ensure the availability of necessary components provided by other actors that are 
not bounded by hierarchical relationships or contractual agreements (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Jacobides et al., 2018). Previous studies examined cooperative actions that firms 
use to enable partners to jointly create value for the overall ecosystems (Gawer and 
Henderson, 2007; Ethiraj, 2007; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Adner, 2012). A study by 
Ethiraj (2007), for instance, showed how firms initiate joint R&D to enable component 
providers to resolve the constraints in developing components of a product system. Gawer 
and Henderson (2007) also found that Intel dedicated resources and provide incentives 
for its partners in producing components for the PC ecosystem. Similarly, Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt (2009) showed how proactive engagements of game publishers toward the 
carriers and handset makers contribute to the emergence of the wireless gaming 




ecosystem (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Jacobides et al., 2006; Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009). Firms’ competitive actions are essential to capture the value created within the 
ecosystem and to secure competitiveness. Research shows that firms can secure the most 
value capture through several mechanisms such as early entry (Jacobides et al., 2006), 
revenue sharing agreement (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009), establishing proprietary 
standards (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002), and limiting dependence on complementors 
(Jacobides et al., 2016). 
 Recently, research has underscored the firms’ ability to navigate cooperation and 
competition (i.e. coopetition) tensions to shape the emergence of a new ecosystem (Ansari 
et al., 2016; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018). A study by Ansari and colleagues (2016), for 
instance, highlighted the coopetition tensions face by a start-up firm attempting to reshape 
an established ecosystem through disruptive innovations. The coopetition tensions arose 
since the disruptor need the support of the incumbents whose technologies, products, or 
business model could potentially get disrupted. According to the authors, a disruptor 
confronted three coopetitive tensions simultaneously namely intertemporal, dyadic, and 
multilateral. To navigate these tensions, they found that the disruptor continuously adjusts 
its strategy as the ecosystem evolves (Ansari et al., 2016). Another study by Hannah & 
Eisenhardt (2018) showed how new ventures navigate cooperation and competition 
tension in the nascent residential solar industry. They found that firms that can balance 
competition and cooperation over time tend to have a higher performance. In doing so, 
successful firms shift cooperation-competition balance efficiently based on the 
‘bottleneck’ crowdedness. In a similar vein, recent research by Dattee and colleagues 
(2018) investigated the creation of novel innovation ecosystems based on generative 
technologies. The authors showed that during a nascent stage of an ecosystem firms have 
difficulties convincing others to commit resources to a de novo ecosystem since there is 
no compelling “blueprint” for the future of the ecosystem. The absence of a blueprint 
implies the lack of value propositions (i.e. what value is created, how, and for whom) and 
the structures of ecosystems (i.e. who does what, who controls what, and how everyone 
will benefit) (Adner, 2006; Dattee et al., 2018). They found that the creation of a novel 
ecosystem is a process of collective discovery orchestrated by the focal firm that involves 
developing the provision of the ecosystem, envisioning the interdependencies, enacting 
internal and external momentum. To win at the ecosystem game, the authors suggested 
for establishing dynamic control over the creation process to ensure the value propositions 
evolves in a way that the firm hopes to capture some of the created value. A dynamic 




anticipated control points, monitoring the evolution of ecosystems, and updating 
strategies (Dattee et al., 2018). 
 In sum, research on competition in nascent fields reveals that established firms not 
only passively adapt to nascent fields enabled by emerging technologies but can also 
attempt to influence the development of the field to their advantage. However, it requires 
a superior ability to mobilize collective actions and managing tensions of cooperation and 
competition. 
2.2.3 Platform Creation by Established Firms 
As mention in the previous section, the proliferation of digital platforms presents both 
challenges and opportunities for incumbent firms. For established firms with a legacy of 
traditional linear value chains, platforms represent a fundamentally different logic in 
creating value and establishing competitive advantage (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; van 
Alstyne et al., 2016). The supply chain or ‘product’ business involves a linear series of 
production activities where firms create value by optimizing an entire chain of production 
activities and controlling the end products. In contrast, platforms create value by 
providing a foundation technology that is essential for complex and broader value 
propositions (van Alstyne et al., 2016). Platforms change the strategic objective from 
tightly controlled supply chains to loose coalitions of partners and complementors beyond 
the firm’s boundary (Parker et al., 2016). Unlike the traditional buyer-supplier 
relationship in linear business models, a platform leader needs to exert influence on the 
ecosystem without formal contracts and hierarchical relationships. Table 2 contrasts the 
linear supply chain logic with the platform logic. 
Table 2: The comparison of supply chain and platform  
(Gawer & Phillips, 2003: Parker et al., 2016) 
 Supply-chain Platform 
Industry 
Structure 
o Industry or supply-chain 
hierarchy  
o Platform-based ecosystem 
Organizational 
Member 
o Focal Firm/Assembler 
o Supplier 
o Platform leader/Hub firm 
o Complementor 
Objectives o Individual firm’s performance 
o Individual firm’s performance 
o Collective innovation 




o Leadership through the control 
of supply-chain relationship 
and scarce & valuable 
resources 
o Leadership through orchestration 




o Formal buyer-seller contracts 
o Ownership of resources 
o Tight control of intellectual 
property rights 
o Non formal contracts 
mechanisms (e.g. industry forum, 





 Supply-chain Platform 
o Ownership of the platform’s core 
technology, but not the whole 
system. 
o Open intellectual property 
through standard interfaces 
Value creation 
o Optimization of a linear series 
of production activities. 
o Control of the end products 
o Creation of ecosystem-wide value 
propositions 
o Facilitation of external 
innovations 
o Facilitation of interactions among 
different sides of actors 
Value capture o Number of products sold 
o The consumption/usage of 
platform’s functions. 
o Complementary innovations 
Innovation 
approach 
o Innovation trajectory solely 
defined by the focal firm 
o Locus of innovation for 
suppliers is restricted by the 
focal firm 
o Innovation trajectory is 
influenced but not defined by the 
platform leader 
o The platform leader distributed 
and orchestrated innovations, 
performed by ecosystem 
members 
o A wide scope of innovations on 
complementors 
  Despite the challenges, digital platforms also open new opportunities for 
established firms. The creation of a digital platform and its ecosystem enable established 
firms to create novel value propositions and thrive on technological changes (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008). For instance, industrial giants such as General Electric, Siemens, and 
Haier create a digital platform to connect their machines to the internet of things 
(Cusumano et al., 2019). Those established firms might be less familiar with platform 
strategy compared to the digital natives’ firms (e.g. Amazon, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft), but they have technical and market capabilities that can be leveraged to create 
a digital platform (Parker et al., 2016; Cusumano et al., 2019). Prior research suggests 
that large and established firms can have considerable resources & capabilities that they 
can marshal to shape the new technology and ecosystem (Garud et al., 2002; Agarwal et 
al., 2017; Eggers and Park, 2018). Established firms have a broad knowledge base and a 
strong reputation that they can be leveraged for developing a platform-based business 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). They can mobilize a variety of resources, such as patent 
pool (West and Wood, 2008), existing installed base of users (Khanagha et al., 2020), and 
established network of partners (Ansari et al., 2016) Therefore, the success of established 
firms’ in creating a platform firm may rely on its ability to reconfigure existing 




 Platform adoption by established firms involves determining the strategy of 
capabilities reconfiguration that minimizes potential tensions between established 
business and the emerging (platform) businesses. The literature on incumbents’ 
adaptation provides insights on the strategy for capability reconfiguration to respond to 
discontinuous changes (e.g. Lavie, 2006; Eggers and Park, 2018). First, an established 
firm could take a drastic approach by transforming its capabilities and business model to 
fully adopt a platform strategy. This strategy involves major organizational changes and 
may shift organizational identity (Gawer and Phillips, 2013). Intel’s transformation in the 
late 1980s is an example of a firm following this strategy (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; 
Gawer and Phillips, 2013). As depicted by Gawer & Phillips (2013), Intel engaged in a 
various transformation effort to adopt the ‘platform logic’. The firm transformed its 
organizational routines (e.g. from owning to sharing technology) and shifted its business 
model (from linear value chain to platform) to fully adopt the platform strategy. The 
transformation approaches may allow the firm to capture the maximum potential value in 
the ecosystem, especially in the platform-ecosystem characterized by network 
externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). The transformation approaches also effective to 
pre-occupy a strategic position in the ecosystem and hinders new competitors from 
entering the space (Parker et al., 2016). By gaining the first-mover advantages and 
network effects, the firm can define the competitive dynamics in the platform ecosystem 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Nevertheless, this approach requires significant 
investment and commitment from the management (Wessel et al., 2016; Khanagha et al., 
2018). It also needs a superior ability to identify potential capability gaps that inform the 
direction of capability reconfiguration such as which capabilities to acquire and which 
capabilities to substitute (Lavie, 2006). Moreover, organizations will likely face tensions 
and conflicts from internal organizations and stakeholders caused by dramatic shifts in 
the firm’s identity and organizational culture (Tripsas, 2009; Gawer and Phillips, 2013). 
As such, the success of this approach heavily depends on the firms’ ability to manage 
potential tensions and internal conflicts. 
The second alternative is to follow an evolutionary approach by incrementally 
adjusting and modifying existing capabilities. This approach aims to adjust the existing 
capabilities in a path-dependent manner with limited modification (Lavie, 2006). This 
approach follows the adaptation logic that emphasizes learning and evolutionary 
adjustment to emerging opportunities (e.g. Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Davis et al., 2009). 
The evolutionary approach encourages learning and experimentation in order to identify 




delaying resource commitments when uncertainties are high to minimize the risk of 
committing early to a suboptimal strategy (Dattee et al., 2018). In the context of platform 
creation, established firms following this approach tend to aim to leverage as much as 
possible its established competitive advantage, while creating the platform business 
(Gawer, 2009). SAP, a global enterprise software maker, is one of the firms following 
this approach (Gawer, 2009). SAP has traditionally developed and sold integrated 
solutions (i.e. software) for enterprise resource planning and supply chain management. 
To develop a ‘business process platform’, SAP leverage its technical and market 
capabilities that relied on pre-existing knowledge used in software and applications. 
SAP’s evolved technical capability enabled the development of a digital platform with 
predefined enterprise services and integration technology (Gawer, 2009). By this 
approach, SAP successfully transitioned to the platform business and developed an 
ecosystem surrounding it.  Nevertheless, this strategy is based on the assumption that the 
firm’s capabilities are relatively applicable to the new (platform) context. An evolutionary 
approach might be insufficient to produce the desired change in a timely fashion given 
the dynamic of platform competitions (Wessel et al., 2016; Cennamo, 2019). The firms 
may lose the opportunity to influence the development of the ecosystem and capture the 
most values from the ecosystem because of competitive actions by more aggressive 
players (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). They may also face the risk of ‘envelopment’ by 
more dominant players which may challenge the survival of their platforms (Eisenmann 
et al., 2011). As such, managers may need to consider the opportunity cost of late response 
and the competitive dynamics of the ecosystems when following this strategy.    
Between the two extremes, a firm may follow an intermediate response that 
incorporates both existing and new technological capabilities and resources. The hybrid 
strategy involves a combination of capabilities modifications through internal learning 
and acquisitions of new capabilities from external sources (e.g. industry consortium, 
alliance partners, new employees) (Lavie, 2006). Firms following this approach aim to 
introduce platforms that combine elements of both new and old systems (Furr and Snow, 
2015; Suarez et al., 2018). Scholars argue that hybrid strategy allows an organization to 
learn about uncertain technological future especially related to supply-side knowledge, 
demand-side knowledge, and timing knowledge (Furr and Snow, 2015).  In the context 
of platform creation, firms following this approach typically create digital platforms to 
enhance their existing competitive advantage in the linear value chain businesses (Parker 
et al., 2016).  An example of this strategy can be illustrated by the case of Volvo in 




or incremental evolution, Volvo’s managers believed that the success of digital platform 
development depended on an appropriate combination of existing and new/requisite 
capabilities. Platform development at Volvo involved the acquisition of new capabilities 
through external collaborations (i.e. strategic alliances) as well as internal capability 
building. By this approach, Volvo tried to recombine its product legacy (i.e. car 
manufacture) with digital platform capability (i.e. cloud and connectivity) that would 
sustain its advantage in the car industry (Svahn et al., 2017). However, executing the 
hybrid approach is challenging and difficult as the firm engages in dual business models 
and follows two opposing logics simultaneously: product & platform (Markides and 
Charitou, 2004; Gawer, 2009). In addition, firms may expose to the ‘hybrid trap’ in which 
they do not excel in either the product or platform and deliver suboptimal performance 
(Suarez et al., 2018). Firms following this strategy, therefore, need to have a high-level 
integrative capability that enables them to effectively coordinate contrasting activities, 
capabilities, and objectives (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018).  
In essence, established firms adopting a platform strategy need to reconfigure their 
existing capabilities. Prior works suggest that firms may follow a transformation strategy 
that involves major organizational changes or follow an evolutionary approach which 
involves incremental changes. Firms may also follow an intermediate/hybrid strategy by 
combining existing capabilities and new capabilities. Each strategy has costs and risks 
which make the strategic choice far from trivial. The complexity of strategy development 
significantly increases in the context of nascent ecosystems since firms do not have 
sufficient knowledge regarding the technical characteristics and market preferences. In 
this setting, strategy development might rely on the managers’ subjective interpretations 
and perceptions toward emerging opportunities. In the next section, the literature on 
managerial cognition is consulted to understand how cognitive processes influence firms’ 





2.3 The Role of Managerial Cognitions in Strategy Development and 
Strategic Change 
The literature on platform and firms’ strategy in nascent fields indicate that platform 
creation in nascent ecosystems replete with extreme uncertainty and ambiguity. In this 
context, managers making strategic decisions based on ambiguous information since the 
technologies are emerging, customer preferences are still in flux, and the ecosystem is 
still evolving (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Consequently, many aspects such as 
technological features, market opportunities, and ecosystem interdependencies are open 
for interpretations. In this context, cognitive processes in which decision makers’ try to 
interpret and make sense of ambiguous situations can play important role in decision 
making (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2019).  
The strategic cognition literature has underscored the impact of cognitive aspects 
on firms’ strategic behaviours (e.g. Porac et al., 1989; Barr et al., 1992; Walsh, 1995; 
Narayanan et al., 2011). This literature provides useful insights for understanding how 
managerial cognitions shape firms’ strategy in ambiguous environments such as nascent 
ecosystems. As such, in this subsection, the literature on strategic cognition is reviewed. 
The review starts by introducing the basic concept of managerial and organizational 
cognition in strategic management. Then, the cognitive process in relation to capability 
development and strategic change is reviewed. Finally, the emerging research 
investigating the relationship between managerial cognition and firms’ strategy in nascent 
fields is explored. 
2.3.1 The Cognitive Perspective on Strategy 
Strategy and management scholars have long recognized the role of cognition in shaping 
firms’ strategic behaviours. The concept of cognition originally derived from the field of 
psychology to describe the mental activities of decision makers (whether individual or as 
a collective) in processing knowledge and information (Schwenk, 1988; Walsh, 1995). 
Cambridge dictionary defined cognition as “the use of conscious mental process”. In a 
similar vein, the Oxford Dictionary of Psychology defines cognition as “the mental 
activities involved in acquiring and processing information” (Colman, 2009). The concept 
of cognition in management research encompasses two interrelated meanings: mental 
activities and mental structures (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). Strategy and management 
scholars have used a variety of term to denote mental structures including frames 
(Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Gilbert, 2006), interpretation systems (Daft and Weick, 1984; 




et al., 1992). Despite a variety of terms, they assumed to play a key role in an individual’s 
cognitive representation of an environment (see Walsh (1995) for a comprehensive 
review of a historical account of cognition in management research). 
The study of cognition in strategic management has been focusing on the linkages 
between cognitive structure (i.e. managers’ belief about environments and the state of 
organizations) and cognitive process (i.e. managers’ mental activities in interpreting 
information) in strategy development (Porac and Thomas, 2002; Narayanan et al., 2011). 
The cognitive perspective in strategy encompasses how decision makers perceive, 
interpret, and make sense of an organization’s strategic processes, actions, and related 
outcomes (Pfarrer et al., 2019). This perspective dates back to the work of Cyert & March 
(1963) on the behavioural theory of the firm. Their work challenged the assumptions of 
complete rationality and questioned the rational analytical models that do not consider 
environmental uncertainty in decision making. This insight provides a basis for cognition 
scholars to investigate the mental model of decision makers in understanding their 
organizational environment (Walsh, 1995). Moreover, Herbert Simon’s works on 
‘bounded rationality’ laid an important work in uncovering the cognitive limits of 
managers in making sense of the environment. The bounded rationality theory suggests 
that decision makers must construct simplified mental models to solve complex problems 
since they can only have an ‘approximate rationality’ to the problem (Simon, 1976). 
Simon argued that managers (i.e. decision makers) are subject to selective perception and 
bias due to cognitive limitations to comprehensively evaluate all relevant variables for a 
decision. Drawing on Simon’s work, cognitive scholars pointed out the role of managers’ 
subjective interpretation and their associated biases in mediating the organizational 
response to the environment (Daft and Weick, 1984). These scholars believed that it is 
managers’ subjective representations of the environment that shape strategic decisions 
and subsequent organizations’ actions (Daft and Weick, 1984; Barr et al., 1992). 
 In the managerial cognition perspective, managers are considered as knowledge 
workers with the main job to interpret and make sense of environment cues (Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Walsh, 1995). Managers spend most of their time to construe information, 
to be aware of external events, and to interpret cues into meaning for the organizations 
(Daft and Weick, 1984). The cognition perspective suggests that the external environment 
does not directly influence an organizations’ behaviours or strategic actions. Instead, an 
organization only responses to the environment if managers within the organization sense 
and interpret the environment and choose to respond to it (Daft and Weick, 1984; Ocasio, 




how managers notice and interpret the environment and translate those perceptions into 
strategic choices (Walsh, 1995). Confronted with a highly complex and uncertain 
environment, managers developed a knowledge structure or strategic frame to transform 
complex information to facilitate information processing and decision making (Walsh, 
1995; Porac and Thomas, 2002). The strategic frame represents decision makers’ belief 
regarding how the company can best succeed in certain competitive environments 
(Walsh, 1995; Narayanan et al., 2011). This frame entails managers’ assumptions of the 
competitive environment and the organizational actions required to compete in that 
environment (Reger and Huff, 1993; Walsh, 1995). The strategic frame is developed over 
time based on past activities and acts as a ‘guide’ for directing organizational actions 
(Walsh, 1995). Cognition scholars suggest that to understand firms’ strategic actions one 
has to understand mental models or a cognitive frame of decision makers at a time (Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Barr, 1998). As such, research on cognition and strategy has been 
focusing on exploring the interplay between environments, cognitive frames, cognitive 
processes, strategic actions, and outcomes or performances at a certain point in time.  
One stream of research on strategic cognition focuses on understanding managers’ 
strategic frames toward their organizational environment (Huff, 1982; Porac et al., 1995; 
Porac and Thomas, 2002). This research aims to investigate managers’ mental structures 
in understanding the environment such as industry structure or competitions. A seminal 
study by Porac and colleagues (1989) on Scottish knitwear firms found that rivalry within 
an industry is influenced by the managerial cognition of the firm within the industry. In 
this case, managers make sense of the business they are in based on their subjective 
understanding of the product offerings. The authors also found that firms defined 
competitors as firms that operate in the same product offering and at the same 
geographical location. The authors argue that a narrow definition of competition is a result 
of managers’ cognitive limitations. Moreover, other lines of works focus on the firms’ 
collective strategic frame in shaping the boundary and dynamic of an industry (Huff, 
1982; Reger and Huff, 1993; Porac et al., 1995). The collective strategic frame entails 
common assumptions regarding the causal relationship of industry boundaries, 
competitive rules, and strategy-environment relationship (Huff, 1982). Prior works have 
shown that firms within an industry interact with each other to develop a collective frame 
about the boundaries and the rules of competition in the market. For example, Porac et al. 
(1995) revealed that market boundaries are socially constructed by a collective cognitive 
model which is resulted from a firm’s observation of each other’s actions. Another study 




industry velocity; instead, they actively shape their industry velocity through cognitive 
construction mechanisms. They also found that firms in different industries (i.e. high and 
low velocity) develop different cognitive construction systems. These researches jointly 
suggest that environment is not purely exogenous, but endogenous to the interpretations 
and actions of the managers within a firm or collectively among firms.  
The other streams of research aim to uncover the relationship between cognitions 
and strategic outcomes. The research focus of this stream is to understand the impact of 
certain strategic frames on the organizational actions and performances (e.g. Barr et al., 
1992; Gilbert, 2005; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007a; Kaplan, 2008b). Empirical studies 
have provided evidence that different strategic frames shape various strategic actions. As 
an example, a study by Barr et al., (1992) examined the link between changes in top 
managements’ mental model and changes in organizational actions of two railroad firms. 
They found that managers who successfully changed their mental models were able to 
renew their organizations amid environmental changes. They further showed that 
organizational renewal not so much relies on noticing environmental changes, but on 
being able to link the changes to the firm’s strategy and to modify that linkage overtime. 
Another study by Gilbert (2006) on a newspaper organization revealed how a different 
strategic frame towards digital media (i.e. opportunity vs. threat) led to different strategic 
behaviours. A large sample study by Nadkarni & Narayanan (2007a) showed how 
different strategic schema led to a different strategic performance in certain industries. 
Specifically, they found that firms with a complexity frame tend to succeed in fast-clock 
speed industries, while firms with a focus frame were more effective in slow-clock speed 
industries. This study indicates that managerial and organizational cognitions can be more 
prevalent in shaping firms’ strategies in uncertain and ambiguous environments.  
 Apart from understanding the content of managers’ cognitive frame and its 
relationship to strategic actions and organizational outcomes, a group of cognitive 
researchers has been focusing on understanding the cognitive process in strategy 
development. This line of research focuses on the mental activities performed by 
managers in developing strategies (e.g. Thomas et al., 1993; Weick, 1995; Gavetti et al., 
2005; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). Studies on the cognitive process typically focus on the 
internal cognitive dynamics in organizations and investigate the relationship between 
cognition and strategic outcome (Kaplan, 2011). Research has underscored at least two 
important cognitive processes in strategy making, namely Sensemaking and Scanning 
(Narayanan et al., 2011). According to Weick (1995) sensemaking is a process of 




particularly important to comprehend non-routine events such as regulatory changes, 
market crises, and other unexpected events (Weick, 1995). Sensemaking enables decision 
makers to “turn circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in words 
and that serve a springboard into action” (Weick et al., 2005, p.409). Sensemaking at the 
individual level involves noticing, categorizing, simplification, and the use of heuristics 
(Thomas et al., 1993; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997). At the organization level, 
sensemaking involves building consensus in interpretation (Fiol, 1994). Empirical 
research has highlighted the sensemaking activities in an organization and their impact 
on strategy development (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Dutton et al., 2001; Rouleau, 2005). A 
study by Thomas and colleagues (1993), for instance, examined the link between the 
strategic sensemaking process to organizational performance. Moreover, Rouleau (2005) 
investigate the sensemaking activities of middle managers in a clothing company. She 
reported that middle managers had a crucial role in interpreting strategic change within 
the organizations. 
Another cognitive process that has gained interest from cognitive scholars is 
scanning. Scanning involves searching and gathering external and internal information to 
identify important elements, issues, or events that might affect an organization in the 
future (Daft and Weick, 1984; Thomas et al., 1993). Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) 
classified two types of scanning or search process: Forward-looking and Backward-
looking. The forward-looking search process entails on actors’ cognitive maps of action-
outcome logic, while backward-looking involves experiential learning. They found that 
different strategic frames shape subsequent paths of search and action. Interestingly, they 
argued that cognitive-based and experiential-based processes are complementary. 
Cognitive search provides a wider array of alternatives, while experiential search enables 
actors to test these alternatives based on the actual environment (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000). Furthermore, prior studies have underlined the role of scanning in the change of 
strategic frames. For example, Greve and Taylor (2000) showed that innovations 
encourage managers to scan the environment which stimulates organizations to update 
their strategic frame and lead to the adoption of an innovation. A longitudinal case study 
at DuPont by Bhardwaj et al., (2006) documented how the firm conducts a continual 
entrepreneurial search for long-term growth. Importantly, the authors found that the 
search process often accompanies by the creation of a new knowledge structure (frame) 
and new capabilities. 
In sum, the cognitive perspective on strategy emphasis the causal importance of 




advantages. This perspective contends that how decision makers make sense, interpret, 
and perceive their organizational environments can have direct implications for strategy 
formulation, strategic actions, and firm outcomes. As such, the cognitive lens provides a 
powerful theoretical apparatus to understand firms’ strategic behaviours.   
2.3.2 Cognitions, Capabilities, and Strategic Changes 
Strategy scholars have devoted substantial efforts to understand the heterogeneity in 
organizations’ response toward changes. The main explanations have been grounded in 
the differences in either incentives or capabilities (Kaplan, 2011; Eggers and Kaplan, 
2013). For instance, drawing from economic perspectives, scholars argue that differences 
in response to changes such as emerging technologies can be explained as rational 
responses to differential economic incentives (e.g. Henderson, 1993; Christensen and 
Bower, 1996). Other scholars drawing on the resource based view and dynamic 
capabilities argues that firms face difficulty adapting to change due to the path 
dependence and initial endowments (Leonard-Barton, 1992), and the strategic changes 
may not succeed unless they have dynamic capabilities which enable the firms to 
reconfigure their resources (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Helfat et al., 2007). 
Previous research has started to add cognitive explanations to explain why firms 
changed their strategy. Research on this stream claims that strategic change is preceded 
by the shift in firms’ strategic frame. They contend that having the appropriate capabilities 
or incentives may not sufficient for firms to instigate strategic changes (e.g. Barr, 1998; 
Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gavetti et al., 2005). As mentioned earlier, the strategic frame 
encompasses managers’ belief in the action-outcome relationship (Daft and Weick, 
1984). Given the bounded rationality of managers, the cognitive may not accurately 
represent an environment; and the accuracy tends to decrease when the environment 
changes such as by market crises, regulatory changes, or new technologies (Simon, 1976; 
Daft and Weick, 1984). When changes in the environments contradict managers’ belief 
on certain action-outcome linkages, it may trigger the evaluation of the existing strategic 
frame (Walsh, 1995). The strategic frame that can no longer accommodate or explain the 
occurrences in the new environment must be altered and a new cognitive frame must be 
developed (Barr et al., 1992). Fail to do so, may prevent managers from sensing problems 
and initiate strategic change (Barr et al., 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). The strategic 
frame also determines managers’ attention to changes in organizational environments and 
the interpretation of the impact of the changes to the firm’s future performance (Ocasio, 




strategic frame can successfully identify the opportunities (or threat) of the changing 
environment and link them to the organizations’ performance (Barr, 1998; Bogner and 
Barr, 2000). As an example, a study by Barr (1998) showed how strategic changes were 
preceded by the shift in managers’ strategic frame. By tracing and comparing managers’ 
interpretations of six pharmaceutical firms over time, she found that firms did not 
undertake strategic responses toward the environmental change until the managers 
redefine the causal link between the change and its impact on the firms’ performance. 
Prior works have documented how a strategic frame can both facilitate and hinder 
strategic changes. The cognitive research have provided evidence on how the strategic 
frame may result in firms’ inertia and hinder strategic changes’ efforts (e.g. Burgelman, 
1994; Hodgkinson, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Firms’ strategic frames often lag 
behind changes in the internal or external environments, which make strategic change 
problematics (Narayanan et al., 2011). A strong organizational identity may also reinforce 
the existing cognitive frame and prevent them to adopt a new frame (Tripsas, 2009). The 
case of Intel is an example of how cognitive inertia may delay strategic changes 
(Burgelman, 1994). Intel continued to invest in memory businesses even after they were 
no longer viable because of top management’s persistence in viewing Intel as a memory 
company. However, when a firm’s strategic frame is in favour of the environmental 
changes, it may increase the firm’s attention and initiate new strategic initiatives (Ocasio, 
1997; Kaplan, 2008a). Cognitive research has also found empirical evidence on the effect 
of cognition in facilitating strategic changes. In this case, strategic changes may be 
initiated by managers who proactively challenge their assumptions and beliefs about the 
firm, the environment, and the keys to competitive success (Teece, 2012; Helfat and 
Martin, 2015). A study by Cho and Hambrick (2006), for instance, showed that changes 
in the top management attention from engineering to entrepreneurial orientation were 
correlated with subsequent changes in strategic actions. Another study by Kaplan (2008a) 
reported a positive association between managerial cognition and firms’ adaptation to 
technological changes. By assessing firms’ responses to the fibre-optic revolution, she 
found that managers’ interpretations of emerging technologies influence firms’ 
investment in a new area. Interestingly, she suggested that managerial cognition role in 
triggering strategic changes was higher when firms’ do not have relevant capabilities. 
This study is one of the first studies which considers the interplay between cognition and 
capability in strategic change. 
Recently scholars have begun to investigate the link between managerial cognition 




have increasingly aware that the development and deployment of capabilities are 
influenced by managers’ cognition and the interpretive processes in which they engage 
(Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). They argued that managerial cognition determines firms’ 
decisions on which capabilities to developed (Gavetti, 2005; Lavie, 2006; Laamanen and 
Wallin, 2009; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). For example, Laamanen and Wallin (2009) 
found that the evolution of a firm’s capabilities portfolio was in line with the cognitive 
paths of managers. Moreover, a study by Eggers & Kaplan (2009) empirically showed 
that capabilities deployment only occurs if the strategic frames align with the opportunity. 
Eggers and Kaplan (2013) further argued that capabilities development occurs through 
two interrelated cognitive processes: Identification of purposes and Interpretations of 
what the organization is capable of. First, managers identify the purpose of capability 
building by estimating the ideal capabilities given the organizational environment (Lavie, 
2006). In this case, managers interpret the environment either as an opportunity to seize 
or a problem to solve and assess what capabilities are seen to be relevant (Barr, 1998; 
Kaplan, 2008a). Then, managers estimate what the organizations can actually do. 
Scholars argue that the nature and usefulness of organizational capabilities are subject to 
interpretation (Taylor and Helfat, 2009; Danneels, 2011a). Therefore, managers’ 
interpretation of what the capabilities are, shape the direction of capability development 
for the identified purposes (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013).  
In addition, scholars have identified the cognitive process of matching capabilities 
to opportunities (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). They contend that managers must mobilize 
capabilities to initiate strategic actions or strategic changes because it is not enough to 
develop an interpretive frame of their environments or to develop a set of capabilities 
without mobilization (Barr et al., 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 2006; Eggers 
and Kaplan, 2013). Prior studies have observed the matching process during strategic 
changes and organizational adaptation, where managers interpret the fit between internal 
capabilities and external capabilities and (Taylor and Helfat, 2009; Danneels, 2011a). For 
instance, Taylor and Helfat (2009) revealed the effect of managerial cognition in the 
firm’s ability to redeploy existing complementary assets in supporting new technological 
opportunities. The case of Smith Corona by Danneels (2011a) also showed managers’ 
bias in interpreting the applicability of existing capabilities to new environments. He 
found that Smith Corona’s failure to enter into a new product category is partly because 
of the managers’ overestimation of the applicability of the existing capabilities in the new 
domain. This study suggests that managers may have different perspectives on the 




The insights from studies on the capabilities-cognition interplay have encouraged 
scholars to examine the capability of managers in performing cognitive activities. 
Research on this area builds on the assumption that managers have different capacity in 
anticipating, interpreting, and responding to the evolving environment (Adner and Helfat, 
2003). This line of research considers cognition as a capability and move from analysing 
the heterogeneity of cognition among managers (in terms of cognitive frame and 
knowledge structure) to the cognitive ability of managers (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013; 
Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). Recently, Helfat and Peteraf (2015, p.835) introduced the 
concept of managerial cognitive capabilities which refers to “the capacity of individual 
managers to perform one or more mental activities that comprise cognition”. They 
identified specific types of cognitive capabilities that underpin dynamic managerial 
capabilities for sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring, and explained their potential impact 
on strategic changes. For instance, they proposed perception and attention as two 
important cognitive capabilities for sensing opportunities. The cognitive capability of 
perception allows for early recognition of new opportunities, while attention facilitates 
environmental scanning. Importantly, they suggested that managerial cognitive 
capabilities may function as mediators of the relationship between changes in the 
organizational environment and strategic change. 
In sum, strategy scholars have underscored the role of managerial cognition in 
affecting strategic change and inertia. Literature has also highlighted the role of 
managers’ in interpreting the changing environment and initiating strategic changes 
through capability developments and deployments. Overall, research on this stream has 
provided compelling arguments that managerial cognitions matters in strategic changes. 
2.3.3 Managerial Cognitions and Firms Strategies in Nascent Fields 
Strategic and management scholars have applied the cognitive lens to explain firms’ 
strategic behaviours in highly uncertain and ambiguous contexts, such as during the 
emergence of new technologies. Research has highlighted that in ambiguous and 
uncertain contexts, managerial cognitions play a crucial role in shaping firms’ behaviours 
since managers should make sense of overwhelming and contradicting information 
(Gavetti et al., 2005; Kaplan, 2008b; Benner and Tripsas, 2012). In the context of 
emerging technologies, scholars argue that new technology is subject to sensemaking 
given the unpredictability and of the technologies (Weick, 2000; Kaplan and Tripsas, 
2008). The nature of emerging technologies and their trajectory is not obvious. As a result, 




implication to the existing technology is (Kaplan, 2008b). In such ambiguous conditions, 
managers need to make sense of the situations and make choices about how to respond 
(Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) proposed the concept of a 
technological frame, which captures how managers make sense of technology. A 
technological frame guides the managers’ interpretation of what the technology is and 
what the function is. They argued that managers’ technological frames are influenced by 
their idiosyncratic organizational history and industry affiliations. The authors further 
argued that multiple actors’ technological frames and interpretive processes influence the 
technology trajectory during technological evolution. 
 Prior studies have empirically examined the impact of managerial cognitions on the 
firms’ behaviours towards emerging opportunities. These studies have focused on firms’ 
responses to ambiguous opportunities resulted from the emergence of new technologies 
(Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 2006; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). Prior research 
typically focused on the managerial cognitions in relation to the firms’ strategic choice 
on adaptation i.e. whether to embrace a particular new technology or not. For instance, 
during the transition to digital imaging, managers’ cognitive frames have been found to 
influence firms’ decisions in adopting digital technology (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
Tripsas, 2009). A similar effect has been found during the shift from print to online media 
(Gilbert, 2006; Cozzolino et al., 2018) and in telecommunication firms’ response to new 
communication technologies (Kaplan, 2008b; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). Each of these 
studies showed that managerial cognitions influence interpretations and organizational 
decisions towards ambiguous opportunities created by new technologies. Moreover, 
previous research has revealed that certain managerial cognitions can also initiate 
proactive actions to emerging opportunities (Gavetti et al., 2005; Bhardwaj et al., 2006; 
Teece, 2012; Gavetti, 2012) rather than mere passive responses. Scholars argued that 
some “entrepreneurial managers” have cognitive capacities to discover emerging 
opportunities and create new opportunities (David J. Teece, 2007; Alvarez and Barney, 
2007). As described in the previous sub-section, these entrepreneurial managers typically 
have superior cognitive abilities to recognize opportunities as they arise (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2015). Furthermore, research showed that forward-looking managers are able to 
initiate entrepreneurial actions to new opportunities even if they lack the needed 
capabilities (Gavetti, 2005; Kaplan, 2008a). Furthermore, Gavetti (2012) argued that 
firms’ ability to pursue and compete for a ‘superior’ opportunity depends on the leaders’ 
ability to overcome complex mental processes. Specifically, he argued that superior 




manage the mental process of identifying, seizing, and legitimizing opportunities. 
Together, these studies imply the important role of managerial cognition and managers’ 
cognitive capability in shaping firms’ behaviours in uncertain and ambiguous contexts.  
 In addition, scholars have recently begun to investigate the role of cognition in 
firms’ entry strategy to nascent fields (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Zuzul and Tripsas, 
2020). As mentioned in the previous section, in nascent fields there is no established 
‘dominant category’ or a conceptual schema that most stakeholders adhere to when 
referring to products/services that address similar needs and compete for the same market 
space (Suarez et al., 2015). In this case, managers not only have to interpret the meaning 
of underlying technologies, but also need to make sense of unfamiliar product designs, 
business models, customer preferences, and competitive dynamics (Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Eggers and Moeen, 2018). A few studies have examined the link 
between managerial cognition and firms’ strategy in nascent industries. For instance, 
Benner and Tripsas (2012) argued that in a nascent industry, firms’ product feature 
choices are influenced by the way managers interpret emerging opportunities and 
conceptualize the product. They contended that managers develop initial product 
concepts based on their assumptions about the emerging industries since they lack 
concrete data on customer preferences. Interestingly, they found that the managers’ 
conception of a new product type is influenced by the prior industry affiliation. For 
example, their data suggests that photography firms were more likely to frame digital 
cameras as a substitute for analog cameras, while computing firms frame it as a computer 
peripheral. A more recent study by Zuzul & Tripsas (2020) investigated how four start-
ups progress in the nascent air taxi market. This study highlighted the role of founder 
identity in influencing the firms’ flexibility in responding to the evolving nascent market. 
They showed that founders who identified themselves as revolutionaries tend to reject 
required adaptive changes that contradictory to identity and managerial beliefs. In 
contrast, founders who identified themselves as discoverers were more adaptable to 
changes. This study suggests that a founder’s identity shapes managerial beliefs that can 
influence a firm’s survival in a nascent industry. Moreover, this study also implies that 
managers might need to continuously adjust their cognitive frame about the product and 
business model due to the highly evolving nature of nascent industries. 
 These studies provide solid evidence that managerial cognition does influence 
firms’ strategic behaviours in nascent fields. Nevertheless, the mechanisms in which 
managerial cognitions influence firms’ strategic decisions regarding product and 




design (in the case of platform creation), and market positioning deserves more attention 
(Eggers and Moeen, 2018). Research may also investigate the interplay between 
managerial cognition, firms’ strategy, and industry/market/ecosystem dynamics (Kaplan 
and Tripsas, 2008; Suarez et al., 2015). As shown by Zuzul & Tripsas’ (2020) study, the 
highly evolving nature of nascent fields may require firms to shift and pivot away from 
their current strategy towards a different approach. It implies that firms may switch or 
even break away their existing strategic frame in different milestones of 
industry/ecosystem emergence. As such, it would be worthwhile to research the firms’ 
internal cognitive dynamics overtime to unpack the complex relationship between the 
nascent fields, cognitive strategic frames, and firms’ strategies. 
 To conclude, this subchapter reviews the literature on the cognitive perspective in 
strategy to understand how cognitive processes may influence firms’ strategic behaviours. 
Prior literature has provided compelling arguments on how cognitions influence firms’ 
strategic action and outcomes/performance. Extant research has also shown that 
cognitions can trigger strategic changes or inertia. Moreover, more recent studies 
indicated that managerial cognitions shape firms’ strategy in nascent fields. Overall, these 
researches suggest cognitive explanations for understanding firms’ strategic actions in a 





2.4 Platform Creation by Established Firms in Nascent Ecosystem: 
The interplay of ecosystem dynamics, strategic frames, and 
platform strategies 
This section discusses the intersection between the literature on platform strategy, 
established firms’ response to technological changes, and managerial cognition that 
motivates the research question which this study addresses. The following paragraph 
describes the relevance of investigating the dynamic process of platform creation 
strategies by established firms, and the motivation of using the cognitive lens to explain 
the emergence of different platform strategies overtime. This section concludes by the 
fundamental issues and research gaps that motivate this thesis. 
 Platform researchers have acknowledged an increasing number of established firms 
adopting a platform strategy – a strategy where firms orchestrate complex value 
propositions by controlling a digital architecture (Tiwana, 2014; Evans and Gawer, 2016). 
Advances in digital technologies create new markets and opportunities that encourage 
established firms to enter and seek growth from nascent ecosystems (Evans and Gawer, 
2016; Eggers and Moeen, 2018; Nambisan et al., 2019). Platform literature provides 
insights on strategies to create and orchestrate platform-based businesses (McIntyre and 
Srinivasan, 2017 for a review). However, the platform theory has been built primarily on 
examples or insights from firms that have started as a digital platform (e.g. Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, Uber). To date, very few studies investigate the strategies that 
established firms can follow to create a digital platform for nascent ecosystems (i.e. 
Dattee et al., 2018; Khanagha et al., 2020). Moreover, literature generally expects a high 
degree of dynamic capability, assuming that once decisions for platform strategy are 
made, firms would be able to reconfigure their capabilities accordingly (Cusumano and 
Gawer, 2002; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Teece, 2017). Yet, recent studies have 
underscored the challenges faced by established firms when trying to create and 
orchestrate platforms due to the limitations coming from their organizational legacies and 
resource dependencies (Gawer and Phillips, 2013; Wessel et al., 2016; Cozzolino et al., 
2018).   
 Platform literature has highlighted several key strategic decisions for developing a 
new platform. One important strategic decision to be made by a platform creator is how 
to position its platform in the market (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Adner, 2012). 
Platform positioning strategy influences strategic choices on the technical functionalities 




applications it would address (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Cennamo, 2019). Platform 
strategy literature has highlighted platform positioning strategy as the main determinants 
of value created within the platform ecosystem and value captured relative to other 
competing platforms (e.g. Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Suarez 
and Kirtley, 2012; Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). Furthermore, a firm occupying a 
strategic position in a nascent ecosystem determines the share of the value created in the 
ecosystem that the focal firm will command (Adner, 2017), the sustainability of the 
platform strategy over time (Eisenmann et al., 2011), and the firm’s ability to influence 
the development of the ecosystem to gain an increasing advantage over time (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008; Cennamo, 2019).  
 Extant research has offered two distinct approaches to develop a strategic position 
in the ecosystem: domination and differentiation. The domination approach advocates for 
aiming a position where it could address the largest customer base and gain the biggest 
network effects (Schilling, 2002; Hagiu, 2009). On the contrary, the differentiation 
approach focuses on claiming a position that allows for a unique market identity through 
distinctive technological features and market scope (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). The 
conventional line of thought holds that a platform creator picks its position and march 
their resources and capabilities to occupy and defend its role in the ecosystems (Adner, 
2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). Existing research offers scant guidelines for how 
established firms can develop a platform positioning strategy (Adner, 2006; Adner, 2017; 
Cennamo, 2019). For instance, Adner (2006; 2017) suggests performing a thorough 
analysis of the ecosystem structures including the activities required to materialize the 
desired value proposition, the actors needed to undertake those activities, and the links 
between those actors, in order to determine a promising position in the ecosystem. Other 
studies emphasize certain market characteristics such as the heterogeneity level of 
complementors and customers (Lee et al., 2006; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017), 
customer preferences (Zhu and Iansiti, 2012), and competition dynamics (Seamans and 
Zhu, 2017) as factors that must be taken into account for developing a platform strategy. 
Overall, these studies generally assume that firms are able ex-ante to scan the 
environment, understand market preferences, and identify interdependencies among 
actors in the ecosystem. 
However, theories and insights that were derived by observing established 
ecosystems may not be applicable to nascent ecosystems. The inherent uncertainties and 
ambiguities of nascent ecosystems made it difficult for a platform creator to fully know 




example, platform creators may struggle to understand the relevant dimensions on which 
to differentiate since technologies, market preferences, and competitions are unspecified 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Choosing a differentiation strategy by targeting a niche 
market may also imply constraining firms’ choices and options early on (Seamans and 
Zhu, 2014), which minimizes both its opportunities to grow and its latitude to influence 
the formation of the ecosystem to its advantage. Similarly, while the domination strategy 
and aggressive actions may be effective for pursuing opportunities that can be assessed 
and dimensioned, it becomes riskier for ambiguous opportunities since it can prematurely 
lock the firms to suboptimal investments (Rindova and Kotha, 2001). These associated 
risks and dilemmas, thus, make the development of a positioning strategy in nascent 
ecosystems far from straightforward. 
 The inherent ambiguity of nascent ecosystems prevents managers to have 
complete rationality about the environment (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). The strategy 
developments in this context, thus, are mainly influenced by the cognitive factors where 
decision makers interpret and make sense of ambiguous situations (Gavetti and Rivkin, 
2007; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). In particular, how managers 
frame the ambiguous environment becomes the driver of strategic decisions (Bogner and 
Barr, 2000; Nadkarni and Barr, 2008; Benner and Tripsas, 2012) and subsequent platform 
positioning strategy. Strategy literature has underscored the role of strategic frames in 
shaping firms’ strategic behaviours toward ambiguous opportunities (e.g. Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 2006; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). Strategic frame entails 
managers’ interpretation of the environment where a firm operates, and assumptions of 
strategic actions required to compete in that environment (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 
2007a; Kaplan, 2008b; Raffaelli et al., 2019). Strategic frames enable managers to make 
decisions and act under extreme ambiguity by simplifying complex information and 
providing mental templates for ill-defined problems (Walsh, 1995; Eggers and Kaplan, 
2013). These interpretations and assumptions become particularly salient when firms 
enter a highly ambiguous new ecosystem since managers lack concrete data about market 
preferences as well as technological and social interdependencies (Benner and Tripsas, 
2012; Anthony et al., 2016). 
Prior research suggests that strategic frames influence how firms understand 
boundaries and the rules of competition in an industry (Porac et al., 1995; Nadkarni and 
Narayanan, 2007b). In nascent ecosystems, actors are not fully aware of each other and 
the available competencies and roles (Dattee et al., 2018). Hence, strategic frames in this 




interdependencies among them  (Adner and Feiler, 2019). Consequently, the way 
managers cognitively frame the alignment structure of the ecosystem shapes the 
ecosystem strategy. In addition, strategic frames influence the identification of potential 
opportunities in a new environment (Shane, 2000). Extant studies have shown that 
emerging opportunities are cognitively distant and managers have varying capabilities in 
sensing such opportunities (Gavetti, 2012; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). A study by Benner 
& Tripsas (2012) also reveals how a firm’s interpretation of emerging opportunities, 
which influence by prior industry background, influence the conceptualization of 
products feature for nascent markets. Thus, strategic frames influence a firm ability to 
sense emerging opportunities in nascent ecosystems and its attitude toward the 
opportunities.   
Strategic frames also shape managers’ evaluation of emerging opportunities in 
terms of their relevance to the firm’s capabilities and legacies (Lavie, 2006; Raffaelli, 
2019). When confronted with emerging opportunities, managers interpret the match 
between the firm’s capabilities and the emerging opportunities before taking strategic 
actions (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Prior research on incumbent’s adaptation argues that 
opportunities that perceived not fit with the organization’s capabilities and legacies tend 
to be disregarded (Hodgkinson, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Nevertheless, managers 
can leverage their cognitive capacity to recognize contradictions and embrace 
incongruous capabilities and opportunities (Smith and Tushman, 2005; Raffaelli et al., 
2019); hence, they are able to bundle and mobilize seemingly incompatible capabilities 
to pursue emerging opportunities (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Moreover, how managers 
perceive the applicability of existing capabilities to the new environments influence the 
pathway of capability developments and reconfiguration (Lavie, 2006; Danneels, 2011b). 
This implies that managers with different assumptions of capabilities-opportunities fit 
will have different approaches to capability reconfiguration in relation to securing 
strategic positions in the nascent ecosystems. 
Lastly, the shift in firms’ strategic frame could instigate strategic changes that 
necessary to respond to the changing environment (Barr, 1998; Raffaelli et al., 2019). 
Prior studies have documented how strategic frames can both facilitate and hinder 
strategic changes (e.g. Burgelman, 1994; Hodgkinson, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
Since the strategic frame entails managers’ belief on the action-outcome relationship 
(Daft and Weick, 1984), strategic changes occur when manages redefine their belief on 
the causal link between the changing environment and its impact to the firm’s 




dynamic of a firm’s strategies in a nascent ecosystem is influenced by the fluctuations of 
a firm strategic frame over the course of the ecosystem’s evolution. 
 Despite its potential impact on platform creation, current strategy literature rarely 
considers cognitive aspects in examining firms’ strategic actions in a nascent platform-
based ecosystem (Suarez et al., 2015; Pfarrer et al., 2019). Moreover, existing platform 
strategy research mostly focuses on platform strategy at a given point in time rather than 
examining its processual dynamic over time (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). The few 
scholars who took a processual perspective (e.g. Eisenmann et al., 2011; Teece, 2017; 
Khanagha et al., 2020) have focused around technology and market evolution over the 
platform’s lifecycle, but did not examine the internal cognitive processes. As such, how 
managerial cognitions influence firms’ positioning strategy over time remains unclear. 
To conclude, the literature on platform strategy has underlined the strategic 
decisions a platform creator should make when developing a platform for an established 
ecosystem. However, literature provides scant guidelines that established firms can 
follow to create a platform for nascent ecosystems. More recent research revealed that 
platform creation in nascent ecosystems is fraught with challenges and dilemmas since 
strategic decisions must be made under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Established firms face unique challenges in this regard, as they need to incorporate 
constraints of their organizational legacy and resource dependencies in their decision 
making. These challenges call for an in-depth investigation of the process of platform 
creation for a nascent ecosystem by an established firm. Furthermore, platform creators 
will likely deploy a complex repertoire of strategies that change over time given the 
highly evolving nature of nascent ecosystems. As such, we need to understand why 
certain platform strategies emerge or shift over the course of ecosystem evolution. The 
literature on managerial cognition can provide a powerful theoretical lens to understand 
firms’ strategic actions given the prevalence of cognitive processes that may dominate on 
strategy making in the ambiguous environment.  
Thus, it motivates this study to ask: How does an established firm develop platform 
positioning strategies for a nascent ecosystem and Why does it emerge and shift over 
time? This research question has elements of uncovering the process (how), which can be 
observed through the firm strategic actions, and the drivers (why), which can be observed 
through the strategic frames underlying the strategic actions. To address this question, 
therefore, an in-depth longitudinal study that allows for a thorough investigation of 





CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the methodology and research design of this research project. The 
research methodology entails a plan, procedure, and techniques applied in a research 
project to address the research question(s). Specifically, the research methodology 
describes philosophical assumptions, research design, the data sources and the collection 
techniques, and the approach to data analysis (Ritchie et al., 2014). A detailed explanation 
of these various aspects and the rationale of the chosen methodology is presented in this 
chapter. 
This chapter consists of five sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter explains the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning this research including the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions regarding the investigated social phenomenon. Then, the 
next sub-chapter describes a case study approach as a suitable strategy of inquiry. In line 
with the qualitative research design approach, the data sources and the collection 
techniques are discussed. Next, a detailed documentation of the data analysis approaches 
adopted in this research is presented. This chapter concludes with the ethical 
consideration of this research project. 
Overall, this research adopts critical realism (Mir and Watson, 2001) as the 
philosophical stance to questions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology. A 
longitudinal case study (Pettigrew, 1990) method is used to provide an in-deep 
understanding of the evolving process of the phenomenon under investigation. Multiple 
techniques were used for data collection including, semi-structured interviews, field 
observations, analysis of internal archives, and external reports. In analysing the data, an 
iterative inductive theory building technique (Strauss et al., 1997) was used to infer 
theoretical insights from raw data. The following sub-chapters explain the motivations 
underlying the chosen research methodology. 
3.1 Philosophical Stances 
Research design and the choice of methodology should be guided by philosophical 
paradigms that underpinning a researcher’s stances on the nature of reality (Benton and 
Craib, 2010; Myers, 2013). Social reality can be approached in different ways that are 
underpinned by particular philosophical paradigms (Ritchie et al., 2014). Scholars have 
argued that researchers should maintain consistency between their philosophical 
assumptions and the methodological approaches they adopt in order to produce a better 




represent researchers’ belief in the nature of reality (ontology) and the nature of 
knowledge (epistemology). The philosophical paradigm determines researchers’ 
assumptions on what is to be observed, what kind of questions are supposed to be asked, 
and how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). These philosophical assumptions will then guide the research methodology and its 
associated practices including data collection and data analysis (Myers, 2013). 
While there are different varieties of philosophical traditions underlie social 
research, they can be categorized into three distinct schools of thought: Positivism, 
Interpretivism, and Realism. Positivism subscribes to the assumption that there is a single 
objective reality (truth) that exists independently of researchers (Benton and Craib, 2010). 
The main tenets of positivism lie in the beliefs on the objectivity and value-free process 
within social phenomena which allow researchers to be objective and remain emotionally 
neutral (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Researchers adopting positivism tend to explore social 
linkages of social phenomena based on event regularities which involve a substantial 
number of empirical observations of events, usually in the form of large quantitative data 
sets (Benton and Craib, 2010). In contrast, interpretivism asserts that there is no such a 
thing like ‘objective truth’ since reality is a socially constructed activity which can be 
seen through different perspectives and point of views (Myers, 2013). Interpretivism 
appreciates the complexity of social phenomena and recognizes the inability to 
understood social realities from an objective point of view (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Interpretivism believes that knowledge is produced by exploring the understanding of the 
social world of the actors being studied by focusing on their meanings and interpretations 
(Ritchie et al., 2014). Therefore, the main objective of the interpretivism is to understand 
the subjective meanings of a social phenomenon by investigating how individuals 
acknowledge the existence of these meanings, and how they reconstruct and understand 
them (Stake, 1995). Lastly, realism emerges as an alternative philosophical stream that 
provides a middle ground between positivism and interpretivism (Danermark, 2002). 
Ontologically, realism assumes that there is a reality that exists independent of people’s 
beliefs or understanding about it (Vincent and O’Mahoney, 2018). However, critical 
realists1 believes that the reality is only accessible through the perceptions and 
interpretations of individuals due to the multifaceted and stratified nature of reality 
 
1 Critical realism is a variant of realism introduced by Roy Bhaskar in 1978. It considers reality 
as a stratified environment consist of the empirical domain (i.e. observable reality), the actual 





(Bhaskar, 1998; Ritchie et al., 2014). They also argue that social phenomena occur in 
open systems where the generative mechanism cannot be isolated from its context 
(Vincent and O’Mahoney, 2018). The aim of knowledge is, therefore, to discover the deep 
causal mechanisms beyond what is observable by the researcher (Danermark, 2002). 
Critical realism is primarily interested in causal explanations, moving from the what to 
why, that describe the underlying mechanisms behind empirical and actual events. As 
such, critical realists prefer a research method that allows for an in-depth investigation 
that provides rich and detailed explanations beyond the ‘surface level’ of a certain social 
phenomenon (Piekkari and Welch, 2018). 
This research is guided by the critical realism philosophy which informs the 
methodological viewpoints and other important choices throughout the research. This 
includes the research focus, questions, and the conceptualizations of the social 
phenomenon under investigation. Being trained as an engineer, I used to look at social 
phenomena from the perspective of natural science where there is an objective reality 
independent of the observer. Therefore, researchers could investigate a social 
phenomenon by observing patterns or regularities and it is possible to find the general 
laws concerning the causality in a social phenomenon. However, I am convinced that one 
could not fully understand a social reality by only observing the ‘observable’. Being 
involved in the management research for the past 7 years, I acknowledge various 
intangible factors such as discourse, perceptions, and interpretations that also play a role 
in shaping the realities. Yet, I am not convinced that reality and scientific knowledge is 
purely socially constructed in which social realities reside on individuals’ consciousness. 
For example, within an organization, there are real things such as ‘managers’, 
‘profit/loss’, ‘production systems’ that are not socially constructed. These contentions 
convinced me to subscribe to the critical realism ontological assumptions that distinguish 
between reality and the interpretation of the reality held by individuals.  
Regarding the epistemological assumptions, I agree with the contention that there 
is no such thing as ‘pure’ inductive (or deductive) in acquiring and interpreting knowledge 
(e.g. Blaike (2011); (Piekkari and Welch, 2018)). My experience in management research 
reveals that it is unlikely for researchers to generate and interpret their data with a ‘blank 
mind’ since we, as researchers, will likely to have background knowledge, either from 
theory or prior observation. Hence, I am more convinced with a retroduction logic which 
endorsed by critical realists. In this logic, the researchers seek a possible explanation for 
patterns that emerge in the data and identify the mechanisms that might have produced 




I believe that to some extent generalization of a theory is possible and good research is 
the one that can generate insightful theory for practices. In this case, the research findings 
or theories should not aim for a ‘general law’ (as expected by positivists). Instead, they 
should have a limited and contingent generalizability for a particular context. 
My subscription to critical realism influenced how I treat some organizational and 
managerial concepts in this research, including the nature of strategic choice, 
opportunities, and innovation. For example, I treat manager as an ‘information processor’ 
(Daft and Weick, 1984; Mir and Watson, 2001) where she/he interpret and make sense a 
‘real’ event in their organizational environment. Hence, I acknowledge the limitation of 
managers (i.e. bounded rationality) to comprehend ‘complex’ realities. The critical 
realism view also in line with the strategy processes research (e.g. Burgelman, 1983; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Langley et al., 2013) that focus on the actors’ actions and cognitions on 
decision making. Moreover, I adopted a realist perspective on entrepreneurial 
opportunities (e.g. Ramoglou and Tsang, 2016). In this case, the opportunities are not 
merely out there waiting to be discovered nor they are created through a subjective 
process of social construction (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Instead, I concur with the 
realists that argue opportunities are present in the deeper domain of existence and need to 
be actualized by the entrepreneurs through the introduction of novel products or services 
(Ramoglou and Tsang, 2016). Furthermore, the realism philosophy shaped my view on 
innovation as a process (rather than merely as an outcome) that involves both tangible 
(e.g. experimentations, prototyping) and intangible (e.g. imagination, ideation) activities. 
This view also in line with the emerging view on innovation ‘as a process’ which focuses 
on the unfolding process of innovation (e.g. Garud et al., 2017; Garud et al., 2018). 
In sum, this research is guided by a critical realism paradigm that considers social 
phenomena as an open system which consists of multiple underlying structures and 
generative mechanisms. As a line of inquiry, this research adopts a retroduction logic that 
involves movement from the empirical level to the abstraction level to uncover the 
generative mechanisms of a social phenomenon. These philosophical stances, eventually, 





3.2 A Longitudinal Case Study as the Research Method 
This research employs a longitudinal case study (Pettigrew, 1990; Langley, 1999) based 
on field research (Edmondson and Mcmanus, 2007) as a methodology to investigate 
platform strategy development in a nascent ecosystem by an established firm. This 
research method is chosen based on the philosophical assumptions and the research 
objectives. The following paragraphs provide justifications of the chosen method, as well 
as TELECO as the investigated case. 
 As mentioned earlier, the critical realism paradigm encourages a research method 
that allows researchers to deep dive beyond the surface level of empirics to uncover the 
‘deep structure’ of social phenomena. Scholars have considered Qualitative research as a 
suitable practice in this regard (e.g. Sayer, 1992; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Compared to 
quantitative research, qualitative research is more powerful in providing an in-depth 
understanding of a complex and poorly understood social phenomenon (Myers, 2013; 
Ritchie et al., 2014). Since the research on platform strategy creation in a nascent 
ecosystem is in its earlier stage, qualitative research is the most methodologically fit 
(Edmondson and Mcmanus, 2007). Qualitative research enables the collection of data that 
are rich and detailed, which are difficult to measure quantitatively (Ritchie et al., 2014). 
Moreover, it allows the researcher to capture multiple viewpoints from different actors 
that are necessary for a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon under 
investigation (Myers, 2013). Qualitative research is also uniquely suited to opening the 
‘black box’ of organizational processes by uncovering the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ aspects 
of the individual or collective action as it unfolds over time (Doz, 2011). Although a 
mixed method approach is often advantageous, quantitative methods are not sufficient to 
capture detailed feedbacks from the actors/participants (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
Therefore, a triangulation of multiple qualitative techniques is used in this research to 
capture a broader range of perspectives and to corroborate research findings rather than a 
mixed method (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Myers, 2013). The justification of a qualitative 
research design also supported by strategy and innovation scholars that encourage a 
deeper understanding of strategy development and innovation process over time (e.g. 
Langley et al., 2013; Burgelman et al., 2017; Garud et al., 2017). Thus, the qualitative 
approach is suitable with the nature of the social phenomenon under investigation and the 
research philosophy. 
 A longitudinal single case-study design (Pettigrew, 1990; Siggelkow, 2007) is 
chosen to understand the dynamic process of platform strategy development in a nascent 




focus on developing an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system (i.e. case) 
in its real-life context  (Yin, 2009). A case study is deemed to be appropriate when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and when the use of 
a variety of data collection procedures are needed (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). The case 
study research also suitable if there is either no theory or limited one and if the aim is for 
theory building related to a complex process (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A case 
study research can be done through single cases or multiple cases. However, this research 
employs a single case (and longitudinal) due to its various advantages in understanding 
the complex organizational process. First, a single case study enables an in-depth 
understanding of complex organizational phenomena from a variety of perspectives over 
time that could result in a rich ‘story’ describing the ‘how’ and why’ aspects (Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991; Siggelkow, 2007). Secondly, a single case study gives privilege to 
researchers of unique access to a phenomenon that may not be easily observable to 
outsiders (Ozcan et al., 2018). The case may be an initiation of an unusual or rare 
phenomenon in which multiple cases may not exist (Yin, 2009). Lastly, a single case 
study allows researchers to study a complex process over a long period of time that would 
not be feasible through multiple cases (Ozcan, 2018; Piekkari and Welch, 2018). 
 The longitudinal single case study design has been advocated as a powerful 
methodology to investigate temporally evolving processes of organizational changes at a 
fine-grained level of detail (Pettigrew, 1990; Langley, 1999). Moreover, a longitudinal 
study based on field research at a real organization or industry has the potential to generate 
substantial theoretical contributions as well as relevant insights for practices (Edmondson 
and Mcmanus, 2007). A longitudinal single case study has been used by prominent 
scholars to examine a variety of complex organizational processes including corporate 
venturing (Burgelman, 1983), organizational changes (Langley et al., 2013), innovation 
(Garud et al., 2006), and organizational responses to emerging technologies (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). These studies showed the effectiveness of a longitudinal single case study 
to explore the contexts, content, and process of changes over time. Given the main 
objective of this study to uncover the dynamic processes of platform strategy 
development, it is essential to trace the unfolding process longitudinally over an extended 
period of time. Overall, a longitudinal case study design enables the collection of rich 
data and a deep immersion to the organizational process as it unfolds over time. As such, 
the longitudinal case study design is the most appropriate methodology to investigate the 
dynamic interplay between platform positioning strategy, managerial cognition, and 




 The study investigates the case of a global telecommunication corporation in 
developing a platform positioning strategy in the nascent IoT ecosystem2. The chosen 
case is appropriate for answering the proposed research questions for several reasons. 
First, IoT represents a nascent ecosystem where the market and technology are still at the 
early stage of development (McKinsey, 2017). The IoT ecosystem comprises of multiple 
actors such as device makers, platform providers, application developers, system 
integrators, network providers, and industrial end-users that exhibit complex 
interdependencies; yet, the ecosystem structure is still in flux (Deloitte, 2014). The case 
organization, TELECO, is one of the first firms that engage in the IoT ecosystem since 
its inception. Therefore, the case of TELECO in the IoT ecosystem can be considered as 
a ‘revelatory’ case (Yin, 2009). Secondly, TELECO has a legacy of a traditional linear 
business model that may not fully align with the platform business model. This is 
important since part of this study is to investigate the response of an established firm and 
their transformative efforts toward emerging technologies. Hence, this case is suitable for 
the theoretical context. Thirdly, TELECO’s long engagement in the IoT ecosystem 
enables a longitudinal observation of evolving contexts, strategies, and cognitions at 
different points of time. Finally, the research agreement between TELECO and the 
University of Leeds gave me unique access to extensive archival data and field access to 
conduct interviews with relevant informants and to perform field observations. Overall, 
these accesses make the progresses and changes of the investigated phenomenon 
‘transparently observable’ (Pettigrew, 1990). A more detailed explanation of the research 
setting is provided in Chapter 4. 
  
 




3.3 Data Collection 
In this research, a combination of retrospective and real-time data collection approaches 
were utilized to capture the dynamic process of platform strategy development (Pettigrew, 
1990; Langley, 1999). The data collection started in spring 2017 when I was given access 
to TELECO’s internal system and database through its corporate laptop. At the same time, 
I had the opportunity to meet with a manager and his team that works on new business 
developments at TELECO around 5G and IoT technology. The access to an internal 
system as well as the communication with one of TELECO’s managers provided an initial 
background on TELECO’s initiatives in IoT. A more intensive data collection started in 
September 2017 when I was seconded to TELECO’s headquarter in Stockholm, Sweden. 
During the secondment, I was given an internal status in the organization which provided 
a great advantage for a real-time collection of multiple data sources. Nevertheless, the 
data collection covered a wider period starting from 2011, when the firm formalized its 
efforts in IoT, until early 2020. As such, the data collection also captured the retrospective 
aspects of the investigated case. 
 As mentioned in the previous section, rich, detailed, and evocative data are needed 
to shed light on the investigated phenomenon that is not well understood. Therefore, 
multiple sources of data were utilized in this study. The focus was to extract insights from 
qualitative data including interviews, internal archives, observations, and published 
reports/articles. Interviews with key informants are an efficient means to obtain rich and 
empirical data that capture both real-time and retrospective processes of interest 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Moreover, internal archives are an important source for 
understanding events and decisions at different milestones of the organizational process, 
while published reports and articles give insights related to the environmental contexts in 
which an event or strategic decision occurred (Ozcan et al., 2018). Finally, participation 
observation allows for a deep investigation of actors’ interpretations and actions, and 
triangulate (i.e. confirm) what informants have said in the interview to what they actually 
do (Myers, 2013). Table 3 summarizes the data sources and their use in the analysis. A 





Table 3: The detailed description of data sources and their used in analysis 




37 semi-structured Interviews 
with 35 senior and middle-
level managers involved in 
TELECO’s IoT platform 
initiatives 
 
5 workshops (one online, four 
offline) between 2018-2019 
 
Gained insights on managers’ 
interpretation on the ecosystem 
dynamics, opinions on TELECO IoT 
strategy, and the rationale behind the 
strategy emergence. 
 
Presented the preliminary findings for the 
sake of triangulation and deepening 
understanding on validity of the 




18 Months presence at the 
headquarters, 5 days a week 
following the standard 
working hours. 
 
117 files of field notes from 
observations of internal 
meetings and presentations. 
 
Provided an in-depth understanding of 
internal strategy development process 
within TELECO and a firm-wide 
organizational context. 
 
Identified tensions and challenges faced 
by managers when implementing 
strategy. Provided opportunity to 





335 files of Internal documents 
including presentations, 
product and marketing 
guidelines and, and strategic 
planning. 
 
44 video recordings of senior 
managers’ internal 
presentations and discussions 
on IoT strategy ranging from 4 
-90 minutes of recording. 
 
57 CEO’s letter from 2017 to 
2019 and 8 annual report from 
2011 to 2019 
 
54 instances of managers’ 
comments in an internal online 
strategy forum and in internal 
social media about IoT. 
 
Provided a detailed description of the IoT 
platform strategy including the platform 
technical design, and 
partnership/ecosystem strategy and how 
they evolved over time 
 
Gained understanding on the underlying 
motivation of a particular strategies and 




Provided an understanding on the 
strategic context at the firm-wide level. 
 
 
Captured the issues and concerns of 
managers from different organizational 





51 Analyst reports on the 
consequences on the IoT 
ecosystem related to the 
telecommunication for 
telecom industry accessed via 
Google search and TELECO’s 
internal database 
 
77 files of articles and 
commentaries published 
Captured additional understanding of IoT 
at the ecosystem level. Complemented 
the understanding regarding the IoT 
ecosystem dynamics over time and 
compared them to the TELECO’s view 
on the ecosystem structure/dynamics 
 
 
Gained an outsider view of the evolution 




Data Sources Details of the data Use in the analysis 
online in industry news 
website such as telecoms.com, 
iotrevolution.com and online 
blogs. 
Triangulate observations and emergent 
findings. 
 
3.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
The semi-structured interview is a prevalent method for data collection in qualitative 
research (Myers, 2013; Ritchie et al., 2014). Interview entails a conversation between 
researchers and relevant actors with the aim to understand the interviewee’s perspective 
on the investigated phenomenon (Myers, 2013). In this case, the informants were 
considered knowledgeable agents who are able to provide a detailed account of their 
actions and the rationale behind them (Gehman et al., 2018). The semi-structured 
interview technique was used which entails a set of pre-defined themes and open 
questions. An interview protocol format was used to ensure that interview themes are 
sufficiently covered and relevant for the research questions (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the themes covered in the interview protocol were varied from interview to 
interview depending on the interviewee’s knowledge and background in relation to a 
particular organizational context. In this case, the interview protocol was not rigid 
guidance. Instead, it is a framework that allows the interviewer to ask further questions 
to explore the expressed views of the participants (Ozcan et al., 2018). As such, some 
questions may be omitted (or added) in particular interviews and the order of questions 
may be varied according to the flow of conversation. The Interview protocol is provided 
in Appendix 1. 
In total, 37 interviews were conducted with 35 informants between July 2017 and 
November 2019. The informants were senior and middle managers involved in the IoT 
initiatives during the observation period. The informants were chosen based on their 
current (or former) role and position within the IoT unit. Some informants who were not 
part of the IoT unit but played an important role in the IoT platform initiatives were also 
interviewed3. The majority of the interview was conducted through face-to-face, but due 
to geographical limitation, some interviews were conducted through video conference 
(i.e. Skype). In every interview, the respondents were asked about their involvement in 
the IoT platform initiatives, their experiences, and their opinion on certain strategic 
decisions. In particular, I asked their view on the rationale of certain strategic decisions 
 
3 These informants typically researchers from the R&D department who work with the development of IoT-




and the risks/downsides of such decisions. The respondents were also asked to explain 
the projects/activities related to the IoT platform development as well as the challenges 
they faced in the process. Additionally, the respondents who had long been in the IoT 
initiatives were asked to describe how certain strategy emerge at different points in time 
and the rationale behind the emergence. Some of the informants (4 person) were 
interviewed multiple times at different times to clarify emerging events (e.g. strategic 
changes) and to confirm some of the emerging concepts from the initial stage of data 
analysis. Overall, the interviews typically lasted from 25 to 70 minutes and were recorded 
(except for four interviews) and transcribed. The interviews were further triangulated with 
archival data and field observations. The detailed information about the interviewees can 
be found in Table 4. 
Table 4: The list of conducted semi-structured interviews 
Informant 
(anonymize) 
Date Organizational Positions Interview 
Method  
























Sales Engagement Manager 
IoT 
Face-to-face 60 
PP 20/03/2018 Head of IoT research program Skype 60 
JS 22/03/2018 Architect Solution IoT Skype 45 
DK 27/03/2018 IoT project manager Face-to-face 30 
JE 27/03/2018 Senior engagement Manager Skype 60 
AL 28/03/2018 IoT Researcher Skype 30 
RV 10/04/2018 IoT project manager Face-to-face 50 
LK 24/04/2018 IoT Program Director  Face-to-face 45 
WC 27/04/2018 












Former head of customer Unit 
Industry & Society  
Face-to-face 60 
JF 10/05/2018 



























Portfolio Manager of IoT 
Transport & Logistics 
Skype 60 
EJ 19/11/2018 




















IoT Senior project Manager 
(Member of leadership team) 
Face-to-face 60 
KE 20/12/2018 








Strategic Product Manager 
IoT Accelerator 
Face-to-face 40 
AM 27/03/2019 IoT Service Management Skype 70 
HD 16/09/2019 Head of IoT Ecosystem Face-to-face 60 
AB 16/09/2019 
Senior portfolio and product 
manager IoT 
Face-to-face 60 
MS 05/11/2019 IoT customer director Skype 50 
* The interview was not recorded as requested by the informant 
 In addition, during the secondment, I held five workshops with TELECO’s 
employees who interested in the topic of platform strategy and business model. During 
the workshop, I presented my research topic and preliminary findings to the audiences. 
The workshop was helpful to gather inputs from the participants around the current issues 
in IoT within TELECO or in the ecosystem in general. The workshop also provided me 
the opportunity to test my findings and refine the emergent theoretical framework. Table 





Table 5: The overview of workshops 










• Presenting my research topic 
around IoT 
• Discussion on strategic 
challenges around IoT 
22 
“Strategic challenges 






• A roundtable discussion with 
middle-level managers about 









• Presenting my research on 
the developing platform 
strategy for IoT ecosystem 
• Discussions on the practical 
implications of my 
preliminary findings for 
TELECO 
8 











• Presenting the findings and 
theoretical framework 
related to the platform 
development process at 
TELECO 
• Gathered feedback on the 
insights derived from the 
research 
• Discussions of the ‘lesson-
learned’ for practice 
14 
“Adoption of platform 





• Presenting the findings and 
theoretical framework 
related to the platform 
development process at 
TELECO 
• Gathered inputs concerning 
the relevance of theoretical 




3.3.2 Internal Archives 
Internal documents are also a significant source of data for this study. The full access to 
TELECO’s internal archives allowed me to collect 335 internal documents related to the 
IoT platform initiatives from 2011 to 2019. The collected documents including strategic 
planning, strategy presentations (both to internal & external audiences), product and 
marketing guidelines, internal reports, newsletters, and meeting notes in various formats 
(Pdf, PowerPoint, and Words). The documents enabled me to track strategic changes and 
to understand how the platform strategy unfolds over time. The internal product & 
marketing guidelines and external presentations were useful to analyse the strategic 
content of the platform in a certain phase. These documents were equally powerful as the 
interviews since they gave a detailed account of the platform’s technical features, business 




and meeting notes described the rationale of the strategy and strategic assumptions held 
by the managers at a certain period of time. These data captured the cognitive factors of 
strategy making that allowed me to understand the ‘why’ aspects regarding the strategy 
emergence especially in the earlier phases of the process (prior 2016). I have also 
collected the annual reports (from 2010 to 2019) and the CEO’s letter (from 2016 to 2019) 
which covered TELECO’s overall strategic objectives and vision. These documents 
provided a better understanding of the general strategic narratives and firm-wide contexts. 
Moreover, I joined an internal online strategy forum where the TELECO’s employee 
discuss key strategic issues. From the online forum, I captured 54 instances of discussion 
related to the IoT initiatives. Finally, I gained access to 44 internal video recordings of 
workshops and internal presentations by senior managers concerning the IoT platform 
initiatives. The videos were not used to gain an in-depth understanding the emotion of 
embodied cognition of the involved actors (Gylfe et al., 2016); instead, they complement 
the insights from the documents and interviews related to the strategic content (the what 
and how) and the underlying motivations (the why). 
NVivo, a qualitative software tool, was used to organize a large set of archival data4. 
The documents were organized according to the year it belongs (2011 to 2019). NVivo 
was practically helpful to mark specific themes within search and to do advance searches. 
The software can help to group a relevant text (i.e. quotation) from different documents 
into common themes and to explore possible relationships between the themes. As such, 
NVivo made analysis of a large dataset much easier. 
3.3.3 Field Observations 
As part of the research agreement, I was seconded at the TELECO’s headquarter in 
Stockholm from September 2017 and February 2019. The 18 months secondment 
provided a unique opportunity to observe the investigated process in real-time as they 
evolved5. Observations have been considered as important sources of data in field 
research as they enable a deep immersion of the investigated phenomenon (Pettigrew, 
1990). Since the objective of this study is to understand the strategy development process, 
observations provided unique insights. Observation allow the researchers to observe 
complex social and behavioural processes as they unfold (Langley et al., 2013; Ozcan et 
al., 2018). 
 
4 The interview transcripts, published articles & reports, and field notes were also organized in NVivo.  




During the secondment, I was treated as a ‘formal’ internal at TELECO with an 
official email account and access to the offices as well as some internal events. I was 
placed at the ‘emerging business’ unit that responsible for the creation of new businesses, 
including IoT. I spent 5 days a week on the premises following the standard working 
hours of the firm. This research adopted an observer-as-participant approach in which 
the researcher revealed their identity and made the participants aware of the intention of 
the research (Saunders et al., 2015). In this research, my involvement in the organizational 
activities was very limited, but I occasionally helped the managers on non-essential 
activities (e.g. sending meeting invitations, shared meeting notes) when asked. The full 
access to the organization premises allowed me to frequently engage with TELECO’s 
employees, observe their day-to-day activities, and take part in informal chats during 
coffee breaks or lunches. I have also participated in project meetings in the IoT unit (in 
total 59 meetings) as a passive observer and attended numerous organizational internal 
events such as project showcases, workshops, and internal conferences. These meetings 
and internal events provide were very informative since they take place in the natural 
setting (Myers, 2013). Overall, the field observations not only allowed me to get a deeper 
understanding of the organizational process and strategy development process around 
IoT, but also the firm-level context within TELECO. 
3.3.4 Published Reports and Articles 
A variety of external reports and articles were also collected to complemented data from 
the internal sources. These data include analyst reports, press articles, and commentaries 
regarding the IoT ecosystem in general. The analyst reports were useful to understand the 
activities of other actors in the ecosystem and the evolution of the IoT ecosystem. These 
reports did not mean to provide an in-depth understanding regarding the strategic actions 
of other actors in the ecosystem, since this research only interested in the subjective’ 
interpretation of TELECO’s managers toward competitive dynamics in the ecosystem. 
Hence, analyst reports were utilized mainly to complement and triangulate TELECO’s 
view on the ecosystem dynamics. In addition, press articles and commentaries (e.g. blog 
posts) related to the TELECO’s strategy in IoT were collected. These data gave outsiders 
views about TELECO’s strategy on IoT. In general, the data from published reports and 
articles had helped increase my understanding regarding the context of the IoT ecosystem 






3.4 Data Analysis  
In analysing the data, I utilized the combination of established methodologies for 
longitudinal case analysis (Pettigrew, 1990; Langley, 1999), grounded theory building 
(Glasser and Strauss, 1967), and content analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The data 
analysis involved travelling back and forth between the data and the emerging structure 
of theoretical concepts in an iterative fashion (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). In doing so, 
further data collections were conducted to refine multiple elements in the theoretical 
concepts. Being seconded to the investigated organization provided me with a unique 
opportunity to immediately collect additional data relating to new events or the emerging 
theoretical concept from the preliminary analysis. The content analysis technique (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008) was used to analyse the qualitative data from multiple sources (internal 
documents, field notes, and interview transcripts). As mentioned in the previous section, 
qualitative data software i.e. NVivo 12 was utilized to organize and analyse the data. The 
NVivo 12 was an efficient tool for data coding and recoding, identification of themes and 
subthemes, as well as searching for relationships among the themes. Figure 4 illustrates 
how the data was organized in the NVivo in which I grouped the data based on the sources 
and the year (phases) it represents. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the data analysis was performed in an iterative and non-
linear fashion. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the data analysis can be described in 
four sequential steps. The data analysis was started by constructing a case history of the 
IoT platform development at TELECO. This first stage of the analysis was very important 
to identify the events, changes, and outcomes of platform strategies in different periods 
of development. The second stage was focused on investigating the different platform 




strategies within the 9 years period. In the third stage, the analysis was focused on the 
cognitive factors of the managers i.e. the managerial assumptions related to the ecosystem 
structure, opportunity, and the opportunity-capability fit. Then, in the final stage, analysis 
related to the relationship between constructs was performed and a grounded theoretical 
model was developed. Table 6 summarizes the stages of data analysis. A more detailed 
explanation of each analytical stage presented in the following paragraphs 
Table 6: The summary of data analysis 















1) Thematic analysis 
2) Temporal 
bracketing  
A chronology of internal 
events, changes, and 
outcomes (Figure 5). 
Stage 2: Identifying 
the content of 
platform strategy 







(2017 – 2019) 
1) Multiple rounds of 
open coding to identify 
positioning strategy in 
each phase. 
 
2) Axial coding to 
relate the second-order 
codes (concepts) to 
positioning strategies 
1) Identifications of 
platform architectures 
and platform market 
scopes in different 
phases Table 10 
 
2) Development of 
constructs of three 
distinct positioning 
strategies (Figure 6a) 
Stage 3: Analysing 








(2017 – 2019)  
1) Multiple rounds of 





2) Axial coding to 
relate the strategic 
assumptions to 
strategic frames. 
1) Identification of 
multiple strategic 
assumptions related to 
the ecosystem structure, 
opportunity, and 
capability fit (Table 10) 
 
2) Development of new 
constructs of three 
distinct strategic frames 
(Figure 3b) 










Selective coding to 
connect the “Strategic 




of platform positioning 







 Stage 1: Constructing a case history. As suggested by Yin (2009), the first data 
analysis was aimed to build a chronological description of TELECO’s journey in the 
nascent IoT ecosystem. The analysis covered 9 years period from 2011 when the firm 
formalizes the initiatives in building a connectivity management platform until late 2019. 
In constructing a case history, I mostly consulted with the internal strategic documents 
and published reports as well as interviews from managers that were involved in the 
development of IoT platform since its early development. These data sources contain 
valuable information related to the platform launching, introduction of new features, 
discontinuation of platform features, the growth of the installed base, new partnerships, 
and other internal events. By continuously reading and rereading, the internal documents 
I developed a timeline of the main changes in the TELECO’s strategy and the 
organizational contexts in which the changes took place. At this stage, I did a ‘temporal 
bracketing’ (Langley, 1999) to categorize different phases of platform strategy 
development which correspond to the changes in platform positioning and the ecosystem 
dynamics. To increase the validity, I shared the preliminary timeline and temporal 
bracketing to the participants of the first and second workshops and revised accordingly 
based on the feedback. As a result, three distinct phases were identified, namely: “Phase 
1: Entry and Initial positioning (2011 – 2015)”, “Phase 2: Shaping the ecosystem (2015 - 
2018)”, “Phase 3: Shifting to an attainable position (2018 – 2020)”. Overall, the data 
analysis at this stage results in a timeline of events and identifications of three phases of 
platform development which corresponds to different platform positioning strategies, as 











 Stage 2: Identifying the content of platform strategy over time and the strategic 
changes.  Following recent suggestions for the analysis of platform positioning strategy  
(Cennamo, 2019), I mapped the changes in the platform positioning strategy related to 
the platform architecture and market scope between 2011 and early 2020. I decided to 
firstly focus on the platform strategies rather than the cognitive aspects of the strategy 
making since they were more observable. I examined the content of internal documents 
(e.g. Presentations, Product & Marketing guidelines, reports) describing the platform 
technical specification, product feature, platform roadmap, target market, customer 
benefits, competitive analysis, commercial plan, and ecosystem/partnership strategy. The 
content of interview transcripts and field notes were also analysed in order to understand 
the platform positioning strategy in phase 2 and phase 3. Following the advice by Gioia 
and colleagues (2013) regarding qualitative rigor in inductive research, I used sentences 
or paragraphs as coding units. Each textual expression was labelled with either the exact 
languages used in the text or with simple descriptive phrases. Then, multiple specific 
textual expressions were grouped into first-order codes according to the similarity. The 
links between first-order codes were established in the next round of axial coding. Then, 
the similarities in the first-order codes were evaluated and were given theoretical labels. 
As an illustration, the first-order code of “Targeting and exploiting the existing network 
of customers” was formed by statements explaining the mobile operators as the main 
target customers of the platform. That first-order code was linked to another first-order 
code of “Engaging existing partners” which then was grouped to a second-order code of 
“Leveraging existing customers and partners”. The second-order code represents the firm 
strategic actions related to the platform architecture and platform market scope. Based on 
the analysis it was apparent that the platform architecture was represented by the 
technological layer in which the platform operates, while platform market scope was 
represented by the platform target markets and partnership approach. Finally, I inferred 
an association between the second-order codes based on informants’ statements related 
to the strategic position aimed by the firm in a particular phase. Finally, these second-
order codes were clustered in the form of new theoretical constructs representing the 
positioning strategy of the firm in each phase. 
 Stage 3: Analysing the strategic frame underlying the platform strategy. The next 
stage of data analysis was devoted to investigating the cognitive aspects underlying the 
development of platform positioning strategy.  In line with the previous research on 
strategic cognition, I focused my attention on uncovering the strategic frame of managers 




2006; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007a). At this stage, I relied on the interview transcripts 
and field notes to understand the rationale of a platform strategy. Internal archives 
including video presentations and interviews were also consulted. The content analysis 
technique was performed in analysing the qualitative data. At first, I looked at specific 
words that represent managerial believe, assumptions, and expectations such as “We 
believe..” , “We thought..”, “..will be.. in the future”.   In the first round of the analysis, I 
found three types of assumptions held by the managers that shape the strategic frame in 
each phase, including the assumptions of ecosystem structure, the assumptions of 
opportunity, and the assumptions of capability-opportunity fit. It was quite apparent that 
managers tried to envision how the ecosystem structure would look like and what is the 
role of TELECO and mobile operators (as the firm’s core customer) in the nascent IoT 
ecosystem. Managers also estimated how big the opportunity was for the firm and 
evaluated the extent the firm capabilities fit with the opportunity. Therefore, in the second 
round of data analysis, I focused on capturing managers’ assumptions toward these 
aspects in different phases. Then, I employed the same coding technique as in the previous 
stage to structure the data. From this analysis, I identified the shifts of managers’ 
assumptions over three phases of platform development, which highlights in Table 10 in 
Chapter 5. Finally, the second-order codes were clustered in a theoretical construct 
representing the strategic frame in each phase. The data structure derived from analysis 
in stage 2 and stage 3 is presented in Figure 6. 
 Stage 4: Developing a grounded theoretical model. In the last stage of data analysis, 
I verified the emerging theoretical constructs by running through the data once again. The 
aim of data analysis in this stage was not only to verify each theoretical construct but also 
to infer the relationship between the constructs of strategic frames and the platform 
positioning strategies (Gioia et al., 2013). Based on informant statements and theoretical 
work regarding these concepts, it can be inferred that strategic framed precede over and 
shape the platform positioning strategy. Follow-up meetings with key informants and the 
formal discussions during the workshop verified the correspondence between the 
emerging theoretical insights and their experiences, which further enhanced the internal 
and external validity of the theoretical model. I revised the model multiple times based 
on feedback from the informants, my supervisors, and academic colleagues during 
conferences. Finally, the robust theoretical model which is the core contribution of this 







•Leveraging firm’s technical expertise and 
capabilities  
•Positioned as a leading specialist for a specific 
technological layer 
Focused development to a 
specific tech. layer 
•Targeting existing customers as the main users 
of the platform 
•Engaging existing partners 
Leverage existing 
customers and partners 
ANALOGOUS 
POSITIONING 
•Verticalizing all technology layers 
•Positioned as a leading specialist for a 
specific technological layer 
Development of a full-
stack platform 
•Broadening the target markets beyond mobile 
operators 
•Engaging existing partners 
Expansion of target 
market and ecosystem 
EXPANSIONARY 
POSITIONING 
•Refocusing on the two main bottom layers 
i.e. connectivity and Device & data 
management layers 
•Incrementally evolve to the higher layers 




•Refocusing on the mobile operators’ 
markets. 
•Non-competitive positioning and 
collaboration with other powerful actors 
Refocusing to a selective 
target market 




























•The rise of technologies enabler for the 
emergence of IoT   
•Emerging needs from the existing markets 
•Consistency between new technological trend 
with the firm’s expertise and legacy 
•Perceived match between the existing 
capabilities and the required capabilities in IoT 
•Existing customers & partners were expected 
to have similar role & position in the emerging 
ecosystem 
•Underdeveloped structure with few small 
players exploring the ecosystem 
•Optimistic projection of market potential 
beyond the existing customer 
•Perceived success as a connectivity 
management platform specialist 
Incremental growth 
from existent customers 
Consistency between the 
existing capabilities and 
required capabilities 
High degree of similarity 






•Assumptions of high applicability of 
capabilities 
•Confidences in narrowing capability gaps and 
shaping the ecosystem’s future 
•The IoT ecosystem as an expansion of the 
existing  
•High expectation to be a central and leading 
player in the broader IoT ecosystem 
Adequate capabilities to 
shape the nascent 
ecosystem 
Transformative ecosystem 
structure where TELECO 
could be the central player 
PROACTIVE 
FRAME 
•Changing perception of sources of growth, 
refocusing to connectivity & device 
management 
•Revised understanding of market and 
technology maturities 
Targeted growth 
opportunity based on 
emerging needs of existent 
customers and limited new 
customers 
•Revised understanding of capability gaps 
•Realization of increased organizational 
complexity  
•Awareness of potential market occupation 
by powerful actors 
•Awareness of potential market overlaps by the 
core customers 
Partially adequate 
capabilities to pursue better-
defined opportunities 
Increasingly structured and 
competitive ecosystem with 
limited attainable position 
ADAPTIVE 
FRAME 
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Committee (reference number: LTLUBS-178) before entering the field. 
 Ethical considerations were followed during the data collection. All research 
participants were informed about the objective of the research. In addition to a verbal 
notification from the researcher, the participants were provided with an information sheet 
(see Appendix 2) prior to the interview. The documents described the title of the projects, 
the researcher contact, the purpose of the study, the organization and funding body, the 
reason for the invitation, the confidentiality of the collected information, the opportunity 
to withdraw from the research, and the further use of data collection. All participants were 
asked for their consent in recording the interviews and were ensured with the anonymity. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that the researcher was not employed by the researched 
organization and did not receive any type of rewards from the host organizations or its 
employee. Hence, the absence of conflict of interest can be ensured despite the internal 





CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH SETTING 
This chapter describes the research context of the study. The research setting of this study 
is the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem that is in the process of emergence. This setting 
is attractive to this research for several reasons. First, despite its enormous potential, the 
IoT ecosystem is nascent and still emerging. There are huge variations in terms of 
technology architecture, value propositions, and the structure of value creation and value 
capture, which make strategy development carried out in a highly uncertain and 
ambiguous situation. Second, this nascent ecosystem is at the convergence of several 
established but distinct global industries, including telecommunication industries, 
information technology (IT) industry (e.g. software, application providers), and 
operational technology (OT) industry (e.g. device makers, machine manufacturers). 
Moreover, this ecosystem is potentially complex, with many different types of firms 
involved from the different industries which make it challenging to precisely envisioned 
how the structure ecosystem would look like. Lastly, this setting is appropriate for this 
study because the IoT ecosystem is shaped by a layered modular architecture consist of 
nested platforms. The multi-platforms characteristic of this ecosystem makes positioning 
strategy crucial for the platform competitiveness. 
 In particular, I chose TELECO as a case study to investigate the firm-level process 
of platform strategy development in a nascent ecosystem. The case of TELECO is a fertile 
ground to address the research question of this research due to several reasons. First, 
TELECO was among the first firms that engage in IoT platform development. By 
investigating one of the pioneer firms, this study could uncover a detailed process of 
strategy development since the inception of the ecosystem. In addition, TELECO 
business model is primarily based on a traditional, linear supply chain where the firm 
develops and sells products to customers. As such, TELECO represents an incumbent 
firm that did not has a high degree of familiarity with a digital platform business. Finally, 
this case study is suitable because I had the opportunity to observe the strategy 
development in real-time as the process unfolded in its natural setting and before the 
outcome was known. This kind of access to the organization allows the researcher to 
uncover the dynamic process of internal strategy development and the managerial 
cognitions underlying the development.  
 The following sub-chapters describes the research setting in a more detailed. The 
first subchapter explains the characteristics of the IoT ecosystem and the technological 




introduction to its existing business model, ecosystem, and organizational structure is 
described. Then, the IoT-related activities within TELECO and the organizational unit 
that responsible for those activities were described. 
4.1 The IoT Ecosystem 
The basic idea of IoT revolves around the enablement of physical devices (e.g. sensors, 
machinery, appliances) to communicate and exchange data with each other through the 
internet. In other words, IoT can be defined as any physical object that is linked via 
wireless networks. The rise of IoT was triggered by the development of sensors and 
wireless technology. The idea of connecting objects through the internet has been around 
since the 2000s (McKinsey, 2017). At that time the technologies, called Machine-to-
machine (M2M) technology, were limited to one-to-one communication among the same 
type of devices/machines only. As can be seen in Figure 7, The IoT technology is the 
advancement of the M2M where it uses a cloud-based architecture to connect various 
types of devices (Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015). As such, the IoT entails a broader ecosystem of 
connected devices that exchange data through wireless networks. 
The digitization of physical devices through the IoT enables a new range of 
products, services, and business models for various sectors and industry verticals ranging 
from Google Nest ‘Smart Thermostat’ to Tesla ‘Self-driving Car’. According to 
TELECO’s internal report, the IoT is expected to connect 50 billion “things” to the 
internet by 2025. Analysts predicted that IoT has a potential economic impact of more 
than $2 trillion globally by 2025. The vast data and new information of products or 
devices enabled by the IoT bring multiple business opportunities to various application 
domains, which are often called IoT verticals, including agriculture, healthcare, and 
transportation. Despite its economic potential, many analysts and consultation firms 




consider the IoT ecosystem and market is still in a nascent phase (IoT-now, 2016; 
McKinsey, 2017; Forbes, 2019). This is mainly because of the technology architecture 
and the market landscape of IoT is still emerging. Moreover, there has been a lack of 
agreement regarding the structure of IoT ecosystems in which each and every actors have 
their version of roles and responsibilities in the IoT ecosystem (Gartner, 2018; Hodapp et 
al., 2019). 
Although there is a lack of precise view on the structure of IoT ecosystem, one can 
infer the ecosystem from the components that required for developing final IoT 
products/services. As shown in Figure 8 there are five distinct components which form 
an IoT ecosystem: (a) Sensors, (b) Hardware/devices, (c) Wireless network, (d) IoT 
platforms, and (e) Applications.  
 Sensors are small electrical devices that capture changes in the environment (e.g. 
temperature, motion, position) or any relevant-data and send the information to other 
electric devices or processing units. Hardware/devices are the ‘things’ which embedded 
by sensors that would act according to the received signal or command. In other words, 
the hardware is any physical objects (‘things’) that could communicate and react without 
human intervention (e.g. ‘smart’ car, ‘smart’ thermostat). The wireless network is a 
communication channel or a medium that transport data from hardware (with embedded 
sensors) to connect to each other and to the cloud (i.e. IoT platform). The example of 
wireless network technologies including cellular (3G/4G/5G), WiFi, Bluetooth, and 
LoRa. Next, there is an IoT platform that processes the data in the cloud and acts like a 
bridge between the hardware/devices and the applications. The IoT platform could offer 
various features, which will describe in detail in the next paragraphs. Finally, applications 
are the software that processes the information from the IoT platform and triggers certain 




actions. The IoT applications often entail a ‘user interface’ where the end user could 
control the system and set their preferences. In sum, these distinct components are 
essential for developing any IoT offerings (products and services) and have little value in 
isolation. 
However, it is difficult to precisely define the actors and the relationship 
(interdependencies) among them since there is a lack of well-defined roles in the value 
creation and value capture process (Hodapp et al., 2019). For example, one could expect 
that mobile operators such as Vodafone, BT Telecom, T-Mobile would act as wireless 
network providers; yet, in practice, they could act as platform providers or application 
providers. Companies like GE, ABB, and Siemens that embedded IoT sensors to their 
industrial hardware (e.g. machinery, appliance, and equipment) also develop their own 
IoT platforms and applications. Moreover, software and application companies not only 
offering IoT platforms or IoT applications but also developing hardware (e.g. Google 
with its Nest thermostat, Amazon with its Alexa smart home system). In other words, the 
structure of the IoT ecosystem is still in flux where positions in the ecosystems are up for 
grabs by any players who aim to secure their competitive role and position in the 
ecosystem. 
The focus of the study is on the positioning of IoT platforms in the ecosystem. IoT 
platform can be considered as a central component in the IoT ecosystem that processes 
the data from IoT devices and enable the development of IoT applications services 
(Lucero, 2016). In a simple term, the IoT platform facilitates centralized management of 
connected devices and data process & storage. However, there is no consensus regarding 




the architecture and feature of IoT platforms. Firms from various sectors including 
telecommunication, industrial infrastructure, enterprise system, and cloud computing 
develop their own version of IoT platforms. Nevertheless, an IoT platform entails a 
layered modular architecture that (Yoo et al., 2010) that typically consists of four layers 
(Porter and Heppelmann, 2014; Lamarre and May, 2017). Each of these layers entails 
distinct technical capabilities and engaged with different ecosystem partners (i.e. 
complementors). As illustrated in Figure 9, at the bottom layer, the connectivity 
management layer manages communication between IoT devices and applications 
through connectivity protocols such as RFID, WiFi, 3GPP (i.e. cellular). This layer 
ensures that IoT devices are reliably and securely connected to the network. The device 
management layer enables provisioning, monitoring, and control of IoT devices. In this 
layer, data from devices are received, proceed, and delivered to the service management 
or application layer. The service management layer integrates data from multiple sources 
for certain business purposes such as data analytics and monetization. Finally, the 
application enablement layer provides tools and functionalities for IoT use cases6 
development for various business applications including smart building, industrial 
automation, and smart cities (Porter and Heppelmann, 2014; Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015). 
The four layers represent different design hierarchies where lower-level layers 
support functionalities at higher, user-facing layers. However, these layers are loosely 
coupled where the individual design decision in each layer can be made with minimum 
consideration of the other layers (Yoo et al., 2010). As such, innovations can arise 
independently at any layer through platform resources (e.g. SDKs and APIs). 
Nevertheless, orchestration is still needed at the ecosystem level to organize and 
coordinate complementary inputs made by independent stakeholders from various layers 
(Tiwana, 2014) in order to develop and deliver IoT applications to end users. This layered 
digital platform architecture has some resemblance to a traditional linear industry 
architecture. However, the software-based characteristics of a digital platform bring 
unprecedented levels of generativity, which allows the development of an unbounded 
range of digital applications. These features allow for faster scalability, which enable 
players to dominate based on very strong network effects (Yoo et al., 2010; Sturgeon, 
2019). The results are vast ecosystems of nested platforms with various owners 
competing in different layers by offering their own standards, architectures, and 
functions. 
 
6 IoT use case is a common term that describes the area of applications where IoT technology is 





In sum, the IoT platform entails multiple strategic options of technical architecture 
and market scope that provide multiple entries strategy for firms. A firm may enter and 
compete by creating platforms, modules, products and services for a specific layer. It also 
provides opportunities to build a full-stack platform that addresses multiple layers that 
would benefit from economies of scope and diversification across layers. As such, 
strategy development for positioning the IoT platform is far from straightforward. 
4.2 TELECO as the Selected Case Study 
TELECO was chosen for an in-depth investigation of platform positioning strategy 
development in a nascent ecosystem because the firm was among the first in introducing 
a large scale IoT platform7. TELECO is a global telecommunication equipment provider, 
founded in 1876, with a worldwide operation in 180 countries. The firm has more than 
90,000 employees worldwide (per 2019) and is one of the front runners in the cellular 
technology with around 50,000 patents. Around 40% of the global wireless connections 
and data move through TELECO’s network equipment (per 2019). TELECO has a matrix 
organization, as can be seen in Figure 10. Within the period of analysis, TELECO had 
undergone two major re-organizations in 2016 and 2017. Nevertheless, the activities of 
the firms have been organized in a cluster of Business Units (BU), Market Areas (MA), 
and Group Functions (GF)8. The BUs are grouped according to specific product 
categories they represent. A BU owns, develops, and innovates products or services with 
profit and loss responsibility.  The MA is responsible to sell products/services created by 
the BUs. It also responsible to develop as well as maintain relationships with customers 
 
7 At that time, it was considered as a M2M connectivity platform since the term IoT was only 
widely used in 2014. Nevertheless, TELECO’s platform utilized cloud-based technology which 
is the basis of what now known as the IoT platform. 
8 The reorganizations mainly affected the name and the scope of the organizational units. 




in specific areas/regions. Finally, the GFs support the development and management of 
common group processes within TELECO without profit and loss responsibility. 
The IoT platform development and the other IoT-related activities were organized 
in a dedicated and independent unit within a BU. Since its development in 2011, the IoT 
unit has been growing in terms of size of employees and sales. However, the IoT unit has 
always been considered as an ‘exploratory unit’ that was not expected to be a profitable 
business until 2023. For example, since 2017, the IoT unit has been hosted in the business 
unit of Technology and Emerging Businesses that responsible to oversee new businesses 
outside the core businesses (i.e. Networks, digital service, and managed services). 
Moreover, the IoT unit had been moved between different business unit following the 
firm-level reorganization. Nevertheless, the unit has always been had a high degree of 
autonomy with little influence from the core businesses. As such, it is safe to assume that 
the reorganization had a little influence on the IoT platform strategy. 
 
TELECO’s legacies and technological expertise in the telecommunication 
technologies bring certain advantages for exploring IoT opportunities and developing an 
IoT platform. Yet, IoT entails unique challenges that potentially require a new way of 
doing business. For many years, TELECO’s business model is primarily based on a 
traditional supply chain or “pipeline business” (Parker et al., 2016) where the firm 
develops and sells telecommunication equipment to customers and delivers supports and 
maintenance services (see Figure 11). The sales of physical products and software have 
been the main source of revenue for the organization. Moreover, the transaction with the 
customers has been done in a transactional Business-to-Business (B2B) fashion in which 
TELECO supplies telecommunication equipment to the mobile operators in various 
countries (e.g. Vodafone, Three, Orange, Telia, China Telecom). However, in the 
platform business, a provider ‘sells’ the functionality and capacity of its platform and 
charge them based on the usage instead of selling hardware products and related services. 
The end users of the service would also shift from individual customers to enterprise 
customers (from B2B2C to B2B2B). The changes in value structure may require the 
development of new business models distinct from TELECO’s legacy business model. In 




addition, the IoT platform represents generativity where unbounded future applications 
can be produced from the combination of heterogenous resources of different 
stakeholders (Yoo et al., 2010; Wareham et al., 2014). At its most extreme, the IoT 
platform enables TELECO to offer various IoT applications to serve any industries (e.g. 
automotive, healthcare, manufacturing, agriculture) that would benefit from the 
implementation of IoT. As such, TELECO may need to engage with new partners that it 
has not partnered with before in order to facilitate innovations around the digital platform 
(Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; Nambisan and Sawney, 2011). These new challenges 
significantly increase the complexity of IoT platform development in TELECO. 
In addition, the development of IoT platform positioning strategy entails a strategic 
dilemma for TELECO. For instance, TELECO’s managers were confronted with a 
strategic choice whether to focus on a specific layer or to build a full-stack platform that 
addresses multiple layers of the platform architecture. TELECO may focus on the lower-
level layer that requires specialized knowledge and has a higher barrier to entry. This 
approach may have less institutional issues due to the proximity to the firm’s existing 
technological capabilities (i.e. telecommunication). Yet, such approach may significantly 
limit the potential opportunities it can capture. In contrast, the higher-level layers are more 
lucrative and bring more opportunities for value creation and value capture. However, the 
higher-level layers are more crowded with small and large players that have knowledge 
and expertise in specific areas and markets; therefore, it requires TELECO to stretch 
beyond its existing expertise. In addition, there were also opportunities for a balanced 
approach where the firm gradually evolves its platform by starting from the lower-level 
layers and incrementally move to the higher-layer. Nevertheless, choosing the right 
strategy was not a straightforward decision since the IoT ecosystem is evolving. 
Therefore, this setting allows for a transparent observation of the way an established firm 
strategizing to create a platform-based business in the nascent ecosystem.  
To conclude, the case of TELECO’s journey in the nascent IoT ecosystem is an 
appropriate setting to address the research question. The IoT platform ecosystem is nicely 
fit with the criteria of a nascent ecosystem from prior research (e.g. Ozcan and Santos, 
2015; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018). Furthermore, the nature of IoT platforms which 
shaped by layered modular architecture makes positioning strategy central for firms’ 
competitive advantage. Finally, TELECO, as the focal organization under investigation, 
provides a fertile ground for uncovering the internal process of strategy development and 





CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS 
This chapter describes the empirical findings from the study of IoT platform creation at 
TELECO from 2011 to 2020. The longitudinal analysis allows the researcher to unpack 
the dynamic of platform positioning strategies in a nascent ecosystem over time. Three 
distinct positioning strategies are identified in different phases of the ecosystem 
evolution. These positioning strategies are significantly different in terms of platform 
architecture (i.e. technical layers & functionalities) and platform scope. The in-depth 
nature of this research allows me to highlight how these strategies unfold and identify the 
characteristics of strategic frames that explain the decisions for a particular platform 
positioning strategy. Specifically, the analysis reveals how managers’ assumptions about 
the ecosystem structure, the growth opportunities, and the capability-opportunity fit 
evolve as the ecosystem progress. These changes in managerial assumptions lead to the 
shift in the strategic frame which eventually led to platform repositioning. 
 This chapter consists of four subsections. The first three sub-section (5.1 – 5.3) 
explains a certain phase of the development of TELECO’s IoT platform. The first 
subsection describes TELECO’s positioning strategy in the early stage of the IoT 
ecosystem and its associated strategic frame. The second subsection describes the changes 
of the strategic frame in the momentum phase of the IoT ecosystem which, triggers the 
adoption of a new positioning strategy. In the third subsection, the change of positioning 
strategy and the associated strategic frame in the later stage of development is explained. 
Finally, in the last sub-section (5.4), the comparison between strategic frames and 
platform positioning strategy of TELECO over a period of 9 years is presented. 
5.1 Phase 1: Entry and Initial Positioning (2011 – 2015) 
As early as 2010, even before the term ‘Internet of Things’ became prevalent, TELECO 
had begun to look at the potential of machine-to-machine (M2M) technology. At that 
time, the connection between devices/machines was mainly handled through a proprietary 
and closed system. As such, the connected devices were only limited to a single 
application with low interoperability between devices. Researchers at TELECO saw the 
opportunity to expand the application of the M2M technology by building a cloud-based 
digital platform that would bring disparate systems into large networks of connected 
‘things’, which later become known as the IoT ecosystem. To explore the emerging 
opportunities, by the end of 2010, TELECO created a small unit as a joint program 




based M2M platform). The creation of this dedicated unit marked TELECO’s journey in 
the nascent IoT ecosystem.  
5.1.1 Strategizing through an Evolutionary Frame 
In the early phase of the firm’s entry to the nascent IoT ecosystem, managers tried to 
make sense and envision how the structure of the ecosystem would look like (i.e. the role 
of actors, the positions, and their interdependencies) and the associated growth 
opportunities that TELECO’s could capture based on its legacy capabilities. Interestingly, 
managers believed that a lot of elements in TELECO’s legacy ecosystem in its core 
telecommunication businesses would apply to the IoT ecosystem. Managers in this phase 
assumed that TELECO’s existing partners and customers would have a similar role in the 
IoT ecosystem. The managers expected that the interdependencies among actors in the 
IoT ecosystem would follow a linear value-chain model with new smaller players in the 
front-end of value chains, as shown in an internal presentation (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Managers’ vision of M2M/IoT ecosystem structure (Internal document, 2013) 
Managers expected mobile operators, TELECO’s main customers, to take a 
prominent role in the IoT ecosystem, beyond their current role as a connectivity provider. 
Mobile operators were considered to have important assets and capabilities (e.g. access 
to end users, network infrastructures) relevant to the emerging IoT ecosystem even though 
at that time they had a low interest and lack of vision in IoT. It was clear that in this early 
phase, the managers envisioned the ecosystem’s structure based on their knowledge and 
experience form the legacy ecosystem. Managers’ assumption of mobile operators’ role 




“Mobile operators, as the owners of the connectivity, are in a strong position to profit from the 
new (IoT) ecosystem. They have key assets in the form of a large customer base and have extensive 
experience in building and running networks.” (Internal document, 2012). 
 In this phase, there was a lack of references concerning the magnitude of 
opportunities in IoT and the required capabilities to successfully capture the 
opportunities. Accordingly, managers evaluated the emerging IoT opportunities through 
the lens of the firm’s existing capabilities and experiences in the prior ecosystem. The 
proliferation of connected devices was expected by the TELECO managers to provide a 
moderate growth opportunity given the firm’s expertise in telecommunication 
technology. At this point, the opportunity was considered as an extension from 
‘connecting places and people, to connecting things’ (Internal doc, 2012). IoT was 
expected to provide new growth for TELECO from the emerging needs of the existing 
customers, the mobile operators. Managers assumed the IoT opportunities would come 
from the potential rise of data consumptions and related connectivity services. Hence, this 
would further increase TELECO’s as well as mobile operators’ relevance in the IoT 
ecosystem. The below quotation reflects the growth expectation of IoT in the early stage 
of the development.  
“We are in the early stages of the next major inflection point for our industry – the connection of 
a vast array of “things”. The cost of connecting devices is falling and the value of connectivity is 
rising for individuals, businesses and society in general. [..] New revenue opportunities are 
emerging for mobile operators through the delivery of M2M and related connectivity services” 
(Internal doc., 2010). 
 In addition, managers assumed that the required capabilities to explore emerging 
opportunities in the nascent IoT ecosystem would be consistent with the firm’s legacy 
capabilities. Managers believed that TELECO’s engagement in the nascent IoT 
ecosystem was a “natural progression” of the firm’s technological legacies. Accordingly, 
it was expected that the firm’s expertise in network and cellular technologies would bring 
competitive advantages in the nascent ecosystem.  Despite the lack of clarity on the 
market potential, connectivity was considered as the “key enabler” technology for IoT. 
They assumed that without connectivity there would not be IoT in the first place; thus, 
connectivity was expected to provide an “entrance ticket” to the IoT ecosystem. As such, 





“We manage over 950 million mobile subscribers and we have the competence from the Core 
networks to build the best in class (IoT) platform. We have the resources and economies of scale 
to do this as well as a long-term commitment to developing this business” (Internal document, 
2011). 
 Overall, managers assumed that the structure of the nascent IoT ecosystem would 
be similar to the legacy ecosystem in which mobile operators would remain the ‘hub’ and 
capture the most value. They also assumed that the IoT would present a modest growth 
opportunity from the emerging needs of mobile operators. Moreover, the required 
capabilities to explore the emerging IoT opportunities were expected to be consistent with 
the firm’s legacy capabilities in the telecommunication industry. Eventually, these 
assumptions formed an evolutionary frame in which managers believed that similar 
capabilities and positioning that made TELECO’s successful in the legacy ecosystem 
would be applicable and help the firm succeed in the nascent IoT ecosystem. 
5.1.2 Entering through an Analogous Positioning strategy 
The evolutionary frame which assumed high conformity between the nascent IoT 
ecosystem and TELECO’s legacy telecommunication ecosystem eventually shaped the 
firm’s decisions on the platform architecture, market scope, and the overall platform 
positioning. In this phase, TELECO positioned the IoT platform analogous to its 
positioning in the legacy ecosystem by emphasizing a specialized feature that aligns with 
the firm’s renowned expertise. At that time, managers acknowledged the possibility to 
build a full-stack platform that offer features in several technology layers. Nevertheless, 
managers strategically chose to focus on the connectivity management layer which builds 
upon its existing technical capabilities (Figure 13). 
The firm introduced the platform as ‘the best in class connectivity platform’ by 
leveraging its strong reputation in the telecommunication industry. The quotations below 
explain the rationale of this positioning strategy: 
Connectivity Management Layer 
Device & Data Management Layer 
Service Management Layer 
Applications Enablement Layer 




“In an emerging ecosystem like IoT, it is not easy to find the right path where we want to go. It 
has to be something that relates to where we can contribute. We can definitely contribute through 
connectivity. I believe with 3GPP (i.e. cellular technology) we can push for standardization and 
interoperability to reduce technological fragmentation. That’s why we’ve been focusing on 
(building) connectivity platform since the beginning.” (Portfolio Manager, 2017). 
Furthermore, the evolutionary frame encouraged TELECO to focus on the market 
that they know very well rather than target broader and unfamiliar markets. In turn, 
TELECO dedicated its connectivity platform to the mobile operator’s market. The firm 
aimed to leverage its established network of mobile operators to form an initial installed 
base. During this phase, TELECO diligently communicated its vision of IoT to the mobile 
operators and explained how they should engage in the emerging ecosystem. The firm 
marketing efforts were targeted to convince mobile operators and its longstanding 
suppliers and collaborators in supporting the platform. The firm also initiated partnerships 
with a consortium of mobile operators to increase the platform adoption. For instance, in 
2014, TELECO initiated a partnership with a consortium of mobile operators across Asia-
Pacific, Middle East, and Africa. Lastly, TELECO’s collaborated with device and sensor 
makers’ that, which have a history of cooperation with the firm, to ensure interoperability 
with its IoT platform.  
Figure 14 illustrates the value creation and value capture activity through 
TELECO’s IoT platform. In this approach, the mobile operators will be gained access to 
the platform’s functionality to develop IoT offerings to the industry customers such as 




connectivity service, data analytic, or other IoT related services. The mobile operators 
could also develop industry specific IoT services (e.g. smart cities, smart logistics) by 
collaborating with device makers and application providers. The platform revenue was 
generated based on the mobile operators’ ‘consumptions’ of the platform features. As 
such, the more active the mobile operators in developing and selling IoT offerings, the 
more revenue TELECO’s will receive. 
 TELECO gained several advantages by following the analogous positioning 
strategy. First, it allowed the firm to build upon its existing technology and market 
capabilities by focusing on the platform feature (i.e. layer) that was closer to the firm’s 
capabilities. As such, the firm could avoid major capabilities reconfiguration that requires 
high investments and involves significant organizational changes. Second, it allowed 
TELECO to offer distinct value propositions that focus on the emerging needs of a 
specific market segment. In the early phase, the demand uncertainty and heterogeneity of 
IoT among customer segments were high due to incomplete knowledge regarding 
business applications and customers’ preferences. By tailoring the platform for a segment 
that TELECO knows very well, it may increase the potential customer’s adoption of the 
new platform. Finally, the analogous positioning strategy enabled TELECO to form an 
installed base and ecosystem of complementors in a relatively short period by leveraging 
its existing network of customers and partners. The strategy allowed TELECO to dedicate 
its market building efforts in introducing its vision of IoT to a specific set of audience. 
TELECO’s marketing efforts were targeted to convince mobile operators and its 
longstanding suppliers and collaborators in supporting the platform. By this approach, 
twenty major mobile operators with around 8 million connected devices were subscribed 
to the platform. In sum, the analogous positioning strategy enabled TELECO to enter the 
IoT ecosystem by focusing on the technical layer and market that close to its technological 
and market capabilities. 
 Overall, TELECO strategy that positioned its platform analogous to its existing 
technology and market capabilities as well as reputation, enabled TELECO to enter and 
to establish an initial position in the nascent IoT ecosystem. Table 7 provide selected 





Table 7: Selected evidences of strategic frame and positioning strategy of TELECO in Phase 1  
Aggregate dimension: EVOLUTIONARY FRAME  
2nd order theme 1st order codes and representative evidence 
Modest growth from 
existent customers 
The rise of technologies enabler for the emergence of IoT 
• “We are in the early stages of the next major inflection point for our industry – the connection of a vast array of “things”. In 
2020, everything that benefits from a connection will have one. We predict there will be 50B connections by 2020. From the 
Businesses perspective, it means that new applications will continue to automate industrial and business processes and help 
the businesses to manage their assets. New business opportunities will open up, companies which did not exist before will be 
born.” (Internal document, 2011)  
• “The cost of 2G mobile modules has reached a point where mass-market deployment makes commercial sense, and 3G 
modules are following suit. the enormous economies of scale of 3GPP/3GPP2 standard technologies continue to drive down 
both the cost of modules and the solutions required to connect them.” (Internal document, 2011) 
Emerging needs from the existing markets 
• “New revenue opportunities are emerging for mobile operators through the delivery of machine-to-machine (M2M) and 
consumer device connectivity services, which add value for enterprises and consumers.” (Internal document, 2011) 
• “From being the owner of the service and customer relation, operators with the connectivity they provide, will be a part of 
the end solution, and the customer relation is many times moved to a specialized service provider bundling the connectivity 




capabilities and the 
required capabilities  
Conformity between new technological trend with TELECO’s expertise and heritage 
• “We manage over 950 million mobile subscribers and we have the competence from the Core networks to build the best in 
class (IoT) platform. We have the resources and economies of scale to do this as well as a long-term commitment in 
developing this business” (Internal document, 2011). 
• “We have been leaders in telecommunications ever since [..] 1876. Today, we are expanding into the ICT arena [..]. It is a 
natural progression [..], and those technologies are powering modern technologies such as [..] and machine-to-machine 
(M2M) communication.” (Annual report, 2013) 
• “TELECO have over the last 135 year been connecting places with fixed telephony services. From the 90s’ onwards, we 
connected people. We’re now reaching the inflection point where now we are connecting things” (Internal document, 2013). 
Perceived match between the existing capabilities and the required capabilities in IoT 
• “First and foremost, IoT is the key for the existing core business of the TELECO. Connectivity is prerequisite for IoT, you 




• “We build the solution based on our experience and assets where we are also a leading supplier in wireless provisioning. We 
have the competence in Business Support System and Core networks to build the best in class platform” (Internal document, 
2011). 
• “We build the solution based on our experience and assets within the needed domains where we are also a leading supplier 
in wireless provisioning. We have the competence from BSS (i.e. Business Support System) and Core networks to build the 
best in class platform” (Internal document, 2014). 
 
High degree of 
similarity between 
the nascent 
ecosystem and the 
firm’s existing 
ecosystem 
Existing players & customers was expected to have similar role & position in the emerging ecosystem 
• “From being the owner of the service and customer relation, operators with the connectivity they provide, will be a part of 
the end solution, and the customer relation is many times moved to a specialized service provider bundling the connectivity 
with a device and application and sell this to the end user, being enterprise customer or consumer.” (Internal doc, 2013) 
• Similar (linear) value chain with operators and existing partners (i.e. device and chip/module) play important roles. 
(Internal doc, 2013) 
Underdeveloped market with many small players exploring the markets 
• “The main competitors come from new and small ventures as well as in-house developments of mobile operators. Our 
traditional competitors have intentions and stories but not credible today” (Internal Document, 2012) 
• “Although IoT offer endless opportunities, there are some issues when applying these technologies in a more open 




Aggregate dimension: ANOLOGOUS POSITIONING 
2nd order theme 1st order codes and representative evidence 
Focused 
development to a 
specific tech. layer 
Leveraging firm’s technical expertise and capabilities 
• “We build the solution based on our experience and assets within the needed domains where we are also a leading supplier 
in wireless provisioning. We have the competence from BSS and Core networks to build the best in class platform” (Internal 
document, 2014). 
• “First and foremost, IoT is the key for TELECO’s existing core business. Connectivity is prerequisite for IoT, you need to 





Positioned as a leading specialist for a specific technological layer 
• “The Connectivity Management platform will be able to address all verticals with its connectivity management offering, 
adding more value than the Basic Connectivity Provider.” (Internal document, 2013) 
• “Our wanted position: TELECO connectivity platform perceived as the leading machine-to-machine (M2M) connectivity 
management platform by 2020” (Internal document, 2014) 
• “TELECO is a leading NEP (Network Equipment Provider) with a lot of connectivity knowhow and experience. The 
combination would therefore facilitate the global extension of M2M applications, i.e. allow telco’s match the demands of the 




Targeting and exploiting existing network of customers  
• “The TELECO connectivity Platform is a platform offered to operators for B2B wholesale business development of M2M. 
It is a horizontal layered approach for M2M optimized for operational efficiency, commercial flexibility and providing 
simplicity for applications” (Internal document, 2011) 
• Initiate strategic partnerships with consortiums of mobile operators (i.e. Bridge alliance and GSMA) to increase the adoption 
of TELECO platform (February 2015). 
Engaging existing partners 
• Secured partnerships with the longstanding partners (e.g. SIM card, device makers) to ensure interoperability with the 
platform (February 2013). 
• Initiated joint research programs with leading chip & device makers including ARM, GEMALTO, and Intel to ensure 




5.2 Phase 2: Shaping the Ecosystem (2015 – 2018) 
In this phase, TELECO shifted its platform positioning strategy which preceded by the 
change of the strategic frame toward the nascent IoT ecosystem. By mid-2014, the IoT 
technology had gained considerable attention in the ICT industry and beyond. Gartner, a 
global analyst firm, considered IoT was at ‘the peak of inflated expectations’ in this period 
(2014-2015). The term ‘Internet of Things’ had surged of media coverage and became 
the new buzzword. The number of connected machines and devices had also reached 
around 15 billion globally by the end of 2015, which was also followed by increased 
development of IoT use cases in various sectors (IDC, 2016). At the same time, TELECO 
had initiated various exploration activities with new partners from outside the 
telecommunication industry such as utility providers, car makers, and city councils 
(Internal document, 2015). These collaborative explorations, which had been around 
since 2014, aimed to explore the commercial applications of connected devices in 
multiple industrial contexts and to showcase the technical capabilities of TELECO’s 
platform. These successful collaborations combined with the progression in the 
ecosystem changed the managerial assumptions and strategic frame, which eventually led 
to the adoption of a new positioning strategy.  
5.2.1 Strategizing through a Proactive frame 
By 2015, TELECO’s strategic frame toward IoT begun to shift following managers’ 
changed assumptions on the ecosystem structure, the growth opportunity, and the 
opportunity-capability fit. After evaluating the progression of the IoT ecosystem, 
managers expected that more players including large IT firms such as IBM, Microsoft, 
Amazon, and Google would participate in the nascent IoT ecosystem. They envisioned 
that the structure of the IoT ecosystem would be radically different than the legacy 
ecosystem where mobile operators potentially face competition from big IT firms. These 
expectations were reasonable considering the launching of IoT platforms by IBM in late-
2014, Amazon and Microsoft in 2015. However, managers were convinced that these new 
competing IoT platforms were still ‘sub-scale’ compared to the TELECO’s platform that 
had been operating since 2011 (Internal doc, 2016). In this phase, TELECO connectivity 
platform had started to gain tractions with more than 8 million connected devices (apart 
from smartphones) managed through the platform. Moreover, TELECO’s earlier 
involvement in IoT (i.e. M2M) heightened the confidence in occupying a more central 
role by becoming the ‘bridge’ between mobile operators, industry customers, and other 




would be malleable to shaping efforts by the firm. Managers’ confidences are highlighted 
below: 
“We have been doing it for many years long before the term IoT became super-hot in the last 18 
months. We have led the market with our IoT connectivity platform, and it has become an 
industry-leading product in that space.” (Marketing director, 2016) 
“We are one of very few, if not only ICT provider with an end-to-end (E2E) offering spanning the 
value chain. As a natural bridge that links mobile operators with industry customers, we are in a 
unique advantage position to create value for both customer groups.” (Internal Document, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the rapid entrance by other firms created a sense of urgency to act 
fast and decisive since managers were convinced that the ecosystem was still emerging, 
and many positions in different technological layers were up for grabs. In an internal 
memo, the CEO emphasized that “Digitization and IoT are happening now” and urged 
the firm to “act now or miss out on the opportunity” (2015). On several occasions, he 
stated that TELECO had what it takes to “lead the transformation in the ICT market” 
through IoT. At the same time, the market interest to IoT had started to grow with many 
non-ICT players in various industries begun to explore the IoT applications in their 
sectors. With the IoT technology became the new trend, managers’ assumption of growth 
opportunity became inflated. At this point, managers sensed that IoT could open the way 
to serve new markets beyond mobile operators; hence had the potential to transform the 
firm “from a single industry portfolio to multiple industry portfolio” (Internal video, 
2016). The growing ambition is followed by the new target set by TELECO’s top 
management to generate 25% of the firm total sales from IoT-related businesses by 2020. 
 Moreover, managers assumed that TELECO would have the capability to shape 
the nascent IoT ecosystem according to the firm’s vision and the projection of future 
capabilities. The perceived success in developing and positioning the connectivity 
management platform formed this assumption. At this stage, managers believed that 
TELECO had “the breadth of capabilities that are required to ensure that nothing is left 
Figure 15: Manager's envisioned of IoT ecosystem structure and TELECO's 




unaddressed” (Internal document, 2015). Moreover, managers expected the development 
of 5G, the next-generation cellular technology, in the upcoming years would further 
accelerate the adoption of IoT and the diversity of IoT applications. As the key developers 
of 5G technology, managers perceived that the IoT ecosystem would evolve in a way that 
is aligned with TELECO’s vision and future capabilities; thus, strengthen TELECO’s 
position in the IoT ecosystem. As described below: 
“IoT is already happening even without the official arrival of 5G. The diversity of the IoT use 
cases will be further enhanced by 5G. With our global industry leadership in 3GPP (cellular 
technology) and now 5G, we are enabling the IoT transformation for both mobile operators and 
industry customers” (Internal Document, 2017) 
Additionally, the successful collaborative exploration with non-mobile operators’ 
partners in creating new IoT use cases/applications (e.g. connected cars, smart utilities) 
created a positive signal which encouraged managers to capture the opportunity in the 
higher layers (i.e. service management, application enablement). As noted before, by 
2016, TELECO had initiated more than 50 collaborative projects with application 
providers, device makers, and industry customers to explore the development of IoT use 
cases in various industry sectors (e.g. cities, transportation, energy, agriculture). 
Motivated by the success of these collaborations, the head of IoT envisioned that 
TELECO could “climbing up the value chain” by offering a ‘full stack’ platform that 
provides functionalities beyond connectivity (Field observation, 2018). It was believed 
that only offering connectivity management feature was not enough to secure future 
competitiveness in the IoT ecosystem. Managers acknowledged that expansion to higher 
layers requires new technical capabilities and broader engagement with firms outside the 
industry to be able to address broader market needs. Nevertheless, they believed that 
TELECO has “the breadth of capabilities that are required to ensure that nothing is left 
unaddressed” (Internal doc., 2016). Moreover, managers were aware that mobile 
operators had a different level of interest toward IoT and a lack of capabilities to develop 
IoT applications. By developing a full-stack platform, it was expected that TELECO 
could provide mobile operators with all the technical features required to develop IoT use 
cases. As explained by the head of IoT below: 
“If mobile operators manage to do something in IoT, it's usually M2M or sim card 
communications. There is no real growth in providing only connectivity. We were saying that is 
not enough. We need to move up the value chain and deliver more than just connectivity” (Head 




 In sum, the early success of initial positioning and collaborative explorations 
coupled with growing market traction changed managers’ assumptions about the 
ecosystem structure, growth opportunity, and opportunity-capabilities fit, which formed 
a proactive strategic frame. In this phase, managers believed that the ecosystem structure 
would be radically different from the legacy ecosystem in which TELECO could become 
a central player and capture more value beyond the existing customers. Managers also 
sensed the high potential for transformational growth based on the emerging needs of 
industry customers who increasingly eager to adopt IoT technology. Managers in this 
phase were also convinced that TELECO’s future capabilities (e.g. 5G, application 
development, analytics) are adequate to shape the nascent IoT ecosystems. These changes 
of assumptions eventually trigger the adoption of a proactive frame which entails 
forward-looking vision to shape the ecosystem and to capture more opportunities. 
5.2.2 Shaping the ecosystem through an Expansionary Positioning strategy 
The proactive strategic frame, which entails a growing ambition to achieve a prominent 
position in the IoT ecosystem, led to a change of platform positioning strategy. At this 
phase, TELECO aimed to position the platform as broad as possible to shape the 
ecosystem and to maximize the potential of value capture. In the mid-2016, TELECO 
launched the next generation of its IoT platform that offered functionalities in all of the 
technological layers. In other words, TELECO aimed to control most of the technological 
parameters in all layers by verticalizing the whole technology layers (see Figure 16). The 
platform was introduced as an end-to-end platform with a complete feature that enabled 
mobile operators and industry customers (e.g. manufacturers, car makers, enterprises) to 
develop a variety of IoT solutions and use cases. TELECO positioned the platform as “the 
centre of IoT ecosystem and the hub for innovation” that link mobile operators, industry 
customers, and complementors such as device manufacturers and application developers 
(Internal document, 2018). 
Connectivity Management 
Device & Data Management 
Service Management 
Applications Enablement 




In contrast with the prior strategy, TELECO aimed to control all the possible 
technological layers and target a wide range of market segments. In this case, TELECO’s 
also expanded its role as an application provider which also developed IoT applications 
and sold them directly to the industry customers in various sectors. This strategy also 
aimed to achieve first-mover advantages by occupying a central position that no one had 
yet claimed. Analysts’ statements below illustrate TELECO expansionary positioning 
strategy:  
“TELECO is hoping to position itself as an IoT matchmaker with the launch of its new platform” 
(Eurobites, 2016).  
“TELECO arguing that they are in a better position than (Mobile) operators to deliver global 
capability and orchestrate partner relationships, by leading the charge” (Heavy reading, 2016) 
At this phase, the platform’s value creation and value capture mechanisms more 
resemble the multisided business model (Hagiu, 2014). As shown in Figure 17, 
TELECO’s IoT platform aimed to mediate between the mobile operators and the industry 
customers. Mobile operators were expected to develop IoT offerings using the 
comprehensive technological feature provided by the platform. In this case, the mobile 
operators would benefit from the ecosystem of complementors and industry customers 
affiliated with the platform. With this setting, TELECO also expected a potential revenue 
from direct sales of IoT use cases to industry customers.  
 
Figure 17: Illustration of value creation and value capture (Expansionary Positioning) 
 Following the positioning strategy, TELECO initiated multiple strategic initiatives 




industry partners) and to establish a leadership position in the broader IoT ecosystem. The 
IoT unit created a sub-unit called ‘Ecosystem & Use Case’ that was responsible for 
developing a broader ecosystem of complementors and foster the development of IoT use 
cases through the platform. TELECO expanded its partnerships to major industrial 
partners including Volvo, Maersk, and some city councils to develop industry specific 
IoT applications. In addition, TELECO created an IoT Marketplace that facilitates 
interaction between actors in the ecosystem. The marketplace was a digital portal to 
connect various actors in the ecosystem to co-develop IoT offerings. The firm put a lot of 
investment to attract device makers and application developers by introducing Software 
Development Kits and exposing the Application Programming Interface (APIs). 
Additionally, TELECO created IoT Business Labs in 4 countries to encourage further 
interactions among various members in the ecosystem through face-to-face meetings and 
experimentations using TELECO’s platform. TELECO also developed SDKs for device 
makers and introduced free-in-charge verification and testing services to increase 
interoperability and adoptions. 
    Moreover, TELECO was actively involved in shaping the broader IoT ecosystem 
through industry consortium and thought leadership. For instance, TELECO initiated a 
consortium of IoT patent holders that promote open cross-license of essential IoT IPR 
and technologies (Internal document, 2016). Through the consortium, TELECO took a 
role as an ‘orchestrator’ which coordinate IPR across areas. TELECO also refrained join 
other consortia (e.g. IoT community, Fog Computing) if it only provided a small chance 
for the firm to be a dominant actor. TELECO also intensively promoted cellular 
technology such as LTE (and 5G in the future) to be the primary choice for IoT 
connectivity as opposed to other technologies such as SigFox or LoRa. The firm 
published several white papers and organized various events and presentations to 
established itself as a thought leader once the ecosystem mature. 
 Overall, TELECO’s positioning strategy in this phase aimed to maximize its value 
creation and value capture potential as well as to shape the evolution of the broader IoT 
ecosystem to its advantage. The expansionary positioning strategy was indicated by the 
development of a full stack or end-to-end platform covering all possible technological 
layers that extend beyond the firm’s technical capabilities. The positioning strategy was 
also characterized by the expansion of the target market beyond TELECO’s existing 
customers and the extension of its ecosystem of complementors. Table 8 provides 
selected evidence of the emerging constructs related to the strategic frame and positioning 




Table 8: Selected evidences of strategic frame and positioning strategy of TELECO in Phase 2 
Aggregate dimension: PROACTIVE FRAME 
2nd order theme 1st order codes and representative evidence 
High potential for 
transformational 
growth 
Optimistic projection of market potential beyond the core customers 
• “Through IoT, TELECO moving from single industry portfolio and sales to multiple industry portfolio and sales [..] We 
aim to reach 18B SEK total net sales by 2020. [..] We are making a strong play in Internet of Things across industries” 
(Internal document, 2016) 
• “TELECO’s mobility report forecasts more-than-tripling of the number of IoT connected devices globally from under 5 
billion today to 16 billion in the next 5 years. Meanwhile, McKinsey concludes that IoT has a potential global economic 
impact of up to USD 11 trillion by 2025.”  (Internal document, 2017) 
• “That (expansion) was an attempt for diversification of our business. I mean we have capabilities to build smart grid, 
telecommunication networks, for example, because we know telecommunication. If the whole telecom business is moving 
into more Internet of Things business, we thought that was opportunity to diversify our business.” (Senior manager, 2018)  
Perceived success as a connectivity management platform specialist 
• “If mobile operators manage to do something in IoT, it's usually M2M sim card communications and there's no real growth 
in providing only connectivity. With a market potential of 619 USD, we were saying that's not enough. We need to move 
up the value chain and deliver more than just connectivity” (Senior Manager, 2018) 
• “The partnership with the Bridge Alliance (a consortium of mobile operators) to deploy the TELECO device connectivity 
platform is a critical milestone to make the adoption of cellular services in IoT devices economically viable for device 
OEMs and enterprises,” (Senior Manager, 2015) 
• Successful collaboration in developing IoT use cases with non-telco partners such as Maersk, Volvo, Landis+Gyr (2016) 
Adequate 
capabilities to shape 
the nascent 
ecosystem 
Perception of high applicability of capabilities 
• “Connectivity and network infrastructure remain an essential element for the development of the IoT. TELECO is naturally 
well suited to pursue all forms of connectivity and equip our customer base to offer reliable connectivity agnostic 
solutions.” (VP strategy & marketing, 2016) 
•  “We are in a unique vantage position as a natural bridge that links one group (mobile operators) with the other (enterprises 
and industrial customers)– in many cases, they need each other to be successful in their IoT deployments and we can match 
them up.” (Head of IoT engagement, 2016). 
• “We have the combination of expertise, services, software, and connectivity infrastructure capabilities to transform the IoT 
business beyond connectivity. We have the breadth of capabilities that are required to ensure that nothing is left 




•  “As a global company, we have created an efficient go-to-market organization based on 10 regions. Backed by our 
collective global knowledge, our regional competence and close customer relationships provide a solid foundation for 
profitable growth.” (Internal document, 2016) 
Confidences in narrowing capability gaps and shaping the ecosystem’s future 
• “We are a leading software provider and developer across all areas of the network, including OSS and BSS – these 
capabilities we see as being key to what will be needed to flexibly support the plethora of future use cases, some of which 
we can only imagine right now.” (CEO, 2015) 
• “While the IoT market is developing rapidly, successful customer engagements require the ability to adapt to local 
ecosystem cooperation. (Therefore), We are investing heavily in evolving our portfolio, in building innovation labs both 
global and regional” (Internal Document, 2017) 
• “The company started to invest heavily on IoT, software and video delivery services, with a significant chunk of its $2.5bn 
annual R&D spending going on IoT connectivity standardization. [..] TELECO’s position is that cellular standards are 
better suited for IoT applications since they can support huge numbers of devices with low complexity and cost, longer 




could be the central 
player 
Expansion of the existing ecosystem 
• “One of the things that this very important this ecosystem and go-to-market partners, they help us. I think if you have read 
the solutions article where we tell about agriculture solution. It's actually showcases of our strategy execution where our 
partners who happen to build an agricultural solution, actually utilized our assets, they used connectivity management, they 
use device management, and now even analytics monetization to build an application.” (Internal document, 2017)  
• “In fact, the IoT market is so large (and still very nascent). Analysts couldn’t agree on how large it is, since definitions can 
vary quite widely & our strategic analysis shows global IoT spending estimates range anywhere from 300 to 2,900 billion 
USD [..]one thing they could agree on is that more value will be created higher up the value chain. [..] Having said that, the 
industry is moving up the stack very quickly with Platforms becoming the next battlefield” (Internal document, 2016) 
•  “The strategy is actually about how do we climb higher up and capture more of the software and application revenue 
because the large value is on top of the IoT stack. In IoT, Connectivity is the key but connectivity (only) is not enough. 
(Therefore) Building pre-integrated solutions is essential to tap into the higher value of the stack.” (Head of IoT, 2017) 
High expectation to be a central and leading player in the broader IoT ecosystem 
• “TELECO’s ICT leadership and comprehensive offerings mean we’re very well placed as our customers’ IoT 
transformation partner – for both mobile operators & industries.” Internal document 2016 
• “TELECO is hoping to position itself as an Internet of Things matchmaker with the launch of its IoT platform, which 




•  “At Mobile World Congress (MWC) 2016, TELECO’s President and CEO said digital disruption will come to every 
industry in 2016 and made major announcements in 5G, the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud. With these announcements, 
TELECO solidifies its positions as a leading ICT transformation partner for customers across industries.” (Internal 
document, 2016) 
Aggregate dimension: EXPANSIONARY POSITIONING 
2nd order theme 1st order codes and representative evidence 
Development of a 
full-stack platform 
Verticalizing all technology layers 
• Launched the new generation of the IoT platform (called IoT-A) with a complete set of features addressing the whole 
technological layers of the platform architecture that enable development of various IoT use cases (February 2016) 
• “Our focus is to expand the platform further with extended connectivity management & aggregation, network near 
functionality and differentiating/niche technology supporting our prioritized verticals.” (Internal Document, 2017) 
Positioned as key and central player in the IoT ecosystem 
• “IoT-A sits at the heart of our E2E IoT offerings and is the hub for innovation, ecosystem collaboration and partnerships. 
We “onboard” devices and apps onto our platform and are a natural link between mobile operators and industries.” (Internal 
doc., 2018). 
• “We enable global scale for the application developer community, we have removed the fragmentation of the data and the 
device ecosystem itself. TELECO’s IoT-A is the centre of our emerging ecosystem and the hub for innovation.” (Internal 
Document, 2016) 
Expansion of target 
market and 
ecosystem 
Broadening the target markets 
• “We are targeting vertical markets such as utility market, automotive, intelligent transport systems, maritime, and public 
safety market. We will explore and expand with selected solutions across industries” (Internal document, 2017) 
• “There are two ways to sell IoT accelerator: Platform driven, and Use case driven. For the former, IoT accelerator is sold 
standalone where the customers get access to the horizontal functionality. For the later, use cases/ applications developed 
by TELECO on top of the platform are sold to mobile operators or industry customers” (Internal document, 2017) 
Development of Ecosystem of third party complementors 
• "The launch of IoT platform Marketplace will unlock the potential for different players in the value chain to deliver value. 
It is another steppingstone to make 5G a reality by enabling massive adoption of massive IoT. This supports service 
providers as they seek to expose network connectivity IoT APIs and monetize these assets." (Head of IoT, 2018) 
• Launched “IoT business labs” an offline regional support for technology trials, Proof of Concept, and cocreation with 




5.3 Phase 3: Shifting to an Attainable Position (2018 – 2020) 
In the latter phase, managers at TELECO revised their assumptions as the ecosystem’s 
evolved in a way that was not fully aligned with their expectations. In this phase, the 
adoption of IoT technology continued to grow as the commercial viability became more 
apparent. Multiple actors including large IT players (e.g. Google, Microsoft), 
telecommunication infrastructure providers (e.g. Cisco, Huawei), and industrial giants 
(e.g. GE, Bosch) had started to develop and claimed their position in the ecosystem (IDC, 
2018). Mobile operators had also ramped up their investment to take on more profitable 
roles at the higher technology layers beyond connectivity (GSMA, 2018). Moreover, the 
expansionary positioning turned to increase the possibility for contestation with the firm’s 
main customers and the other dominant players as the ecosystem gradually taking shape. 
At this stage, managers have a better understanding of the ecosystem dynamics and the 
ramifications of the previous positioning strategy. As such, managers adapted their 
assumptions regarding the ecosystem structure, growth opportunities, and capabilities fit 
as the realities unfold. These revised assumptions shifted the strategic frame which led to 
the change in positioning strategy. 
5.3.1 Strategizing through an Adaptive Frame 
The ecosystem progression and partial success in shaping the ecosystem prompted 
managers to revisit their assumptions and recognized the limitation of their capabilities. 
In this phase, managers sensed an increased competition in the IoT ecosystem which 
could hamper the previous ambitious position for TELECO. The big IT players such as 
Microsoft, Amazon, and IBM had an increased presence with industrial customers and a 
faster growth in attracting IoT application providers. As an example, in the mid-2018, 
Microsoft announced its commitment to invest $5 billion on IoT. Given the relative 
progress of these actors especially in the application layers, managers estimated that 
TELECO was seriously lagging in terms of capability and credibility; thus, it would be 
difficult to directly compete with these big players which increasingly established their 
position. At this point, competing with Microsoft and Amazon at the application layer 
was considered to be an uphill battle, as described below: 
“We used to develop our own developer ecosystem. We can’t compete with IBM-Watson, 
Microsoft Azure, AWS, and all these big cloud platforms. Now, we need to reach out to their 





Moreover, Managers realized that they were underestimated the resources and 
capabilities needed to build an immense application ecosystem. Managers realized that 
building and orchestrating an immense application ecosystem and obtaining a domain 
knowledge for developing IoT use cases in various industry sectors were one of 
TELECO’s capability gaps that were difficult to fulfil in a short period. At this point, 
managers had a better estimation of other actors’ competence and the firm’s limitation. 
As noted by one of the ecosystem managers below: 
“I think we were primarily organized in the fashion that it's better to deal with a few major 
partners rather than with a lot of smaller firms. We are very new in that area (building an 
application ecosystem), Ecosystem building is probably one of the capability gaps that we have.” 
(Ecosystem Manager, 2018). 
 In addition, developing and selling IoT applications for industry customers were 
proved to be challenging. In the earlier phase, managers were confident with TELECO’s 
capabilities to address the industrial markets based on some early successful 
collaborations. However, the investments to acquire specialized knowledge and to build 
domain competences were much higher than expected. Also, managers realized that the 
firm did not have strong credibility beyond the telecom market which made it even harder 
to compete in the application market. As told by a senior manager: 
“To build use cases, you need to have the domain knowledge. I don't think we can build the 
application for certain use cases by ourselves, because simply we don't know. Let’s say we have 
an application or use case, who would come to us? I mean we are not necessarily known for a 
player having the domain competences (as an application provider).” (Senior manager, 2018) 
At the same time, managers sensed a growing ambition of mobile operators in IoT 
given their increased involvement in selling IoT applications to industry customers. If 
TELECO continues to sell IoT applications directly to the end users, managers presumed 
that they would inevitably get into competition with the mobile operators. The potential 
of market overlap was assumed may result in retaliation from mobile operators and could 
damage their long-standing relationships, as explained below:  
“We can't go to mobile operators and say: ‘We give you (IoT) business take  it or leave it’ because 
then they will say: ‘If you are competing with us in IoT, then we will buy less radio base station 
from you’.” (Senior Manager, 2018). 
At this point, managers assumed some positions (i.e. application providers, and 




capability misfits. At this stage, managers adjusted their expectations and started to 
consider a ‘safer’ position that would better align with TELECO’s capabilities and 
minimize potential ecosystem contestations. The firm previous broad engagement with 
multiple market segments with expansive technological features informed managers to 
better estimate the growth opportunities and their fit with the capabilities. Accordingly, 
managers at this stage assumed that TELECO’s existing capabilities are only adequate to 
explore selective opportunities in the nascent IoT ecosystem. We observed that managers 
revised their assumption on the growth opportunity from “connectivity is not enough” to 
“connectivity is big enough”. It was believed that the firm can still achieve substantial 
growth by focusing on its key expertise in connectivity key expertise in connectivity. 
Moreover, TELECO’s installed base of mobile operators was considered as a unique 
selling point that would differentiate the platform. In this stage, managers believed that 
TELECO’s should adapt to the changing ecosystem landscape by refocusing on its core 
technical expertise and market. The quotations below illustrated managers’ changed 
assumptions: 
“It's meaningless to say that connectivity is not big enough. Overall, it's much bigger than many 
of the markets that TELECO is addressing. Of course, connectivity is smaller than applications 
and analytics which is addressed by well-established firms for each and specific sector, but the 
market is big enough for us to have a meaningful business” (Portfolio Manager, 2018). 
“In the beginning, we were developing a whole layer in the stack because we thought that was 
our customer needs. But where our reputation is and where our core is on the lower layer 
(connectivity). It was also hard for us to target both mobile operators and end users and make 
end-to-end use cases that serve every geography and every need”. (Head of IoT, 2018). 
 In sum, the ecosystem progression and the ramifications of TELECO’s 
expansionary positioning strategy prompted managers to evaluate their assumptions 
toward the ecosystem structure, growth opportunity, and opportunity-capability fit. In this 
phase, managers assumed the ecosystem became gradually structured and more 
competitive where big IT players occupy certain positions. Therefore, they expected that 
attainable positions for TELECO would be more limited than previously predicted. The 
growth opportunity would also become more targeted which was mainly based on the 
emerging needs of mobile operators and limited industry customers. Lastly, managers 
realized that its existing capabilities are only adequate to explore a limited set of 
opportunities in the IoT ecosystem as other players have more valuable capabilities. These 




adaptive frame which was shaped by managers’ awareness to adapt to the new realities 
that were not fully aligned with their prior assumptions. The shifted strategic frame 
eventually led to the platform repositioning that encourages adaptation to an attainable 
position. 
5.3.2 Switching to Downward positioning to achieve attainable position 
In the mid-2018, TELECO decided to change its platform positioning strategy along with 
the shift of strategic frame from proactive to the adaptive frame. Although the previous 
expansionary exposed the firm with a potential ecosystem contestation, it brought a 
positive learning effect for managers to clarify their assumptions and misconceptions. At 
this point, managers had better-defined opportunities and estimation of capabilities fit 
given the ecosystem progression and the firm’s previous shaping efforts, which informed 
the platform repositioning. TELECO decided not to address the service management and 
application enablement layers (the two highest layers). Instead, TELECO aimed to 
solidify its position in the lower layers’ technology (connectivity) and extend it with 
adjacent features (device & data management). Rather than making a ‘big bet’ by building 
a full-stack platform, the firm doubled down its investments to the two bottom layers, the 
connectivity and device & data management layers. In this phase, the investments for the 
higher layers were treated with more cautionary and experimental. 
The new strategy aimed to reposition to the point where it could minimize potential 
contestation with the mobile operators and other powerful actors in the ecosystem as well 
as lessen the capability misfit, while still enable differentiation. TELECO introduced the 
platform as the mobile operator’s “trusted partner” that enables and accelerates the 
development of IoT solutions for industry customers. TELECO repositioned the platform 
as a “Global Connectivity and Device Management Platform” that enable mobile 
operators “to move higher up the IoT value chain”. TELECO was committed not to sell 
any IoT solution to the industry customers and make the mobile operators as the main 
Go-to-Market channel. 
As a result of the new positioning strategy, TELECO downward calibrated its 
platform architecture and market scope. TELECO decided to focus on the two interrelated 
layers, the connectivity management and device & data management layers (Figure 18). 
These layers were considered as areas where TELECO had a “higher chance to win and 
reach globally leading scale” (Head of IoT, 2018). Compared to the applications and 
service management, the device & data management layer was considered to be more 
aligned with the platform core feature and TELECO’s technical expertise. Moreover, the 




new technical functions (e.g. seamless integration, Over-the-Air software update) that 
bring unique value propositions that would prevent them to be a mere ‘dumb pipe’ in IoT. 
By focusing on these two layers, it was expected that TELECO could capture emerging 
opportunities beyond connectivity, as noted below: 
“The core of TELECO IoT platform are connectivity and device management – two closely 
related core functions of any IoT system. These are complex components that have a large impact 
on functionality, security, and deployment, where, as experts on networks and connectivity, we 
can provide the greatest value than anyone else in the IoT ecosystem.” (Internal document, 2019). 
The new positioning strategy offered better alignments with mobile operators. 
However, managers learned that most end-users (i.e. industry customers) did not buy IoT 
solutions from mobile operators since they were not known as providers of IoT 
applications. Moreover, the majority of mobile operators had a lack of capabilities to 
develop IoT solutions beyond connectivity services. Nevertheless, TELECO decided to 
strengthen the mobile operators and build a ‘mobile operator-centric’ ecosystem with the 
platform as a central technology enabler. TELECO established a sub-unit called 
‘customer success’ that provides supports for mobile operators in various aspects 
including sales and marketing. TELECO also created a program called ‘enterprise lead 
generation’ where the firm helps generating demands by matchmaking mobile operators 
to the industrial customers (e.g. logistic companies, retailers, energy providers). These 
proactive approaches ultimately aimed to improve mobile operators’ role in the 
ecosystem and help them to address opportunities beyond connectivity. Therefore, the 
more active and innovative mobile operators in developing IoT offering, the more value 
created in the platform and captured by TELECO. 
 In addition, TELECO decided to partner with powerful actors that have a more 
established ecosystem rather than building its own application ecosystem. The firm 
shifted its approach from attracting individual firms to partnering with big firms to 
Figure 18: Platform architecture in phase 3 
(Connectivity management and device & data 




leverage their ecosystem. At this point, TELECO took a non-competitive position with 
the large cloud and application providers; while emphasized the complementarity of the 
platform with their offerings. Managers called this approach an ‘ecosystem-of-ecosystem’ 
strategy. TELECO partnered with leading IoT application platform players such as 
Microsoft, Amazon, and PTC to access their application ecosystem. TELECO took a 
more complementary approach with these partners by focusing on the connectivity and 
device management features and not competing in the application layers. By this 
approach, TELECO’s aimed to highlights its differentiation as the ‘premier choice’ for 
connectivity and device management in the IoT ecosystem. Moreover, TELECO decided 
to stop the development of IoT applications for specific industries and not sell any IoT 
offerings directly to the industry customers (except for connected vehicles due to a long-
standing partnership with a major car manufacturer). Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 
19, TELECO still engaged with selective industrial partners like ABB, GE, and Bosch 
for research collaboration since there was still a need to understand specific requirements 
for the platform’s future development. This approach allowed TELECO to anticipated 
emerging needs of IoT from the industrial customers, despite its focus on mobile 
operators. The statement below highlights TELECO’s partnership strategy: 
“We will focus on cloud platforms, device manufacturers, and industrial partners that can bring 
significant traffic with their ecosystems. By positioning ourselves as their preferred partner for 
connectivity we can reach a very big number of applications and verticals and by doing so, scale 
faster.” (Internal document, 2018).   
 
 





TELECO’s positioning strategy minimized the potential contestations from other 
ecosystem players, while still providing unique advantages to the ecosystem. TELECO 
could avoid direct competition with the big IT players which operate on the application 
layer by positioned the platform as complementary with their offerings. By integrating 
with these players, TELECO could extend its platform ecosystem to the application layers 
without having to build it by itself. More importantly, the positioning strategy 
circumvented competitive situations with the mobile operator that may hamper the 
longstanding relationship in the core businesses. As such, the firm could achieve more 
synergy between the core business and the emerging IoT business. As noted by the CEO: 
“We will not sell directly to enterprises. It is never a good idea to compete with our own 
customers. We will leverage our strong mobile operators’ relationships. We provide (IoT) 
connectivity to enterprises through our customers. This is a great way to make our customers 
successful.” (CEO in an internal letter, 2019) 
 Overall, the positioning strategy in this phase aimed to adapt to the emergent 
ecosystem dynamics and to capture better-defined opportunities that were considered 
more fit with the firm’s existing capabilities. The downward positioning strategy enabled 
TELECO to differentiate its platform and secure a strategic position in the increasingly 
competitive ecosystem. The platform architecture recalibration by focusing on 
connectivity and device & data management layers offered unique value propositions for 
underserved market needs (e.g. seamless integration of connected devices). The 
platform’s credibility strengthens by TELECO’s reputation and expertise in 
telecommunication. Moreover, analysts considered TELECO’s strong focus on mobile 
operators gives a ‘clear positioning’ message to the market. A reputed consultation firm 
even rated TELECO’s IoT platform as ‘the most mobile operator friendly’ platform in 
the market. As shown by an analyst’s review below: 
“TELECO’s decision to refocus its IoT efforts toward the mobile operators market sends a clear 
message to the market about its positioning and allows it to make the most of relationships with 
its core customer base.” (Ovum, 2019) 





Table 9: Selected evidences of strategic frame and positioning strategy of TELECO in Phase 3 
Aggregate dimension: ADAPTIVE FRAME 
2nd order theme 1st order codes and representative evidence 
Targeted growth 
opportunity based on 
emerging needs of 
existent customers 
and limited new 
customers. 
Changing perception of sources of growth, refocusing to connectivity & device management 
• “The market for IoT cellular connectivity is around 50B SEK. So, the market is actually big enough for us. If we can get 10-
15% of the total market, that is already quite big” (Portfolio Manager, 2018) 
• “We need to focus our resources and bet on the areas where we have a chance to win and reach globally leading scale. 
Connectivity and device management are the areas that we will focus on going forward.” (Head of IoT, 2019). 
• “We believe we need to be champions in offering seamless connectivity for any IoT device, anywhere in the world. This will 
be our foundation and must-win battle. Because insights from connectivity combined with data and device insights will be 
our access to the ecosystem.” (Head of IoT, 2019). 
Revised understanding of market and technology maturities 
• “I mean one learning we have from our operators is that all operators start with big ambition to sell solution and all these 
things, but basically every operator without exception has abandoned that ambition. It has not worked for any of the operators, 
zero. No one is any more interesting to sell solutions.” (Customer engagement manager, 2019) 
• “Previously we tried to address some industries that were way out of our scope like agriculture, healthcare. IoT is very 
explorative and very new area. I think we put so much pressure to make like to make money in you know in industries that 
weren't ready for that.” (Partnership manager, 2018) 
• “IoT is a completely new type of business for mobile operators and 70% of mobile operators do not have a clear strategy on 
IoT. We also have to be realistic because operators don’t have that expertise. we don’t really see that operators can address 
industries with IoT offerings.” (Customer engagement manager, 2018) 
 
Partially adequate 
capabilities to pursue 
better-defined 
opportunities 
Realization of capability gaps 
• “In the beginning, we were developing a whole layer in the stack because we thought that was our customer needs. But where 
our reputation is and where our core is on the lower layers (connectivity). It was also hard for us to target both mobile 
operators and end users and make end-to-end use cases that serve every geography and every need”. (Head of IoT, 2018). 
• “Ecosystem building is probably one of the capability gaps that we have. Otherwise, I think we have most of the technical 
competence and so on.” (Senior Manager, 2019) 
• “We are a product company, not necessarily as a physical product. Then, we want to have IoT as-a-service. (But) We are not 





Increased organizational complexity 
• “When we started the unit (IoT). We were working in 33 or 36 in parallel tracks style and subdivided into smart cities, 
utilities, automotive. That proved not to be sustainable because I mean the more you work the more you discover about the 
variances and everything.” (Senior Manager, 2018) 
• “We have invested time, effort an d resources into multiple platforms, selected use cases and a range of platform functions. 
This has led to multiple small and scattered successes, but no big breakthroughs that will grow fast enough to become a major 
business.” (Internal Document, 2018). 
• “We need to work with industry partners to access (enterprise) customers. (However), investing in the enterprise channel is 







Potential market occupation by powerful actors 
• “The main challenge and risk from the previous strategy was getting into competition with large platform company such as 
IBM -Watson, Microsoft Azure, AWS all these cloud platforms because our IoT platform in the previous version included 
data storage, applications some analytics function, etc. Now we are much more, okay we are the connectivity management 
layer, we are of the device management layer That is complementing what they have in the platform.” (Senior Manager, 
2018) 
• “Major players such as IBM, GE and PTC, have announced serious investments of more than $1B each (over a 1-5 year 
period), large share on promoting their respective IoT platform offering” (Internal document, 2017) “We need to engage with 
three or four different main types of companies. (For example), the big cloud providers like Amazon, Microsoft because 
they're so big in IT, that's a necessary and we've got to find ways to work with them. Then, we have the application enablement 
like PTC. We need to work with them with redefined value proposition.” (Head of ecosystem, 2019) 
Potential ecosystem contestations by mobile operators 
• “Mobile operators are starting to realize that this requires ecosystem thinking and willingness to partner with many parties. 
They’re also recognizing that they don’t need to be the lead partner in order to participate and be successful.” (Head of IoT, 
2019) 
• “The CEO got a call code from the Mobile operators asking questions are you trying to take over our role here?  Because we 
will always need to relate to these guys (mobile operators). So, we need to facilitate probably very much on behalf of these 






Aggregate dimension: DOWNWARD POSITIONING 
2nd order theme 1st order codes and representative evidence 
Recalibration of 
platform architecture 
Refocusing on the two main bottom layers (connectivity management & Device & data management) 
• “The core of TELECO’s IoT-A is connectivity and device management – two closely related core functions of any IoT 
system. These are complex components that have a large impact on functionality, security, and ease of deployment, where, 
as experts on networks and connectivity, we can provide the greatest value to enterprises than anyone else in the IoT 
ecosystem.” (Internal document, 2019) 
• “We’re tying device management and connectivity management together along with network insights to measure 
performance, so we can ensure these capabilities work seamlessly across global markets. This unified capability is a key 
requirement we are seeing from multinational corporations” (Head of IoT, 2019) 
Incrementally evolve to the higher layer of the platform architecture 
• “We start from our strength in connectivity and our current DCP assets. We then will invest more in three areas: Platform 
Services, Automotive & Transport Solutions, and Security Solutions.” (Record of internal meeting, 2018) 
• “We believe we need to be champions in offering seamless connectivity for any IoT device, anywhere in the world at any 
time. This will be our foundation and must-win battle. Then, We want to focus on replicable micro services, that is pivotal to 
realize value in many use cases, like precise locations for mining and logistics.” (Internal document, 2019) 
Refocusing to a 
selective target 
market and aligning 
with powerful actors 
Refocusing on the mobile operators’ markets 
• “Operators will still be important in IoT. We need to educate the operators how to sell IoT to the enterprises. We also need 
to make enterprises aware of the capabilities that IoT can bring, the capabilities that mobile operators & TELECO can bring 
through IoT.” (Platform Manager, 2019) 
•  “Mobile operators are and will remain central players in the IoT ecosystem through their cellular network infrastructure 
assets, solutions and enterprise reach. We want to increase the CSPs relevance and help open new value creation opportunities 
with them and for us. They will therefore also remain important customers and partners to us.” (Internal document, 2019) 
Non-competitive positioning and collaboration with other powerful actors 
• “TELECO IoT platform takes a non-competitive position with the other players, like device makers, cloud providers and 
systems integrators in the IoT field. Our solutions are complementary to their offerings. We help plug the gap between the 
device and cloud, helping customers efficiently and securely manage their connectivity and devices.” (Head of IoT, 2018). 
•  “We need to actively partner with the leading application, device, and connectivity providers. More specifically, we aim for 
a position between the global application platforms with their developer ecosystems, such as AWS, Azure, and PTC, and 




5.4 Summary of Findings: The dynamic of platform positioning 
strategy at TELECO 
The empirical analysis of the process of platform creation at TELECO shows how the 
firm engaged in a more dynamic process of positioning which involves the 
implementation of three different positioning strategies. The positioning strategies were 
formed based on the strategic frames and managers’ assumptions of ecosystem structure, 
growth opportunity, and the opportunity-capabilities fit. In the early phase of 
development, TELECO applied an analogous positioning strategy. In this strategy, 
TELECO aimed to position its IoT platform in parallel with the firm’s established position 
in its telecommunication ecosystem legacy. As a result, the platform architecture was 
focused on the connectivity management layer which aligned with TELECO’s technical 
legacy. The platform market scope was also set within the firm’s boundaries where 
mobile operators were targeted as the main customers/users. The analogous positioning 
strategy was driven by the evolutionary strategic frame characterised by managers’ 
assumptions that the similar capabilities and positioning in its legacy ecosystem will help 
the firm to succeed in the nascent IoT ecosystem. In this case, managers assumed that 
mobile operators remain the central actor in the nascent ecosystems and the incremental 
growth was expected to come from the emerging needs of its existing customers, the 
mobile operators. 
In phase 2, TELECO applied an expansionary positioning strategy following the 
shift of the firm’s strategic frame. In contrast with the previous analogous positioning, 
expansionary strategy entails positioning the platform as broad as possible to maximize 
the potential of value creation and value capture as well as the chance to shape the 
ecosystem to the firm’s advantage. This strategy characterizes by the development of 
multiple technical features that covered all possible technical layers, and the expansion 
of the market scope. The expansionary positioning was shaped by the proactive strategic 
frame which represented managers’ belief on the firm’s ability to shape the nascent 
ecosystem to its advantage. The proactive frame was formed because managers changed 
expectations of the potential growth opportunity and their confidence in shaping the 
nascent ecosystem in accordance with the firm’s projected capabilities. 
Lastly, in phase 3, TELECO implemented a downward positioning strategy where 
it recalibrated its platform architecture and refocused its platform market scope to the 
point that better correspond to the firm’s technical and relational limitations. The change 




to the adaptive frame. The adaptive frame entails managers’ revised assumptions of the 
ecosystem structure and its related positions that were attainable for TELECO. It was also 
informed by the managers’ improved understanding of productive opportunities and the 
limitations of the existing capabilities. Overall, the dynamic shifting of positioning 
strategy allowed TELECO to enter the ecosystem through a new platform creation and 
established a strategic position in the nascent IoT ecosystem. 
Table 10 provides a summary of the evolution of strategic frame and platform 
positioning strategies at TELECO. A theoretical framework that describes the dynamic 
of platform positioning strategies is presented in Chapter 6. The discussion about 
theoretical contributions and managerial implications of the findings are also presented 
in the following chapter. 
Table 10: The evolution of strategic frame and platform positioning strategies at TELECO 
  Phase 1 (2011 – 2015)  Phase 2 (2015 – 2018) Phase 3 (2018 – 2020) 
Strategic 
Frame 






The structure of the 
nascent IoT ecosystem 
(actors and their 
interdependencies) are 
similar to the legacy 
ecosystem. 
 
i.e. Mobile operators 
will remain the hub 
and capture most of 
the value 
The structure of the nascent 
IoT ecosystem is radically 
different to the legacy 
ecosystem and malleable. 
 
i.e. TELECO could become 
the hub and capture more 
value in the broader IoT 
ecosystem beyond mobile 
operators and existing 
partners 
The transformed 
structure of the nascent 
IoT ecosystem is 
increasingly competitive. 
 
i.e. Big IT players and 
mobile operators will 
occupy more central 








opportunity based on 




i.e. Expectation of 
growth opportunity 
from emerging needs 
of mobile operators 
 
High potential for 
transformational growth 
based on the emerging 
needs of both existent and 
new customers. 
 
i.e. Expectation of growth 
from emerging needs of 
mobile operators and 




opportunity based on 
emerging needs of 
existent customers and 
limited new customers.  
 
i.e. Expectation of 
growth opportunity from 
emerging needs of 










to explore a narrow set 
of emerging 
opportunities in the 
nascent ecosystem are 
consistent with the 
legacy capabilities 
 
i.e. Expertise in 
connectivity will bring 
Required capabilities to 
shape the nascent 
ecosystem and explore 
multiple emergent are in 
line with the firms’ 
projection of capabilities. 
 
i.e. The expected new 
capabilities (5G, App. 
Development,) are adequate 
Existing capabilities are 
only adequate to explore 
better-defined 
opportunities in the 
ecosystem. 
 
i.e. The expertise in 
connectivity partly 
contribute to the 




  Phase 1 (2011 – 2015)  Phase 2 (2015 – 2018) Phase 3 (2018 – 2020) 
advantages in the IoT 
ecosystem 
to create the envisioned IoT 
ecosystem 









of a specific technical 





i.e. Development of 
connectivity 
management layer 
Development of multiple 
technical layers covering 
all possible layers that 
extend beyond TELECO’s 
technical capabilities  
 
i.e. Development of a full 
stack / end-to-end IoT 
platforms   
Recalibrating the focus 
on selective technical 
layers which better 






connectivity and device 









from the legacy 
ecosystem. 
 
i.e. Mobile operators 
as the main target 
customers. Sustaining 
relationship with 
existing partners (e.g. 
device, SIM cards 
makers) 
Expansion of target market 




i.e. Targeting mobile 
operators and industry 
customers. Expanding to 
the application ecosystem 
Refocusing to a selective 
target market and 
aligning with powerful 
actors  
 
i.e. Targeting mobile 









CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
The ambiguous nature of nascent ecosystems presents a strategic challenge for entrants 
(i.e. new ventures or established firms) who aspire to secure a strategic position by 
introducing a digital platform. In this context, managers must determine the architecture, 
the scope, and the overall positioning of the platform with a lack of clarity about the 
configuration of ecosystem activities to deliver a value proposition, and the required 
capabilities to succeed in the would-be ecosystem (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Moeen 
et al., 2020). Managers of an established firm face unique challenges in this regard since 
they also need to incorporate constraints of their organizational legacies in their decision 
making (Gawer and Phillips, 2013; Cozzolino et al., 2018). This research project aimed 
to understand the dynamic of platform positioning strategies of an established firm in a 
nascent ecosystem by answering two interrelated questions: How does an established firm 
develop platform positioning strategies for a nascent ecosystem? and Why the positioning 
strategies shift over time? By addressing these questions, this study provides theoretical 
and practical insights related to the challenges of platform creation in a nascent ecosystem 
by an established firm. 
 This chapter describes a processual framework of platform positioning in a nascent 
ecosystem, which is the core contribution of this study. It also describes the thesis 
contributions to the extant theory and implications to the managerial practices. This 
chapter consists of three subsections. The first section (6.1) describes the platform 
positioning strategies identified from the empirical findings. Based on these positioning 
strategies, a processual framework of platform positioning in a nascent ecosystem is 
developed. The framework brings a dynamic perspective toward platform positioning 
where the firm switch between three distinct positioning strategies. The framework also 
describes the cognitive dimensions i.e. strategic frame which underlies the emergence of 
positioning strategy at a certain point in time. The following subsection (6.2) describes 
the theoretical contributions of this study to research on nascent ecosystems, platform 
creation, and incumbents’ response to technological changes. Finally, the chapter 






6.1 A Process Model of Platform Positioning in a Nascent Ecosystem 
The core contribution of this study is a process framework that explains the dynamics of 
the platform positioning strategy of an established firm to achieve a strategic position in 
a nascent ecosystem. Prior research examines platform positioning within the context of 
established ecosystems and typically offers two approaches to achieve a competitive 
position in an ecosystem (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Suarez and Kirtley, 2012; Cennamo 
and Santaló, 2013; Cennamo, 2019). The first approach emphasizes domination, and 
suggests aiming for a position where it promises the fastest growth and the largest 
potential market (Hagiu, 2014). With this approach, firms benefit by embracing an 
aggressive strategy which allows them to quickly established installed base of users and 
complementors (Eisenmann et al., 2006). The second approach emphasizes for 
differentiation by claiming a position with limited rivalry (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012). 
Here, firms benefit through an evolutionary approach where the firms adapt to emergent 
market needs and build a distinctive positioning (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). 
Accordingly, prior research suggests for a platform creator to choose among these two 
positioning approaches based on the ecosystem structure and certain market 
characteristics, and march its resources to scale the platform as well as to occupy the 
targeted position (Adner, 2006; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012; Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). 
 In contrast, I find that platform positioning in a nascent ecosystem is far from 
straightforward and involves a dynamic process that is not entirely consistent with the 
suggestions from prior works. This study demonstrates that rather than following a linear 
trajectory, a platform creator switches between three positioning strategies in developing 
a strategic position in a nascent ecosystem. Accordingly, this study introduces three 
platform positioning strategy that an established firm can follow to position its new 
platform in a nascent ecosystem, namely: (1) Analogous positioning, (2) Expansionary 
positioning, and (3) Downward positioning. These strategies have distinct strategic 
objectives and entail different choices of platform architecture as well as the market 
scope. In the following paragraphs, I describe in detail these positioning strategies and 
the strategic frames underlying each of the positioning strategies. Then, a theoretical 
framework which describes the process of positioning strategies is presented. 
 In the analogous positioning strategy, firms position the new platform close and in 
parallel with its (non-platform) ecosystem and capability legacy. The strategic objective 
of this strategy is to leverage as much as possible the firms’ existing technical capabilities, 
the network of customers and partners, and the market reputation. Firms adopting the 




will operate, in line with their technical capabilities. Accordingly, the firms will focus on 
targeting their existing customers and partners to form an installed base of users and 
complementors. The analogous positioning strategy allows the firm to form an installed 
base and establish an initial market position relatively fast due to its longstanding 
relationship and a good understanding of the market. Moreover, positioning the platform 
business in line with the main non-platform business increases internal acceptance as well 
as reduces the potential to violate expectations of essential resource providers and other 
external stakeholders (Benner and Ranganathan, 2012; Gawer and Phillips, 2013). 
Therefore, this strategy can be effective in the initial phase of entry into a nascent 
ecosystem. Nevertheless, firms adopting this strategy need to have integrative capabilities 
(Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018) to be able to leverage its technological capabilities and 
its network of customers and partners to form a new platform-based business. 
 In the expansionary positioning strategy, firms position the new platform as broad 
as possible to maximize the potential of value creation and value capture and to shape the 
ecosystem’s progression to its advantage. The strategic objective of this strategy is not to 
establish domination in multiple domains (Eisenmann et al., 2011), but to explore 
multiple emerging opportunities in different domains. Firms adopting this strategy aims 
to participate in most or all technological layers by developing a full-stack platform. The 
platform will likely address multiple market domains which not necessary within the 
firms’ organizational boundary. Moreover, this strategy is characterized by a proactive 
ecosystem building efforts where firms aim to exert their influence in shaping the 
trajectory of the nascent ecosystem’s progression. The expansionary positioning strategy 
allows the firm to ‘cast the net’ as wide as possible in order to get first-mover advantages 
and gain footholds in some areas (Suarez et al., 2015). As such, this strategy can be 
beneficial when the ecosystem starts to gain market traction. However, this strategy is 
more resource intensive and require high innovation capabilities to develop new 
technological and organizational competencies. It also requires superior orchestration 
capabilities (Wareham et al., 2014) to coordinate a broad platform ecosystem. 
 Finally, in the downward positioning strategy, firms calibrate its position to the 
point that minimize ecosystem contestations and better aligned with their technical and 
relational limitation. The strategic objective is to achieve alignment with other critical 
actors in the ecosystem and to improve a strategic fit between the existing capabilities 
and opportunities. This strategy entails retreating some market positions and 
relinquishing some technological control to drive alignment. Firms adopting the 




and market scope that would minimize ecosystem contestation, but still enable 
differentiation for a distinctive position (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). Nevertheless, this 
strategy only applicable in the latter stage of the ecosystem’s progression when the 
managers have a better visibility of the structure of nascent ecosystems, especially related 
to indirect links among actors (Adner, 2017) and have better estimation of the capability 
gaps (Lavie, 2006). Additionally, this strategy requires superior coopetition capabilities 
(Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018) to simultaneously manage collaboration and competition 
with other platform providers which operate in different technological layers. Table 11 
provides a comparison of the three positioning strategies. 








A strategy to position a 
new platform close and in 
parallel with the firm’s 
(non-platform) ecosystem 
and capability legacy. 
 
    




Focus on one technological 




Platform market scope 
A narrow target market 
consists of existing 
customers and partners 






A strategy to position a new 
platform as broad as possible 
to maximize the potential of 
value creation and value 
capture and to shape the 
ecosystem’s progression. 
 




Focus on most or all 
technological layers which 




Platform market scope 
A broad target market consists 
of both existing and multiple 
new types of customers. 
 
Required capabilities 
Superior innovation and 
orchestration capabilities. 
Definition 
A strategy to calibrate a 
platform position to the point 
that minimizes ecosystem 
contestations and better 
aligned with the firm technical 
and relational limitations. 
 




Focus on selective 
technological layers which 




Platform market scope 
A selective target market 
consists of existing and limited 





 Moreover, this study also reveals the cognitive drivers that underlie each 
positioning strategy. Specifically, I find three unique strategic frames that drive the 
adoption of a certain positioning strategy, namely: (1) Evolutionary frame, (2) Proactive 
frame, and (3) Adaptive frame. An evolutionary frame entails managers’ belief on the 
continuity between the firm’s ecosystem legacies and the nascent ecosystem. This 




provide modest growth opportunities and the required capabilities to those opportunities 
will be consistent with the firm’s legacy capabilities. Firms with the evolutionary frame 
tend to adopt the analogous positioning strategy since they expect continuity between the 
past and the future. On the contrary, a proactive frame entails managers’ belief on the 
transformative nature of the nascent ecosystem and vision to shape the ecosystem’s 
evolution. This strategic frame derives from the managers’ assumption that the nascent 
ecosystem will provide transformational growth opportunities. It also derives from the 
managers’ forward-looking vision (Gavetti, 2005) regarding the firm’s future capabilities 
required to shape the nascent ecosystem. This strategic frame reminiscent of Dutton’s 
(1992) work on the opportunity frame, where managers consider a discontinuous change 
as a potential for entrepreneurial growth. As such, this strategic frame will likely to lead 
to an expansionary positioning. Lastly, the adaptive frame entails managers’ belief on the 
need to adapt to the changing ecosystem dynamic and to adjust their prior assumptions 
toward the nascent ecosystem. The adaptive strategic frame is formed when managers 
perceived some degree of certainty regarding the ecosystem structure and can better 
define the opportunities and their fit with the existing capabilities. Firms with the adaptive 
frame typically adopt a downward positioning strategy as they perceive a more realistic 
position to target. 
 In addition, this study reveals the temporal dynamics of these positioning strategies 
according to the longitudinal analysis at TELECO. In particular, I propose a processual 
framework that explains a pathway of platform positioning in a nascent ecosystem by an 
incumbent. The framework suggests that the process of platform positioning in a nascent 
ecosystem involves a dynamic process which influences by the firm’s strategic frame in 
a different milestone of the ecosystem’s evolution. In the model, I describe an alternative 
pathway for established firms in positioning its new platform to achieve a strategic 
position in a nascent ecosystem that is not predicated by prior research. The framework 
explains when a certain platform positioning strategy most likely to occur and why the 
positioning strategy changes. Specifically, the model shows how the strategic frame 
evolve as the ecosystem progress and realities unfold, and how it triggers the emergence 
of a positioning strategy and instigate a platform repositioning. In doing so, I captured the 
cognitive dimensions of platform creation and ecosystem strategy, which are rarely 
considered by prior studies (Khanagha et al., 2020). The process model is presented in 










In the initial phase, managers of an established firm sense emerging opportunities 
in a nascent ecosystem but lack of reference in envisioning the ecosystem structure and 
the required capabilities to capture those opportunities. During the inception phase of a 
nascent ecosystem, the enabling technology has emerged, but the market applications and 
the commercial value of it are highly unclear (Dattee et al., 2018). Actors involving in 
this early stage of a nascent ecosystem’s formation lack information on what technology 
to develop, which market to target, and how the configuration of ecosystem activities 
would look like (Moeen et al., 2020); hence, determining an effective competitive 
position become a challenging endeavour. Faced by a novel and ambiguous environment, 
the decision makers tend to create cognitive simplifications and representations based on 
the environment that they are familiar with (Gavetti et al., 2005). Therefore, the firm’s 
strategic frame in this phase is more likely informed by legacy ecosystem and capabilities 
given the magnitude of ambiguity in this phase.  
Accordingly, the managers tend to prognose the ecosystem structure and the 
associated growth opportunity through the lens of existing capabilities and experiences 
from the legacy ecosystem. Prior experience and knowledge from the legacy ecosystem 
bring experiential wisdom and insights in which actors apply and develop them to a novel 
setting (Benner and Tripsas, 2012). The assumptions of conformity between the nascent 
ecosystem and the firm’s legacy ecosystem and capabilities are likely to be the main 
driver for entry decision and positioning strategy in the initial phase of a nascent 
ecosystem. In this case, managers expect for the applicability of the firm’s technological 
expertise and knowledge base to a new domain (Cattani, 2006). Thus, the managers tend 
to expect that many elements in the legacy ecosystem will be applied to the nascent 
ecosystem and, the required capabilities to capture emerging opportunities will be 
consistent with the firm’s legacy capabilities (i.e. evolutionary frame). 
The evolutionary frame suggests that similar capabilities and positioning that made 
the firm successful in the legacy ecosystem are still applicable and will help them succeed 
in the new ecosystem. Such a frame may filter strategic options that are distant to the 
firm’s knowledge and capabilities (Gilbert, 2006). Thus, an established firm at this phase 
will likely to position the platform analogous to its positioning in the legacy ecosystem. 
The analogous positioning, which focuses on a technological layer that aligns with its 
technological strength, enables the firm to establish technical control over a specific layer 
of the overall platform architecture and gained an initial installed base. Moreover, 




the potential to violate expectations of essential resource providers and other stakeholders 
that could hamper the firm’s overall initiatives in a nascent ecosystem.  
In phase 2, managers tend to interpret the early success of forming an installed base 
and establishing initial positioning as positive signals to increase the firm’s effort to 
capture more opportunities. At the same time, market tractions and excitements toward 
the nascent ecosystem tend to upsurge, which inflate the growth expectations of the 
managers. In this phase, the nascent ecosystem starts to gain momentum as an important 
technological milestone has been achieved (e.g. feasible technical design) and 
commercial value becomes more apparent. Following this milestone, the market 
expectations and enthusiasm upsurge, which create a new ‘hype’ (Grodal and Granqvist, 
2014) toward the nascent ecosystem and increase entry by new actors. Accordingly, the 
managers tend to perceive the increase in market tractions and new entrants as a signal of 
huge opportunities. In addition, the perceived success in launching the platform in the 
earlier phase increases managers’ confidence to capture more value. At the same time, 
the firm’s engagement in a number of collaborative activities with new and unfamiliar 
partners expand knowledge boundaries and expose the firm with new opportunities 
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Accordingly, it improves the managers’ awareness of the 
transformative nature of the nascent ecosystem and the opportunity to shape the nascent 
ecosystem. Consequently, the managers tend to cognitively frame the nascent ecosystem 
and its associated opportunities through a forward-looking lens rather than through prior 
legacies as in the previous phase. Managers in this phase envision the ecosystem structure 
where they could become a prominent player and capture more value that will bring a 
transformational growth to the firm. Also, they project new capabilities required to shape 
the nascent ecosystem and confidence to fulfil any capability gaps in the future. The 
changes in how managers interpret the nascent ecosystem and its related opportunity 
eventually led to the adoption of a proactive frame.  
The shift to a proactive frame eventually leads to shaping behaviours (Gavetti et 
al., 2017; Rindova and Courtney, 2020) that encourage the firm to influence the trajectory 
of the ecosystem’s evolution to its advantages. In phase 2, the ecosystem tends to be 
gradually crowded by new entrants; yet, positions are still up for grabs. The proactive 
frame results in an increased intention and commitment to capture a broader set of 
emerging opportunities and steering the ecosystem’s progression toward its envisioned 
structure. At this point, the firm will likely shift its positioning strategy to the 
expansionary positioning which allows them to maximize the potential value capture and 




In phase 3, the firm will likely adopt an adaptive frame since managers have a better 
estimation of the ecosystem structure, the growth opportunity, and the opportunity-
capability fit. At this phase, the managers evaluate if the ecosystem’s progression aligns 
with their prior assumptions. After observing the progression of the ecosystem and the 
efficacy of the positioning strategy, the managers have a better understanding of the 
structure and feature of the ecosystem (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006) such as the other 
actors’ competencies and roles, capabilities shortages, and potential contestations. 
Moreover, the managers tend to perceive capabilities limitations that unfold as the 
ecosystem progress. As the roles and interdependencies of actors become more apparent, 
it allows the managers to evaluate their prior assumptions of the ecosystem structure and 
better defined the emerging opportunities and their fit with the existing capabilities. At 
this point, managers have a better estimation of the ecosystem structure and related 
opportunities it can capture based on experiential learning of prior positionings (Gavetti 
and Levinthal, 2000). They also tend to have a better understanding of the expectations 
of the essential customers and complementors toward the platform and the firm’s role in 
the ecosystem. Overall, in this phase, managers perceive that ecosystem progress in a way 
that does not fully align with their prior expectations as they consider the ecosystem to 
be increasingly competitive and the existing capabilities are only adequate to explore a 
narrower set of better-defined opportunities. These revised assumptions eventually form 
a new strategic frame that favours adaptation to the changing ecosystem landscape (i.e. 
adaptive frame).  
 The adaptive frame eventually triggers a downward positioning strategy. At this 
stage, the platform positioning aims to adapt to the emergent ecosystem dynamics and 
capabilities limitations. The broad exploration activities resulted from the expansionary 
positioning become an important source of information in determining a more optimal 
position the firm should target. As a result, the firm will recalibrate the platform 
architecture and market scope to the point that better corresponds to its technical and 
relational limitations. The platform architecture tends to be downward calibrated to 
selective technological layers that better aligned with its technical capabilities, while still 
enable differentiation and secure future competitiveness. Moreover, the platform’s 
market scope will be refocused on selective markets that would minimize potential 
contestations with existing customers/users and more align with their expectations. As 
the firm focuses on certain technological layers and selective market, the positioning 
strategy tends to result in a more coopetition relationship (Khanagha et al., 2020) with 




avoid head-to-head competition with a powerful actor. Eventually, the repositioning 
enables the firm to achieve a competitive position in the nascent ecosystem. 
 Although this theoretical framework is based on a single case, it is also important 
to note that this process model is verifiable in other cases and settings. The proposed 
pathway can be observed in many large established firms attempting to compete in a 
nascent ecosystem shaped by a layered platform architecture. The introduction of the 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) platform by General Electric (GE) is illustrative of 
our proposed pathway. In 2013, GE introduced an IIoT platform that specialized in 
managing data & connections of machines by leveraging its expertise in machines design 
and exploiting its network of industrial customers (e.g. factories, aircraft). In 2016, the 
CEO decided to expand the investment in the industrial IoT (New York Times, 2018). As 
a result, the platform was broadened to include multiple technology layers such as cloud-
based software/applications, device/sensors management, and data analytics. At that time, 
the platform was positioned as the “operating system for the industrial internet” with 
complete features to serve “the wider industrial world” (New York Times, 2018). 
Nevertheless, two years later GE decided to move away from the all-purpose platform 
positioning and decided to refocus on specific industrial applications for selective 
industry customers. Overall, the GE case shows how the process model resulted from this 





6.2 Implications for Theory 
This subchapter discusses the contributions of this study to the various streams of 
innovation and strategic management literature. In particular, this study aims to contribute 
to the study on strategy in a nascent ecosystem, platform creation, and an incumbent’s 
response to technological changes. The following paragraphs describe the contributions 
to the three research streams. 
Platform positioning strategy in a nascent ecosystem. Although established 
firms increasingly adopt platform strategies (Evans and Gawer, 2016) to capture 
opportunities of digital technologies, how firms develop a new platform in a nascent 
ecosystem remain unclear  (Dattee et al., 2018). One of the main contributions of this 
study is to examine how established firms develop platform strategy in ambiguous 
settings such as nascent ecosystems, where actors’ roles are unspecified, and positions 
are up for grabs. This study demonstrates that when entering a nascent ecosystem a 
platform creator encounters strategic dilemmas in determining the platform architecture 
and the market scope due to the lack of knowledge on the ecosystem structure, the growth 
potential, and the fit between the opportunity and its existing capabilities. By identifying 
the key strategic considerations faced by the decision makers, this study extends the 
discussion on the entry strategy for nascent ecosystems (Eggers and Moeen, 2018). 
Moreover, prior research offers a relatively static view of positioning strategy within an 
established ecosystem where the roles of actors and their interdependencies relatively 
clear (Adner, 2017). Through a longitudinal analysis, this study reveals the dynamic of 
platform positioning strategies. Rather than adopting a consistent strategy throughout an 
ecosystem evolution, this study shows that a platform creator alternates between distinct 
positioning strategies over time. In doing so, this study brings a processual perspective to 
uncover how a certain strategy emerges and shifts at different milestones of the ecosystem 
evolution. Hence, this study responds to a call for taking into account temporality when 
studying platform strategies (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). 
Another central contribution of this study is a theoretical framework that explains 
how an established firm position its new platform in a nascent ecosystem. This study 
offers an alternative pathway of platform positioning beyond the widely-known get-big-
fast approach (Eisenmann et al., 2006) or an evolutionary step-by-step approach (Snihur 
et al., 2018) in platform strategy. Specifically, I identify an overlooked pathway of 
platform positioning which entails initially positioning the platform analogous to the 




potential value creation and capture, only later to adapt the positioning to the point that 
better correspond with the firm’s technical and social limitations. Rather than positioning 
a new platform distant from the firm’s legacies (Altman and Tripsas, 2015), this study 
reveals that position the platform analogous to its legacy (non-platform) ecosystem can 
be beneficial in the initial phase of a nascent ecosystem. Positioning the platform 
analogous to the firm’s legacies can solve the ‘chicken-egg problem’ of a new platform 
(Hagiu, 2014) since the firm can leverage its network of customers and partners to form 
an initial installed base. It may also reduce legitimacy challenges in new platform creation 
(Khanagha et al., 2020; Garud et al., 2020) by conforming with the expectations of 
resource providers. Nevertheless, I found that the platform creator could benefit by 
shifting to expansionary positioning in the later phase. In contrast with prior works 
(Dunne and Dougherty, 2016; Dattee et al., 2018), we found that delaying resource 
commitment when the ecosystem starts to gain a momentum can be counterproductive 
because it may contradict with the growth aspirations and prevent the firm to influence 
the course of ecosystem’s evolution. Expanding the platform positioning allows the firm 
to explore multiple emerging opportunities and enable gain a first-mover market position 
(Suarez et al., 2015), which gives reputation advantages and privilege to shape the 
ecosystem’s future. Instead of sustaining such an aggressive strategy (Eisenmann et al., 
2011), this study suggests that the platform creator could benefit from downward its 
position in the later stage, especially when the ecosystem becomes gradually structured 
and competitive. At this stage, an expansionary positioning can lead to intense 
competition with important actors that can be detrimental to the ecosystem’s progression 
(Ozcan and Santos, 2015). Moreover, the capability misfit which results from expansive 
explorations tends to increase organizational tensions (Gawer and Phillips, 2013). 
Therefore, a downward positioning strategy that could minimize potential contestation 
and better corresponds with its technology and market strength will enable the firm to 
establish a competitive position in the ecosystem. Overall, the processual framework 
uncovers the interplay between a firm strategy and nascent ecosystem evolution and 
reveals how and when certain positioning strategies could be beneficial in different 
milestones of ecosystem evolution. 
Finally, this study reveals the competitive dynamics of nascent digital ecosystems 
shape by layered-modular architecture (Yoo et al., 2010; Sturgeon, 2019). The research 
setting of this study, the IoT ecosystem, represents multi-level competitions of platform 
within and across layers (Porter and Heppelmann, 2014). I show that in this setting, a 




technical layers and market applications. In this case, the role of an actor in the platform 
ecosystem goes beyond a binary choice of keystone versus peripheral (Iansiti and Levien, 
2004b; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Cennamo and Santaló, 2013). This study adds a 
conceptual precision by theorising platform positioning strategy based on the range of 
technological layers and market applications a platform creator would cover. Moreover, 
this study also demonstrates how a platform creator could reposition itself by increasing 
or decreasing the scope of the technological layers and market applications. The research 
setting of this study also implies that the winner-take-all logic where platforms with large 
size of network win the entire market (Lee et al., 2006) is less likely to occur in an 
ecosystem consisted of nested platform ecosystems such as the IoT ecosystem. In this 
setting, it is unlikely for a single firm to dominate all technological layers due to the 
generative nature of the IoT and diversity of end-users. In such ecosystem, a shared 
leadership (Adner, 2017) and mutualism relationship (Khanagha et al., 2020) among 
different platform providers are expected to dominate the competitive dynamics rather 
than the monopolistic winner-take-all approach. Overall, this study teases out further 
nuances of platform competition dynamics (Cennamo, 2019) and enhances our 
understanding of how platform competition plays out in an ecosystem characterized by 
layered modular architecture. 
 Cognitive dimensions of platform creation. Second, this study brings cognitive 
dimensions on platform creation to better understand the complexities of platform 
dynamics in a nascent ecosystem (Dattee et al., 2018). Prior studies on platform strategy 
have predominantly focused on technological and economic dimensions (e.g. Baldwin 
and Woodard, 2009; Eisenmann et al., 2011) and rarely consider the cognitive aspects of 
platform creators. This study reveals that managerial cognitions play a crucial role in 
platform creation, especially in the highly ambiguous context such as nascent ecosystems. 
Specifically, this study shows how the choice of platform architecture and the market 
scope is influenced by the firm’s strategic frame which entails managerial assumptions 
of the ecosystem structure, the growth opportunities, and their fit with capability. Rather 
than performing a rational value chain analysis (Adner, 2006; Jacobides et al., 2006), I 
found that in nascent ecosystems managers make a prognosis on the activity 
configurations and interdependencies among actors since they lack knowledge during the 
early-stage of ecosystem formation. The managers also envision technological features 
that will be essential when the ecosystem matures in relation to the firm’s capabilities, 




demands (Moeen et al., 2020). The empirical findings also reveal that it is not only 
capabilities that affect firms’ decision in a nascent ecosystem (Helfat and Lieberman, 
2002; Moeen, 2017), but also cognition about those capabilities and their fitness with the 
anticipated opportunities. Interestingly, this study also shows how initial capabilities and 
legacy ecosystems inform decision making in a highly ambiguous environment. In line 
with the study by Gavetti and colleague (2005) on analogy thinking, I find that decision 
makers tend to transfer their beliefs about prior experiences to an ambiguous situation 
which inform the strategic frame. In addition, this study demonstrates how the strategic 
frame evolves and how it results in the changes in the platform architecture and scope. 
Overall, this study reveals that platform creators face more complex strategic options in 
determining the optimum platform position which goes beyond the rational technological 
or economic trade-offs as advocated by prior research (e.g. Zhu and Iansiti, 2012; 
Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Seamans and Zhu, 2014). By incorporating the cognitive 
dimensions, this study provides a more nuanced understanding of the platform creation 
process by an established firm (Hagiu, 2014; Dattee et al., 2018; Khanagha et al., 2020). 
 By explicating cognitive factors as a strategic driver of repositioning, this study also 
contributes to the research on platform repositioning. Prior research portrays 
repositioning decisions as a rational response to the new competitive dynamics in the 
ecosystem (Wang and Shaver, 2014; Seamans and Zhu, 2017). In this sense, external 
drivers such as the emergence of competition or changed in the customers’ preferences 
are considered as the main factors in platform reposition (Cennamo, 2019). Nevertheless, 
this study demonstrates that platform repositioning in a nascent ecosystem begins with 
the changes of the firm’s strategic frame which represents managers’ belief on the 
ecosystem structure, the growth opportunities, and their fit. In this case, managers 
anticipate the potential of competition and act based on the anticipation even before they 
experience the competition. Moreover, this study suggests that platform repositioning 
occurs mainly because of the change of managers’ assumptions toward the growth 
opportunities and their fit with the firm’s capabilities. In this case, platform repositioning 
in nascent ecosystems resembles ‘pivoting’ by new ventures (Kirtley and O’Mahony, 
2020) where strategic changes occur due to the shift on managers’ assumptions that 
underly their current strategy. Thus, this study enhances our understanding of the 
antecedents of platform repositioning.  
 Lastly, this study adds to the extant ecosystem literature by providing a 
microfoundations perspective (Felin et al., 2015; Foss and Pedersen, 2016) into strategies 




on the structure of an ecosystem (i.e. actors, roles, and interdependencies) shape a firm’s 
behaviour in a nascent ecosystem. In this vein, this study in line with prior works that 
examined the interplay between industry structure and managerial cognitions (e.g. 
Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007; Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). This study extends these 
works by proposing that, in the context of ecosystems, a firm not only develops 
assumptions about the rules of competition, but also interdependencies of partners or 
complementors for value creation and value capture. This study also reveals that a firm’s 
strategic actions are influenced by the way managers frame the nascent ecosystem. 
Specifically, I find that managers frame the nascent ecosystem relative to their legacy 
ecosystems (Benner and Tripsas, 2012) since the lack of references in the initial stage of 
ecosystem emergence. Our study further reveals that managers who cognitively frame the 
nascent ecosystem through a forward-looking lens (Gavetti, 2005) tend to acknowledge 
the transformative nature of the ecosystem and sense a broader set of emergent 
opportunities. On the contrary, when the strategic frame is heavily attached to the firm’s 
past legacies (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), managers tend to overlook the transformative 
potential of a nascent ecosystem. Therefore, in line with previous studies (e.g. Gavetti et 
al., 2005), I found that a competitive position in a nascent ecosystem may lie in the 
cognition of managers. Overall, this study enhances our understanding of the 
microfoundations of ecosystem strategy (Foss and Pedersen, 2016; Adner, 2017) by 
explicating the interplay between the ecosystem dynamics and managerial cognition. 
 Incumbents’ response to technological changes. By investigating the strategy 
process of an established firm in a nascent ecosystem, this study also contributes to a 
broader literature of incumbents’ adaptation to technological changes. Prior strategy 
literature generally considers technological changes as an exogenous factor in which 
incumbents’ response through adaptation (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Eggers and Park, 
2018). This study reveals that incumbents are not only reactively adapting to the 
environmental changes, but also can proactively shaping the trajectory of technology and 
business landscape to their advantages (Gavetti et al., 2017). Our empirical findings 
suggest mechanisms in which an incumbent advance its preferred evolutionary path of a 
nascent ecosystem through stimulating collective actions among its longstanding partners 
and users (Garud et al., 2002) and establishing a cognitive referent by leveraging its 
reputation in the legacy ecosystem (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Nevertheless, the case 
of TELECO shows that an incumbent tends to adapt its response in the latter stage, 




important partners. The longitudinal analysis precisely shows when firms apply the 
shaping and adapting approaches in different milestones of the ecosystem evolution. 
Overall, this study reveals the dynamic and emergent nature of incumbents’ response to 
technological changes in contrast to the deliberate and static approach than been portrayed 
in prior research (Kammerlander et al., 2018). 
 Finally, this study extends the research investigating the role of managerial 
cognition to firms’ responses toward emerging technologies (Kaplan, 2008a; Eggers and 
Kaplan, 2009; Eggers and Kaul, 2017) by identifying a different set of strategic frames 
that underlie a firm’s strategic actions over time. This study introduces three strategic 
frames an incumbent firm had which form by how managers understand ambiguous 
opportunities concerning the emerging technology (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008) and how 
managers evaluate the fit between the internal capabilities and the opportunities (Eggers 
and Kaplan, 2013). For example, I found that when managers believe in continuity with 
current technological expertise (Cattani, 2006), it tends to result in a strategic frame that 
encourages for an evolutionary approach toward the emerging technology. In contrast, 
when managers believe in the ‘superior opportunity’ of the emerging technology (Gavetti, 
2012), it will likely result in a strategic frame that leads to a more transformational 
approach. The longitudinal analysis offered by this study also relaxes the assumption that 
considers the cognitive frame as relatively static and immutable (Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000; Danneels, 2011a; Benner and Tripsas, 2012) by showing the dynamic of a firm’s 
strategic frames over time. In particular, this study reveals how successful explorations 
or experimentations (Ott et al., 2017) and experiential learning (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000) can trigger changes in the strategic frame. In this vein, we add to the recent study 
that argues for cognitive flexibility (Raffaelli et al., 2019) by explicating when and why 
a cognitive frame changes and the implication to the firm respond to technological 





6.3 Managerial Implications 
Our study also provides some important lessons for practitioners that engage in digital 
platform creation in a nascent ecosystem. First, the research has demonstrated that 
entering a nascent ecosystem through a platform introduction can secure the future 
competitiveness of an established firm if successfully managed. By introducing a digital 
platform in the early stage of ecosystem formation, an established firm not only can gain 
potential advantages through network effects but also can influence the course of the 
ecosystem’s future to its advantage. However, this study shows that devising a platform 
strategy in nascent ecosystems entails strategic challenges that result from ambiguity 
concerning the ecosystem structure and the associated opportunities; thus, require a more 
dynamic approach to successfully navigate these challenges. 
 This study offers an alternative pathway that can guide managers in developing and 
positioning a new digital platform in a nascent ecosystem. The proposed pathway 
especially relevant for established firms entering a nascent ecosystem that is formed by 
digital technologies that have a generative potential to produce a plethora of product-
market applications (e.g. IoT, Blockchain, 5G). This study suggests that in the initial 
phase of a nascent ecosystem, managers can benefit by designing the platform in line with 
the firm’s technological capabilities and organizational legacies. In this case, choosing a 
technical layer and a market application that is closer to the firm legacies will be less risky 
and costly and can prevent backlash from the internal or external organizations. 
Nevertheless, this approach allows the firm to form an installed base as well as establish 
an initial market positioning by leveraging the firm’s existing reputation and the network 
of customers and partners. However, this study suggests for the firm to expand its 
positioning as broad as possible when the ecosystem starts to gain market traction and 
when the platform has achieved a critical mass of users. It can be done by adding multiple 
new features for the whole technological layers and broadening the market segments. 
Expanding the platform positioning in this stage will increase its visibility and presence 
in the broader ecosystem and will allow the firm to explore multiple emerging areas. 
However, sticking with an aggressive approach in the later stage, especially when the 
ecosystem becomes gradually structured, will expose the firm with increased 
organizational tensions and ecosystem contestations. To avoid a hostile competition, the 
firm could opt to surrender some part of technical control and initiate more strategic 
partnerships with other powerful platform providers. At this phase, I find that it is 
beneficial for the firm to calibrate the platform by focusing on selective technological 




minimize potential contestations. As the ecosystem becomes gradually structured, 
managers can analyse the activities and actors in which the firm may have no control and 
have no direct contact to get a better overview of the indirect links among actors in that 
crucial for the ecosystem to coalesce. In this case, continuous environmental scanning 
and experiential learning will help the managers in devising an optimal positioning. 
 Finally, the dynamic approach of platform positioning in nascent ecosystems 
required not only organizational flexibility but also cognitive flexibility. This study 
suggests that while it is technically feasible to change the architecture and scope of the 
platform, the changes only occur when decision makers reframe their mental models. This 
study finds that managers need to appreciate the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding 
strategy-making in nascent ecosystems. In addition, managers should be willing to test 
their assumptions and be ready to change the course of action once it contradicted the 
prior belief. I found that maintaining a high degree of exploration activities is necessary 
to foster a flexible cognitive frame. The performance feedback from the exploration 
activities will increase the managers’ awareness of the emergent dynamics in the 
ecosystem and help them to clarify some misconceptions in their strategy. A flexible 
cognitive frame regarding emerging opportunities, the firm’s capabilities, and 
competitive boundaries will help to instigate strategic changes that necessary to adapt to 
the evolving nascent ecosystems. Furthermore, my observation at TELECO suggests that 
an established firm could benefit by organizing its platform initiatives as an independent 
unit separated from the non-digital platform business. The organizational separation will 
provide substantial flexibility for the managers to change the course of the platform 





CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes the report of this thesis research in the area of innovation 
management. It consists of two subsections. In the first subsection (7.1), the summary of 
findings and contributions is presented. Then, the second subsection (7.2) discusses the 
limitation of this study and the avenue for future research.  
7.1 Summary of Findings and Contributions 
By drawing on a longitudinal case study of a platform strategy development in a nascent 
ecosystem, this study offers theoretical insights that extend the understanding of platform 
creation in a highly ambiguous and uncertain context. The processual model explains 
three platform positioning strategies that an established firm can apply to achieve a 
competitive position in a nascent ecosystem. In particular, the model explains the 
different types of platform design and market scope that a firm may choose according to 
a different phase of ecosystem evolution. Therefore, this model offers a dynamic view on 
platform positioning as opposed to the static approach that has dominated platform 
research. Moreover, this model reveals the strategic frame i.e. managerial assumptions 
that guide the emergence of the platform strategy and trigger strategic changes. 
   In doing so, the model contributes to the growing body of literature on strategy in 
nascent ecosystems or industries as it seeks to address the challenges of strategy making 
under extreme ambiguity and uncertainty. Extensive research has recognized various 
tensions and organization challenges faced by firms in the early-stage of an ecosystem or 
industry formations (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018; Eggers 
and Moeen, 2018). While research has offered strategies and mechanisms of navigating 
evolving ecosystems for firms with product-based offerings (e.g. Benner and Tripsas, 
2012; Anthony et al., 2016), the strategy for developing platform-based offerings in 
nascent ecosystems is less explored (Khanagha et al., 2020). Thus, this study extends the 
existing research on nascent ecosystems by explicating the strategy of navigating 
uncertainty and ambiguity from the perspectives of a platform creator. By adopting a 
dynamic view on the platform creation process (McIntyre et al., 2020) this study provides 
further details on the emergence process of platform strategies and their temporal 
dynamics. In addition, this study extends research on platform strategy by going beyond 
technological and economic considerations on platform creation. Extant research on 
platform strategy tends to portray decision making on platform creation as rational 




McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). This study reveals that in an ambiguous and uncertain 
setting such as nascent ecosystems, platform decisions are predominantly shaped by 
managerial cognitions. Specifically, the model describes the strategic frame that shape 
platform strategies, which entails managers’ assumptions on the ecosystem structure, 
growth opportunity, and capability-opportunity fit. I further show how the changes in the 
strategic frame instigate changes in the platform strategy. Hence, this thesis provides 
novel insights on the dynamic of the platform creation process by explicating the interplay 
between, the ecosystem dynamics, the managerial cognitions, and the platform strategy. 
  Moreover, the findings of this study enhance the understanding of the incumbent’s 
responses to technological changes. Extant research generally suggests technological 
changes as an exogenous factor in which established firms adapt to the changes (Eggers 
and Park, 2018). Nevertheless, the case of TELECO suggests that an established firm not 
just needs to adapt to exogenous technological changes, but also to mobilize efforts to 
shape the change trajectory to its advantage. In particular, the longitudinal analysis 
suggests when an established firm may take a more proactive approach in shaping the 
ecosystems and shift to an adaptive approach in order to make the ecosystem coalesce. 
By doing that, this thesis highlights a more dynamic and complex response of 
incumbent’s toward technological changes. Drawing on the research on the role of 
managerial cognitions on incumbent’s adaptation (e.g. Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Eggers 
and Kaul, 2017), this study also suggests cognitive flexibility as an important aspect for 
adaptation (Raffaelli et al., 2019). In this regard, this study shows the importance of the 
ability to revise strategic frames during the process of adaptation to technological 
changes. Lastly, the processual framework resulted from this thesis can guide practicing 
managers who deal with platform creation in nascent ecosystems. This study provides 
suggestions for the platform designs and market scope that a manager can choose in the 
different milestones of the ecosystem. It also suggests the required capabilities to 






7.2 Limitations and Agenda for Future Research 
While the empirical findings offer new theoretical and practical insights, this study has 
some limitations that correspond to promising avenues for future research. First, this 
research mainly captured the firm-level strategy development of a focal actor in a nascent 
ecosystem. The scope of this study is limited to report the interactions of a focal firm with 
relevant actors instead of all members’ interactions at the ecosystem level. While this 
study captured the interaction between a focal actor (TELECO) with potential customers 
(Mobile operator) and complementors (device manufacturers and App providers), it did 
not focus on the interaction with direct competitors or disruptive entrants (Snihur et al., 
2018). Recent research indicates that the choice of platform design can be influenced by 
direct competitors’ architectural configuration (Cennamo, 2018). Although we did not 
find such indications in the TELECO’s case, it can be an interesting avenue for future 
studies to investigate how the positioning of direct competitors influences the choice of 
platform’s positioning of the focal actor. This study also did not capture the effect of 
government regulations on the ecosystem dynamics and the subsequent platform strategy. 
Recent research indicates that the absence of supporting regulations could hamper the 
progress of nascent ecosystems (Moeen et al., 2020). Platform creators may need to 
circumvent regulations or change their platform designs and business model to navigate 
nascent ecosystems (Garud et al., 2020). Therefore, another interesting research avenue 
is to investigate the interplay between regulation, ecosystem dynamics, and platform 
strategy. In addition, this study focuses on the ‘high-level’ aspect of platform strategies 
i.e. positioning strategy. Research that puts more focus on platform governance such as 
the degree of openness and technical performances (Cennamo, 2019), and their impact 
on the firm’s competitiveness in nascent ecosystems can provide new insights on platform 
governances and orchestration. Besides that, this study advocates a processual and 
dynamic view to understand the process of platform creation in the nascent stage of an 
ecosystem. Future studies can take a longer time frame to uncover the persistence of the 
platform in a full life cycle of an ecosystem (nascent-mature-decline) and compare the 
platform strategy development in multiple nascent ecosystems (McIntyre et al., 2020). 
 This research invites other scholars to investigate the cognitive dimensions of 
platform creation. However, this study only focuses on the cognitive process of decision 
makers at a firm level rather than at the ecosystem level. More recent studies indicate the 
legitimacy challenges of new platform creators and show the importance of socio-
cognitive strategies in dealing with such challenges (Ansari et al., 2016; Khanagha et al., 




where firms try to shape the perceptions of others toward the firm’s preferred ecosystem’s 
future during the expansionary positioning strategy. Future studies can bring this forward 
by investigating the strategies a platform creator may use to solve legitimacy challenges 
and achieve optimal distinctiveness in nascent ecosystems. Moreover, future research can 
examine how collective actors in a nascent ecosystem perceived opportunities and 
competition (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008), and how it affects the ecosystem’s evolution. In 
addition, this study only focuses on one aspect of managerial cognitions i.e. strategic 
frame. Future research can also take into account other aspects of managerial cognitions 
such as managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) or motivation (Eggers and Kaul, 2018). 
Another aspect that worth further investigation is the role of emotion in strategy 
development in an ambiguous and uncertain environment. Recent studies show that 
emotional frames can influence incumbents’ innovation adoption (Vuori and Huy, 2016; 
Raffaelli et al., 2019). Thus, understanding the interplay between managerial cognition 
and emotions toward the firm’s strategic action in nascent ecosystems is a promising 
research avenue. 
 Finally, another important direction for future research is the relation between the 
platform creation activities and positioning strategies of the firm’s business model. In 
TELECO’s case, the firm’s initiatives in the IoT space was fully supported by the top 
management team at the corporate level. Moreover, TELECO’s technological capability 
was relatively aligned with the IoT technology. The IoT initiatives were organized as a 
dedicated unit separated from the core businesses and with a high degree of autonomy. 
However, many of the incumbent firms which not born as a digital platform company 
often face inertia and organizational tensions when adopting a platform business model 
(Gawer and Phillips, 2013; Svahn et al., 2017). In this case, the platform business has the 
potential to disrupt the firm core businesses. Research on the change management to 
overcome internal resistance and other organizational barriers during the adoption of the 
platform business model can shed light on the success factors of platform adoption by 
incumbent firms. Furthermore, research has emphasized the role of dynamic capabilities 
(David J Teece, 2007) and business model innovations (Chesbrough, 2010) as critical 
factors for firms to successfully evolve their business model in the highly dynamic 
settings such as nascent ecosystems. Therefore, future studies could also look at the 
impact of different organizational capabilities on the platform creation in nascent 
ecosystems. Comparative studies of multiple cases of incumbent firms could provide new 
insights into the organizational characteristics and antecedents of the success of platform 
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Appendix 1. Interview Protocol 
1. Introduction of research project. Asking consent for recording. 
2. Profile of the Interviewee 
a. Respondents current position and job description 
b. Respondents’ involvement in the IoT initiatives 
3. TELECO’s general initiatives at the IoT 
a. Description of TELECO’s vision and objective for IoT. 
b. The history and background of TELECO’s at IoT, since the beginning (if 
applicable, depends on the interviewee’s experience). 
c. Main milestones of the development and strategy. 
4. IoT Platform Strategies 
a. The description of the IoT platform (current generation). 
b. The comparison of the current generation IoT platform with the earlier 
generations in terms of technical features, business models, and market 
positioning. 
c. The partnership, ecosystem strategy of the platform in different milestones 
(if applicable). 
d. The advantages and disadvantages of certain platform strategy. 
e. The interviewee’s experienced challenges or tensions in executing the part 
of the platform strategy.  
5. Managerial assumptions and cognitions 
a. The rationale of a particular platform strategy. 
b. The interviewee’s view/interpretation of the ecosystem structure (i.e. roles 
of TELECO and others at the IoT), the growth opportunity of the IoT for 
TELECO, and the fit between the opportunities and TELECO’s 
capabilities. 
c. The interviews’ opinion on the reasons of the strategy changes. 
6. Closing 
a. Ask if there is any question that should be asked by the interviewer to 
understand platform strategies. 




Appendix 2. Information Sheet for Respondents 
Research project:  
“Exploration of emerging businesses by an established firm in a nascent IoT ecosystem”  
Researcher: Fathiro Putra (TELECO/University of Leeds) – Fathiro.putra@teleco.com 
Project Supervisor: Dr. Saeed Khanagha (TELECO) – saeed.khanagha@teleco.com ; 
Prof. Krsto Pandza (University of Leeds) – K.Pandza@leeds.ac.uk  
What is the purpose of the research project? 
The purpose of this study is to understand the strategy development process of a large and 
established firm for exploring opportunities in the nascent Internet of Things ecosystem. 
This study also seeks to understand how a non-platform born company develops a 
platform-based business. The findings of this research help to address contemporary 
challenges TELECO is facing in developing emerging business in IoT. 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
This research is part of the Complex and Open Innovation in Networked Society 
(COINS), a collaboration project between TELECO and the University of Leeds. This 
project is funded by the European Commission under the EU horizon 2020 scheme.  
Why were you invited to participate? 
You are invited to participate because we feel that your work at TELECO is relevant and 
particularly important to inform this research. We believe that this research project will 
greatly benefit from your expertise and experience. However, there is no obligation for 
you to participate in this research. 
What are the benefits of taking part in this research project? 
It is expected that the result of this research can help managers at TELECO to address 
contemporary challenges in developing emerging businesses in IoT. However, there are 
no immediate benefits and material compensations from participating in this research. If 
requested, a summary report of the research findings can be provided. 
What will happen if you decide to participate? 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to do an interview with the researcher. The 
interview will be conducted in English from about half to an hour. You will be asked to 
give your consent to record the interview. You will be asked several questions related to 
your involvement in the IoT initiatives at TELECO. You are free to decline any particular 
question if you do not want to answer or to make certain answers off the record. You are 
also free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason by contacting the researcher. 
You will be asked for a follow-up interview if needed, but feel free to decline or accept. 
Will your participation in this research be kept confidential?  
Yes, all interviews, documents, and observations will be anonymised. It will not be 
possible to identify anyone from the written results of the interviews since no private 
names will be mentioned or linked in any research material. It is also important to note 




What will happen to the results of this research?  
The results of this research will be used in a thesis for a doctorate study in innovation 
management. The empirical findings of this research will also be presented in academic 
conferences and published in scholarly journals and books. 
Who to contact if you have additional questions? 
Please feel free to contact the researcher via email at Fathiro.putra@teleco.com or connect 
via the Skype messenger at @Fathiro.putra 
What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted? 
If you are not happy with how the research was conducted or have any complaints, please 
contact the project supervisor on behalf of TELECO: Dr. Saeed Khanagha at 
saeed.khanagha@teleco.com.  
 
 
